From peacemaking to 'vigorous self-defense': US foreign policy and the multinational force in Lebanon 1982-1984 by Varady, Corrin
 1 
 
 
 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
From Peacemaking to ‘Vigorous Self-Defense’:  
US Foreign Policy and the Multinational Force in Lebanon 
1982-1984 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corrin Varady 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of 
the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, London, March 2015. 
 
 2 
 
 
Declaration  
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD 
degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my 
own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others 
(in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other 
person is clearly identified in it).  
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is 
permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be 
reproduced without my prior written consent.  
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the 
rights of any third party.  
I declare that my thesis consists of 100,326 words.  
 
Statement of use of third party for editorial help  
 
I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, 
spelling and grammar by Ms Demetra Frini.  
 3 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis is a study on the use of military force in United States peacemaking in 
Lebanon between 1982 and 1984. It argues that the failure of the Reagan 
Administration to understand accurately the complex political landscape of the 
Lebanese Civil War resulted in the US and the Multinational Force in Beirut 
becoming intertwined in the broader Lebanese conflict. Because of this, President 
Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz applied a policy focusing on 
military force with a vague peacekeeping vision which led to catastrophic US 
casualties. This thesis also argues that US policy in Lebanon was inaccurately 
designed because, from the outset, Washington did not see Lebanon as a key policy 
frontline. However, the Administration’s failed attempts to resolve the crisis and 
Reagan’s personal pursuit for international credibility bound the US to one of the 
world’s most complicated and violent conflicts. 
By examining newly released archival material this thesis will show how the 
foundations of the US’ interventionist policy in Lebanon came from the Reagan 
Administration’s desire to see the US as the key military power in the Middle East 
rather than protecting Lebanese sovereignty or containing the Soviets. This thesis 
offers a fresh perspective on the impact of the US intervention and the decision-
making drivers that led Reagan into the Lebanese Civil War. It challenges the notion 
that Reagan deployed US Marines under the ideals of international peacekeeping. 
Rather it will argue that the Multinational Force withdrew from Lebanon as a failed 
military force having made little progress. 
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Introduction 
 
On 25 August 1982, Reagan appealed to the heroism of the 850 US marines who were 
bound for Lebanon under the Multinational Force (MNF),1 stating that ‘you are tasked 
to be once again what Marines have been for more than 200 years - peacemakers.’2 
The Reagan Administration charged the Marines with a mission, beyond the realms of 
the UN or NATO, to intervene militarily in what Reagan called ‘this long-tortured 
city.’3 The Multinational Force I (MNFI) arrived as a limited force of fewer than 2000 
international troops, entrusted with overseeing the implementation of the Israeli-
Palestinian ceasefire agreement and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
fighters’ expeditious withdrawal from Beirut.  
 Following the massacre of many hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese 
civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, from 16-18 September 1982, 
Reagan held a press conference at the Oval Office, declaring that ‘there is little that 
words can add, but there are actions we can and must take to bring that nightmare to 
an end.’4 Little did Reagan realize that his commitment to action over words would 
mark the beginning of a nightmare for the US itself.  
  As Reagan unwittingly committed himself to a violent conflict, he failed to 
realize that this would eventually have tragic and humiliating consequences for the 
                                                
1 For reasons of specificity, the Multinational Force (MNF) will be spilt into two distinct 
bodies, namely Multinational Force I (MNFI), from 29 August-10 September 1982 and 
Multinational Force II (MNFII) from September 20 1982-17 February 1984. For the purpose 
of this research, the broader reference to the Multinational Force (MNF) will include both 
MNFI and MNFII. 
2 Statement by President Reagan [Message to US Marine Forces Participating in the 
Multinational Force in Beirut, Lebanon], 25 August 1982, Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library (hereafter RRPL), p.1. 
3 ibid. 
4 [Address to the Nation Announcing the Formation of the New Multinational Force in 
Lebanon], 20 September 1982, RRPL, p.1. 
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US in general and his Administration in particular. By October 1983, the presence of 
the Multinational Force II (MNFII) had escalated to 5800, French, Italian and British 
troops.5 The intensification of the conflict and the MNFII’s offensive engagement led 
to the force sustaining devastating casualties. By 17 February 1984, with the final 
withdrawal of the US marine contingent from Lebanon and redeployment of the 
Marine Amphibious Units (MAU) back to the Mediterranean Sea, the key decision-
makers in the Reagan Administration questioned if any good had come from the US 
intervention in Lebanon. 6  Indeed, this was a time for reflection. The US had 
withdrawn without completing any of its initial mission objectives and left Lebanon 
as a failed state, still plagued with violent sectarian and regional conflict.7 In reference 
to the US intervention in Lebanon, US Secretary of State, George Shultz, stated, ‘I 
can't resist using that old image that the light you see at the end of the tunnel may be 
the train coming towards you.’8  
  This thesis examines peacemaking and the use of military intervention in US 
foreign policy in Lebanon from 1982-1984. The Reagan Administration’s 
intervention through the deployment of the MNF is an example of a questionable US 
operation that sought to bring peace through the use of military force. Outlining five 
major phases of US policy, this research will consider the period from August 1982, 
following Israel’s Operation Peace for Galilee, until the withdrawal of US Marines 
and the collapse of the MNFII in February 1984. The focus of this analysis is the shift 
in US policy from peacemaking to the use of military force. Several key research 
                                                
5 ‘5800 “soldats de la paix”’, Le Monde, 25 October 1983, p.1. 
6 [Statement on the Situation in Lebanon], 6 February 1984, University of Texas, Online: 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/20684c.htm, Accessed 20 March 2014. 
7 Ralph Hallenbeck, ‘Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York: 
Praeger, 1991), pp 123-134, xi. 
8 Bernard Gwertzman, ‘Washington Frustration’, New York Times (hereafter NYT), 17 
February 1984, p.1. 
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questions relating to US policy in Lebanon and the MNF are explored here: namely; 
was Lebanon of such strategic importance for the US as a policy frontline that Reagan 
risked the possibility of long-term conflict? What were the key drivers affecting US 
policy in Lebanon, specifically in relation to the Israeli, Syrian, Palestinian and Soviet 
influence? Was the use of military force responsible for the MNFI and MNFII’s 
inefficiencies and failures? 
 
Original Contribution and Arguments 
The original contribution of this thesis is threefold. It provides a comprehensive, 
detailed analysis of the executive level US decision-making during the Lebanese Civil 
War from 1982-1984, based on US documents that have only recently been 
declassified. It also adds to the existing scholarly literature on the civil war, especially 
the ‘internal’ and non-Christian narratives of the conflict. Finally, and most 
importantly, the research findings re-calibrate the historical judgment of the 
intervention by proposing an alternative framework. Rather than focusing on whether 
or not the initial mission objectives were executed effectively, this thesis posits that a 
thorough examination of the thinking behind the mandates, orders and escalations is 
required in order to truly determine the success or failure of US policy in Lebanon. 
An in-depth analysis of the ways in which the mandates continually changed 
throughout the deployment of the MNF will demonstrate that Lebanon, in the early 
1980s, represented an untenable landscape that neither the UN nor the US could 
possibly control.9  
                                                
9 Theodor Hanf, ‘Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation’, 
(London: Centre for Lebanese Studies, Tauris & Co, 1993), pp.551-566. 
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This thesis advances three key arguments regarding US policy in Lebanon and 
the MNF’s history. First, building upon the dominant academic views that claim that 
the MNF (both MNFI and MNFII) was an example of a failed military-led 
peacekeeping mission, it will be argued here that US policy in Lebanon was   
conceptually flawed due to the Reagan Administration’s failure to accurately 
recognise Lebanon’s complex consociational and sectarian dynamics.10 One example 
of such miscalculation was Shultz and Reagan’s unwavering support for Christian 
Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, whose political impotence in the crisis impeded 
the process of national reconciliation and unity.11  
  Second, this thesis reasons that the newly-elected Reagan Administration 
became involved in Lebanon because Reagan saw this as an easy way to resolve 
several Palestinian-Israeli issues. If successful, the MNFI intervention could have 
been Reagan’s equivalent of the Camp David Accords mediated by President Jimmy 
Carter. Instead, the deployment of the US military force weakened Reagan’s 
commitment to peacekeeping and quickly escalated US military engagement. As a 
result, this created an uncontrollable spiral of offensive and defensive policy 
measures, thus transforming the US-led peacekeeping force into an active party in the 
internal Lebanese crisis. By committing themselves to unrealistic, lofty goals, Reagan 
and Shultz unintentionally bonded themselves to resolving both the complex 
                                                
10 Ramesh Thakur, ‘International Peacekeeping, UN Authority and US Power’, Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political, Vol. 12, 1987, pp.461-492; Ann Marie Baylouny, ‘US Foreign 
Policy in Lebanon’, in Robert Looney, ed., Handbook on U.S. Middle East Relations, 
(London: Routledge, 2009), pp.310-323, 315; Theodor Hanf, ‘Coexistence in Wartime 
Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation’, pp.174-175; Agnes Korbani, ‘U.S. 
Intervention in Lebanon, 1958 and 1982: Presidential Decisionmaking’, (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1991), p.94 & Ramesh Thakur, ‘International Peacekeeping in Lebanon: United 
Nations Authority and Multinational Force’, (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987). 
11 James Nathan & James Oliver, ‘United States Foreign Policy and World Order’, 
(Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), p.469. 
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Lebanese and the wider regional conflict, which the US neither understood nor could 
handle.  
  Thirdly, this thesis argues that the Reagan Administration’s biggest mistake 
was the establishment of the MNFII in September 1982, as its construction was 
impractical, ambiguous and even – in the words of Colin Powell – ‘goofy from the 
beginning.’ 12  It was never the Reagan Administration’s intention to become 
offensively engaged in the Lebanese crisis. However, with the creation of the 
MNFII’s free wielding principles and incremental escalation policies, particularly 
regarding the use of military force, the US became trapped. Avoiding a public defeat 
became the Reagan Administration’s primary focus as it struggled to protect its 
credibility.  
 
Thesis Structure 
Chapter One outlines the history of Lebanon and the Lebanese Civil War from the 
foundation of the modern state to the outbreak of the initial Christian-Palestinian 
conflict and finally the 1982 Israeli invasion to provide background and context for 
the subsequent chapters. Chapter Two outlines the history of US policy and decision-
making in the Middle East and Lebanon, specifically focusing on two key periods, the 
Eisenhower Administration’s intervention under Operation Blue Bat in 1958 and the 
Carter Administration’s non-interventionist policy from 1978-1981. This background 
illustrates the US foreign policy context and more specifically the discontinuities in 
US policy in Lebanon prior to Reagan’s intervention. 
                                                
12 Lou Cannon, ‘President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime’, (New York: Public Affairs, 
2000), p.354. 
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This thesis is then structured chronologically in accordance with the five 
phases of US policy in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984. Chapter Three discusses the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the PLO in Lebanon as a backdrop to 
the eventual landing of US troops and the MNFI’s inauguration from 26 August-10 
September 1982. It argues that the MNFI was established in order to enable Reagan to 
leave his mark on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and illustrate his 
Administration’s interventionist foreign policy. Chapter Four examines the MNFII’s 
first phase, namely, the decision for US marines to return to Lebanon on 20 
September 1982, and posits that the MNFII’s mandate was so ambiguous that it 
eventually led to the force’s ‘interposition’ between the Israeli Defense Force and the 
Syrian Armed Forces. The chapter also outlines Shultz’s involvement in the Israeli-
Lebanese May 17th Agreement as a diplomatic means for the US to prepare for a 
possible withdrawal. Chapter Five deals with the Soviet-Syrian alliance due to the 
increasing US-Syrian tensions in 1983 and the MNFII’s operational evolution from 
‘peacemaking’ to ‘aggressive self defense’ to, finally, ‘vigorous self defense.’ It 
argues that, due to the failure of US diplomatic attempts to coerce Israel and Syria to 
reach a lasting ceasefire, the Reagan Administration moved towards an escalation of 
the MNFII and establishment of a separate US military force. Chapters Four and Five 
also posit that the MNFII’s mandate had changed so significantly since the MNFI’s 
initial deployment in 1982 that no semblance of peacekeeping remained by October 
1983, and that this change was directly responsible for the US becoming an active 
target within the Lebanese conflict. Chapter Six examines US responses to the 23 
October, 1983 US Marine Barracks bombing and its impact on US military strategy in 
Lebanon. It argues that the bombings placed the Reagan Administration under great 
domestic and congressional pressure to withdraw quickly and therefore find a 
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credible, face-saving exit from the Lebanese crisis. Chapter Seven covers the final 
days of the US in Lebanon, with Reagan and Shultz’s attempts to secure a last-ditch 
success. This chapter discusses how the Reagan Administration resigned Lebanon’s 
fate to Syrian dominance and examines how Shultz and Reagan distanced themselves 
from the humiliation of the MNFII’s failure. The final two chapters suggest that US 
policy at the end of the MNFII was determined exclusively by the need to find a face-
saving exit for US troops rather than due to any concern about stability or security in 
Lebanon.  
 
Analytical Framework 
The conceptual framework employed here to analyze the empirical data is foreign 
policy analysis, focusing on Reagan and Shultz as the MNF’s key architects.  
However, this does not mean that Reagan and Shultz were the only actors in the 
policy decisions. This research will also examine the inter-governmental, 
organisational perspectives of foreign policy and the roles of the National Security 
Advisor, National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff and, most importantly, 
Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Alexander Haig. 
Furthermore, the thesis analyzes the broader process of policy development, as well 
as the final executive orders, by questioning Reagan’s full knowledge of the policy 
details laid out by the other members of the Administration.13 Scott accurately argues 
that the Reagan Administration’s constant vacillation on use of military force and 
Reagan’s fluctuating personal involvement in foreign policy decisions makes 
                                                
13 Constantine Menges’s memoirs, as special Assistant to President Reagan, labels the 
executive decision makers noted in this thesis as manipulative and deceitful. Constantine 
Menges, ‘Inside the National Security Council: The True story of the making and unmaking 
of Reagan’s Foreign Policy’, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), pp.11, 346-347. 
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theoretical modelling under a unitary approach difficult.14 Indeed, the ambiguous 
nature of the Administration’s interventionist foreign policy is particularly evident in 
Lebanon.  
  While this thesis does not undertake a comprehensive analysis of US foreign 
policy-making, it will draw upon the leading approaches that apply to the Reagan 
Administration’s intervention in Lebanon. The initial decision to intervene under the 
MNFI followed a rational decision-making model whereby the Administration 
outlined areas of national interest and how the net benefit of the opportunities for the 
Administration seemingly outweighed the potential risks.15 However, subsequent 
decisions revolved around indeterminate, reactionary diplomatic and military 
responses to the changing, uncontrollable Lebanese context best seen through the 
incremental decision-making model.16 With this incremental decision-making came 
greater input from other levels of executive decision-making within Washington, thus 
diluting the structure of rational decision making, as illustrated under a bureaucratic 
political approach.17  
This thesis also draws upon the risk aversion theory suggested by Kahneman 
and Tversky’s ‘Prospect Theory’, which argues that decision-makers will be risk 
averse when decisions relate to specific gains and risk seeking when decisions involve 
a certain loss. This counters the traditional decision-making proposition suggested by 
                                                
14 James Scott, ‘Deciding to Intervene: the Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy’, 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), pp.6-13. 
15 Thomas Brewer, ‘American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction’, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp.27-46.  
16 Rainey, Ronquillo & Avellaneda, ‘Decision Making in Public Organisation’, in Paul Nutt & 
David Wilson, eds., Handbook of Decision Making’, (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 
pp.361-365. 
17 Morton Halperin & Priscilla Clapp, ‘Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy’ 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 2006), pp. 243-300; Jerel Rosati, ‘Developing a 
Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective’, World 
Politics’ Vol.33, No.2, 1981, pp.234-252 & Lauren Holland, ‘The U.S. Decision to Launch 
Operation Desert Storm: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis’, Armed Forces & Society, Winter 
1999, pp.219-242. 
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Bernoulli’s ‘Expected Utility Theory’, which states that a decision-maker will choose 
between risky decisions by comparing the expected value. Prospect Theory allows 
this research to challenge the view that Reagan and Shultz’ continual policy 
amendments occurred not because they calculated the potential or expected gains but 
rather in the face of significant loss.18 
 Contextually, this thesis also examines, in brief, Eisenhower and Carter’s 
foreign policy construction in both of their forays into Lebanon. This will create a 
more comprehensive US-Lebanese model, beyond the MNF intervention alone, 
considering the bureaucratic politics and inter-organisational models of International 
Relations.19  For example, under his Administration, Eisenhower made brothers John 
Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles Secretary of State and Director of the CIA, 
respectively. In contrast, Carter and Reagan created an oppositional environment 
within the executive level of decision-making as evidenced by the Brzezinski-Vance 
mistrust and Shultz-Weinberger rivalry.20 Usually, White House rifts amongst the 
President’s advisors led to a power play for the President’s attention. For example, 
one such debate that is highlighted in this thesis was created between Weinberger’s 
doctrine on the careful marriage of military force and diplomacy against Shultz’s 
staunch support for the use of force as foreign policy. This does not suggest that 
Weinberger was an anti-interventionist but rather that he saw intervention and force 
as a supportive component rather than as leading foreign policy. Weinberger believed 
that: ‘US diplomacy not backed by military strength is ineffectual. Leverage, as well 
                                                
18 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky. ‘Prospect Theory: an Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk’, Econometrica, 1979, pp.263–291. 
19 Patrick Haney, ‘Organising for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers, and the 
Management of Decision Making’, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980). 
20 Richard Halloran, ‘Shultz and Weinberger disputing use of force’, NYT, November 30 
1984, p.1. 
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as good-will is required. Power and diplomacy are not alternatives: They must go 
together…’21   
 
Literature Review and Historiography 
Since the landing of US marines in Lebanon in 1958 under President Eisenhower’s 
Operation Blue Bat, analysts and political scientists have questioned the US 
intervention in Lebanon’s motives and objectives.22 Although several seminal works 
have focused on the Lebanese Civil Wars, Eisenhower’s intervention, and US policy 
in the Middle East and Arab-Israeli conflict, limited primary archival work has been 
undertaken on the 1982-1984 MNFI and MNFII deployments.23 Although this thesis 
examines US policy construction and the deployment of the MNF in Lebanon, it is 
also important to outline the Reagan Administration’s construction of US foreign 
policy more broadly as well as the existing historical narratives regarding the MNF in 
Lebanon. US involvement in the broader Arab-Israeli conflict has inspired scholars to 
produce narratives that focus on the regional instabilities.24 However the 1975-1990 
Lebanese Civil War’s internal political and military complexities also provide a 
context for rich historical analysis that is essential for this thesis.  
                                                
21 Hallenbeck, ‘Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, p.xiv. 
22 Robert Stookey, ‘The United States’, in Edward Haley & Lewis Snider, eds., Lebanon in 
Crisis: Participants and Issues’,(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979). 
23 Michael Hudson, ‘The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon’, (Boulder 
and London: Westview Press, 1985), Kamal Salibi, ‘A house of Many Mansions- the History 
of Lebanon Reconsidered’, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1993); Theodor Hanf, 
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Beydoun, ‘Le Liban: Itineraires dans une guerre incivile’, (Beirut: Cermoc, 1993). 
24 Naseer Aruri, 'U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict,' in The United States and the 
Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi (Albany: University 
of New York Press, 1993), pp.89-124. 
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US foreign policy in the Middle East and the Reagan Doctrine 
 
Given the contested associated narratives of US foreign policy, it is important to 
outline the historical perspectives relevant to the subsequent research regarding the 
Reagan Administration and foreign policy decision-making.25 Alden, Aran, Scott and 
Peterson highlight the importance of the executive level leadership in the Reagan 
Administration’s construction of US foreign policy in the Middle East, specifically 
focusing on the Reagan-Shultz relationship.26  However, Manley argues that the 
National Security Council and Congress’ influence rendered isolated Presidential or 
Oval Office foreign policy decisions almost impossible. Lindsay, Sayrs and Steger 
also argue that the Administration’s policy decisions were even more accountable to 
domestic public opinion than to the machinations of Capitol Hill.27 To this, Peterson 
adds an important study regarding the three broad forms that US foreign policy 
                                                
25 For historiographical frameworks for examining US foreign policy see: Dominic 
Sachsenmaier, ‘Global Perspectives on Global History: Theories and Approaches in a 
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Jonathan Gorman, ‘Historical Judgment’, (Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 
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construction must consider; namely, institutional, constitutional and issue oriented 
policy development.28 Most significantly, the author argues that executive decision-
makers under the Reagan Administration needed to determine how to present a 
military intervention in a foreign country as a national interest-oriented policy before 
either the legal or institutional justifications in order to gain the domestic American 
public’s support.29 It is important for this thesis to ascertain the extent of public 
opinion’s role in the US decision-making process, as well as identify how the US 
congress or the NSC shaped and pressured the Administration’s policy decisions. 
 Reagan is often characterized as an aggressive, confrontational ‘Rambo-style’ 
figure, whose foreign policy was merely a reverberation of bold ideological and 
doctrinal battles.30 From this archetype of the ‘trigger-happy cowboy’ grew the 
broader, more relevant discourse of US imperialism in the 1980s.31 The degree to 
which the Reagan Administration considered global interventionism as a primary 
foreign policy goal is seen, in Lebanon’s case, through the US’ emerging international 
identity as the global peacemaker. However, the international and domestic US 
context in the 1970s was politically relevant to US foreign policy choices in the 1980s 
as it created both limitations of absolute executive power and substantive momentum 
with regard to certain policy areas. Every US President also experienced a diminished 
sense of freedom following the Vietnam War (especially at an Agency level, such as 
the CIA).32 The Vietnam War left behind a more engaged American public, resulting 
in all public foreign policy missions being open to criticism by both Congress and the 
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general public. As Manley and Layne note, the Vietnam War’s legacy left Reagan 
with both public and legalistic challenges with regard to pursuing an interventionist 
policy globally. Similarly, Congressional support for interventions became 
conditional on immediate national security interests.33 For example, in the context of 
the 1979 Iranian revolution and the Soviets in Afghanistan, the US had to manage its 
proxy involvement with great care if it were to convince Congress of the long-term 
US interests in these phenomena.34 Kolko sees the lasting effects of the Vietnam War 
as binding the US to a more subtle imperialist policy, where Reagan’s 
confrontational, impulsive rhetoric had to be equally measured with caution and 
rationality.  
 Pervin, Spiegel and Quandt suggest that US policies in Lebanon and the 
Middle East were as much a pursuit for regional recognition as the identification of 
the US as the primary international peacekeeper.35 Without directly contradicting this 
argument, Taylor carefully qualifies this by stating that US-Lebanese relations were 
defined more by the need for the stronger US military identity in the region than by 
any commitment to peacekeeping and international law. 36  Moreover, Hanf and 
Stookey raise the question of whether the US in the Middle East during the 1980s was 
in fact a broader part of the Cold War and of the degree to which Soviet influence, at 
the international level, shaped the Reagan Administration’s policy in Lebanon, a 
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question which is fundamental to this thesis.37 To this, Velasco responds that the Cold 
War provided the necessary momentum for Reagan’s foreign policy ‘crusades’ 
because the US President himself was set on confronting global communism.38 
Similarly, Hanf’s research on the Lebanese Civil War argues that any US or Soviet 
interference in Lebanon during the 1980s should be analyzed under a broader Cold 
War framework, where superpower confrontation was indirectly played out through 
the Israeli-PLO and Israeli-Syrian conflict.39  
 Stein argues that Reagan inherited an international context characterised by 
the increasing Soviet-US tension and heightened awareness of ‘Third World’ 
countries as the frontier for a proxy conflict between the two superpowers. 40  
Hallenbeck, Taylor and Nelson also argue that the US pursuit of domination in the 
region is particularly important in the context of the superpower dynamic by linking 
the US to a legacy of western imperialism and viewing Soviet influence as a product 
of a Tsarist legacy of expansionism, both poised at the frontiers of the ‘Third 
World.’41 Soviet involvement in the Middle East is defined as ‘a special endeavour to 
promote a Soviet-sponsored “anti-imperialist” front against the United States and 
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Israel.’42 Meanwhile, US ‘imperial’ policy aimed ‘to contain Soviet expansionist 
moves by filling the power vacuum emerging from the incipient withdrawal of Great 
Britain and France from the area.’43 Certainly, a historically Christian, pro-European 
ideology allowed the US to align itself with nations and regimes that had recently 
abandoned their French and British sponsors and Fieldhouse’s thesis maintains that 
US interests in Lebanon evolved directly out of the power vacuum left behind by the 
French.44  
  Westad demonstrates how Reagan’s active engagement with the ‘Third 
World’ from 1981 onwards aimed to reduce Soviet influence in resource-rich 
developing countries and also led to Washington’s push for market-based economies 
in previously Marxist-inspired countries.45 While Westad’s thesis on the Cold War is 
essential to the dialogue of superpower relations in the Middle East, his perceptible 
silence on Lebanon implies that he does not regard Reagan’s Cold War offensive as 
including the Lebanese Civil War.46 Much of this is because, as Freedman also argues, 
while the renewal of superpower tensions created a struggle for a greater military 
identity, the Soviet Union was preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq and Afghan Wars and 
therefore less inclined to enter the Lebanese conflict directly. 47  
 To this discussion, Contemporary or New Cold War historians in the Middle East, 
such as Westad and Khalidi, argue that the Cold War ideology and its effects on 
foreign policy interventions should be examined with caution. Restraint must be 
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exercised regarding the application of a neoconservative view to any discussion of the 
Lebanon crisis, where there is a risk of overstating the superpower dynamic’s role as 
the driving motivation for US intervention there.48 It is important to recognise that, by 
the early 1980s, the Soviet Union faced challenges associated with its international 
clients, where control of and support for pro-Communist armed groups were 
unsustainable, as the waning Soviet support for the PLO evidenced.49 
 While discussing the broad ideological links between Presidents or 
Administrations can prove challenging, Reagan’s Administration has often been 
recognised for its role in reviving and confronting global moral dialogues.50 The 
Reagan Doctrine was a concept that illustrated a distinct break from the non-
interventionist policies that had, in many ways, made President Carter appear 
politically impotent on the international stage.51 Shultz deemed this policy reversal 
‘the ecology of international change’, since US policy was ultimately thrust into the 
act of ‘preventing war’ because ‘old diplomacy is not going to be sufficient to meet 
the novel threats of world security.’52 Reagan renewed the neoconservative’s view of 
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foreign policy in creating the US’ assertive role in confronting the Soviet Union and 
providing the world with a quasi-democratic revolution.53 However, as Layne notes,  
…the Reagan Doctrine failed to give Americans a convincing answer to the crucial 
question of why the United States should become involved in regional disputes that 
were, at best, only peripherally connected to its national security.54 
 
The executive-level doctrines, which will be referred to throughout the research, 
namely, the Eisenhower, Carter, Reagan and Weinberger Doctrines, have all been 
discussed widely on the international platform, with critics and proponents alike 
drawing broad ideological generalisations. While Shultz never proposed a formally 
recognised ‘doctrine’, this research recognises his staunch support of the ‘use of 
military force’ as the Secretary of State’s doctrinal vision even though it was never 
formalised.55  
The Reagan-Shultz and Eisenhower-Dulles relationships are particularly 
important in the development of these doctrines as, under both Administrations, the 
President represented the ideologue while the Secretary of State was granted 
operational and strategic flexibility to execute these broader doctrines. In Lebanon’s 
case in particular, Bell supports the belief that ‘the Eisenhower-Dulles period seems 
the true exemplar and predecessor of the Reagan period.’56 Meanwhile, President 
Carter’s notorious hands-on, domineering approach to the wording, structure and 
message of each policy and operational document (often handwritten) contrasted with 
Reagan’s confrontation of the broader, big picture policy goals, with his Secretary of 
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State and Middle East Envoys holding ultimate responsibility for the details.57 This 
disparity ultimately led to significant differences arising between each 
Administration, disproportionate to the limited contextual differences that each faced 
in Lebanon and the Middle East. That is, both Administrations existed during the 
Lebanese Civil War, the Israeli invasions of Lebanon (in 1978 and 1982) and the 
ongoing Arab-Israeli tensions. 
 
Lebanon and the Multinational Force  
 
The existing historical narratives relating to the 1982 US intervention in Lebanon, and 
more specifically the MNF, are often portrayed as merely a component of the 
complex foreign interference that characterized the Lebanese Civil War. Prominent 
research on the Lebanese Civil War, such as that by Hanf, treats US intervention as a 
minor subtopic of the conflict’s regional dynamics, depicting the MNF as an 
extension of Syria’s and Israel’s regional occupation, which drew in the European and 
American powers.58   
 However, several scholarly works on US intervention examine the MNF as a 
policy vehicle in itself; these include  Hallenbeck, Nelson, Norton, Kemp, and Thakur 
who largely maintain that the MNF in Lebanon marked Reagan’s foreign policy 
program’s complete failure.59 The historical debates regarding the MNF are centred 
on three key questions. First, did the intervention in Lebanon represent a strategic 
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policy decision such that the MNF should be seen as securing broader US goals? 
Second, was there an increasing variance between the US vision of peacemaking and 
those espoused by the UN that ultimately led the Reagan Administration to consider 
itself above the international legal parameters? Third, was the Cold War the key that 
led to US intervention in Lebanon or are claims of US concerns over the Soviet Union 
overplayed?60   
 Hallenbeck argues that criticism of the MNF should focus on how US military 
policy was applied rather than the force’s initial establishment itself.  He calls the US 
intervention a ‘thankless but right-minded undertaking.’61 Bell also maintains that the 
MNF was operationally ill-conceived, doomed to failure from the beginning of its 
deployment. She states: 
The commitment of the Marines in August 1982 and the Reagan Plan initiative in 
September must, to my mind, be classed as strong declaratory signals rather than 
true operational commitments. When Eisenhower put Marines into the Lebanon in 
1958 he used about 15,000 and left them there until the US objectives of the time 
had, for good or ill, been temporarily secured. The Reagan commitment of 1600 
Marines, in contrast, was at a token level. They did not have a military purpose but 
a diplomatic and political one: that is they constituted a declaratory signal.62 
 
However, both Korbani and Bell’s loosely guided rational approach imply that the 
initial MNF deployment was undertaken because the Reagan Administration had 
calculated that its potential net gains would be overwhelmingly in the US’ favour. 
Korbani argues that the decision to intervene was due to ‘the could be factor’, which 
considered the gain that the United States could get if order and peace were 
established.’63 This argument proposes that the Reagan Administration made an 
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active, conscious decision to enter Lebanon as a means of implementing wider 
regional or international goals. Similarly, while Hanf fails to consider the MNF as a 
cogent military influence, he agrees that US involvement was fundamentally entwined 
in the pursuit of other, even more substantial US policy objectives in the Middle East, 
including Palestinian settlement.64 It is important therefore to challenge the view that 
US policy under the MNF was fundamentally aimed at establishing stability and 
sovereignty in Lebanon, as the Administration claimed.65 
Indeed, Hallenbeck identifies how the US pursuit of diplomacy over military 
involvement was initially discussed in the White House, given the concerns about 
domestic public opinion. However, the need to deter the Soviet Union and the sense 
of responsibility regarding the Israeli-Palestinian aggression ‘committed the U.S. 
government to a strategy in Lebanon.’66  
 Thakur further maintains that, while the strategic benefit for the US in entering 
Lebanon was minimal, the wider ramifications associated with the US’ failure to have 
acted tangibly in the conflict could have threatened Washington’s regional and 
international military credibility. He argues that the UN’s failure to exert its 
peacekeeping powers in Lebanon, given the continual failure of the UN Interim Force 
in Lebanon (UNIFIL), led to US justifications for the MNF.67 Rather than upholding 
the principles of sovereignty and integrity, as Reagan proclaimed, the US deliberately 
moved away from a UN resolution so that the Administration could control the 
MNF’s operations and strategy without UN involvement.68 Schou argues that the US 
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should have engaged with UNIFIL in its peacekeeping mission if it truly wished to 
promote neutral, humanitarian mediation of the conflict rather than to escalate it.69 
Pfaltzgraff, Eichelberger and Ovinnikov attribute US refusal to use UNIFIL to the fact 
that the US knew that the Soviet Union would have preferred a UNIFIL mission 
rather than the US-led MNF. Furthermore, the historians argue that because the US 
believed that the Soviet Union saw the MNF deployment as a vehicle for a US-led 
Soviet containment policy, the Reagan Administration could use the MNF to further 
threaten and exclude the USSR from the region.70   
Gabriel, however, asserts that UNIFIL’s seemingly soft approach toward the 
PLO was both a ‘flagrant violation of UN regulations’ and a ‘failure of the UN forces 
to curtail PLO activity in the zone.’71 Even though the Reagan Administration wished 
to avoid being perceived as being unconditionally aligned with Israel in case Israeli 
actions threatened US diplomacy with the neighbouring Arab states, the US State 
Department ordered that the Palestinians should to be handled by the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF) rather than by UNIFIL in order to reduce Israeli protests over 
UNIFIL’s protection of the PLO in Southern Lebanon. Baylouny also highlights the 
MNF’s relationship with the PLO as an extension of US policy toward the 
Palestinians, given that ‘the PLO has long been a problem for US policy.’72 Gabriel 
accurately concludes that that UNIFIL’s inability militarily to control either the IDF 
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or the PLO meant that UN forces became an ineffective buffer between both groups, 
ultimately leading Reagan to deploy the MNF.73  
 Stoddard posits the opposite, specifically that the Reagan Administration did 
not view the Arab-Israeli conflict as a threat or concern for American interests in the 
Middle East as ‘it [the US] sees no crisis to manage.’74 Both he and Sisco question 
whether the MNF was devised to prevent the impending violence between Israel and 
Palestine, such as the Sabra and Shatila massacre proved or, rather, if the 
establishment of the US mission was ultimately an impulsive decision that illustrated 
the Administration’s failure to comprehend the Lebanese crisis for what it was; 
namely a kaleidoscope of internal sectarian violence and regional interference.75 
Thakur specifically regards US opportunism over the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as 
fostering US influence in the region, with little concern for either Arab-Israeli or 
Lebanese peace. He therefore sees the MNF as ‘the imposition of a pax americana in 
the Middle East.’76  
As the literature review and historiography demonstrate, the scholarly research 
has focused on two areas. First, the Lebanon crisis as a potential opportunity for the 
Reagan Administration to implement wider foreign policy goals in the Middle East 
and second, the role of the Soviet Union and the Arab-Israeli conflict as important 
factors in the conflict’s regional and international dynamics. What the existing 
literature so far has failed to provide is an examination of how the US’ regional 
approach failed to engage the internal Lebanese factions, thus creating policy 
inefficiencies throughout the MNF deployment. This thesis aims to fill this gap. 
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Methodology and Sources 
This thesis is an empirical study of executive US decision-making in Lebanon from 
1982-1984. It adopts an incremental rather than a neo-institutional or exclusively 
rational approach to examine US policy in Lebanon, which was characterised by 
significant policy discontinuity. It also focuses on the role of personalities, 
particularly Reagan and Shultz and their confrontational leadership style. As Aran and 
Alden note, the role played by personalities in foreign policy construction provides an 
important context for the specific policies themselves. 77  As such, this research 
cautiously considers Reagan’s key ideological and doctrinal discourses around 
Lebanon. This thesis draws upon a wide range of primary sources, many of which 
were only declassified between November 2010 and April 2014, including National 
Security Council, Presidential and State Department diplomatic cables. The US 
archival material is complemented by further research undertaken in the UN and 
British national archives. The latter holds the European communications between the 
other MNF partners: Britain, France and Italy.  
  In addition to the national archives, the Presidential archives were consulted. 
The Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California has released the majority 
of the documents on Lebanon from the National Security Council (NSC), the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff as well as the working papers and cables from the US Middle East 
Ambassadors Philip Habib, Morris Draper and Robert McFarlane. Key daily reports 
and communication cables from the US-Middle East envoys and ambassadors have 
been released and provide the crucial diplomatic and military intelligence behind the 
US intervention’s main policy phases. This library also contains communications 
between Secretary of State George Shultz and the State Department’s envoys from 
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1983-1984. It should be noted that many of these documents were only declassified in 
early 2012. All of the White House Office of Records Management files have been 
released, as have the majority of the White House Staff Office Files (up to 1985), 
including cable files between US-Middle East Special Envoy Donald Rumsfeld, 
Lebanese President Gemayel, Shultz, Weinberger and Reagan. The NSC working 
papers and National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) meetings and reports have 
all been declassified up to 1985. Although the Habib mission reports have been 
partially redacted, the full documents are also archived at the Department of State. 
Also, numerous NSDD files relating directly to pre-crisis and crisis decision-making, 
NSDD103 ‘Strategy of Lebanon’, NSDD 109 ‘Responding to the Lebanon Crisis’ and 
NSDD123 ‘Next Steps in Lebanon’ (amongst others), and the William Burns Files 
which contain the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) meeting notes for 1984 are now 
available. 78 
  The files which have not been released are the Lebanon Situation Cables 
around the 1983 April US Embassy Bombing and the October Marine Barracks 
Bombings. These contain the Barracks’ field reports and the operational military and 
security communications in the aftermath of the bombings. Similarly, US-Israeli 
operational and military task force documents remain classified. As the focus of this 
thesis is on high-level foreign policy decision-making, the unavailability of the 
military operational reports does not constitute a significant obstacle.  
  Research was also conducted in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential 
Library and James Earl Carter Presidential Library. The former holds both President 
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Eisenhower’s personal communications and internal documents in the Ann Whitman 
File from 1953-1961. The NSC Staff Papers from 1948-1961 also hold records 
relating to the Lebanon Disaster File and the Operations Coordinating Board of the 
Secretariat series. The Carter Library has a large holding of material relating to the 
Camp David Accords but little material that deals directly with Lebanon. US 
Ambassador John Gunther Dean’s cables to Lebanon provide the most detailed 
narrative of the Carter Administration’s policy in Lebanon, although much of the 
diplomatic community has shunned Dean due to his alleged claims of an Israeli 
assassination attempt against his person. 
  The Department of State’s ‘Released Documents’ collection holds numerous 
communiqués between Middle East Envoys, Secretary of State Shultz and US 
Embassies in Beirut and Tel Aviv to the Department of State from 1982-1984. CIA 
reports are limited but provide valuable interagency communications throughout the 
period regarding US security and US-Soviet policy. The CIA has also released a 
number of reports and Intelligence papers regarding the Middle East and Lebanon. 
These files, such as NIIIA84-10012 ‘Interagency Intelligence Assessment - Soviet 
Policy toward Lebanon’ are particularly useful for understanding the extent to which 
concerns over Soviet expansion, armaments and influence in the region affected US 
policy in Lebanon. Much of what is declassified in the CIA archives relates to US-
Soviet policy and interagency or intelligence information papers.  
  The UN Archives and Record Management Section at the UN headquarters in 
New York offer extensive available materials regarding UN policy and 
communication over Lebanon and the Middle East, housed in the UNIFIL archive 
files. The materials at the UNARMS consist of peacekeeping cables, daily 
intelligence reports from Beirut, Secretariat reports and communication cables 
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between the Secretary General and the White House. The documents released 
pertaining to the early 1980s include the private communications and papers of UN 
Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The documents related to the UNIFIL 
strategy in southern Lebanon, as well as the PLO/Israeli and Lebanese/Israeli 
ceasefire negotiations, are most relevant to this thesis.  
  While a large amount of US archival material was available, this was not the 
case for French archival material. Unsuccessful applications were made to Archives 
Nationales: Département de l'exécutif et du législatif, Archives Présidentielles de 
François Mitterrand and Archives Diplomatique in Paris. The files requested 
unfortunately remain closed, based on national security issues and foreign policy 
classifications and are not expected to open until 2044. As such, this research is 
unable comprehensively to examine the domestic French decision-making process 
except from US, UN and British perspectives on French activities and communiqués.  
Fortunately, the holdings on the MNF at the UK National Archives at Kew, with 
many released in April 2014, cover the perspectives, communications and minutes of 
the European MNF partners including France. There are numerous letters from British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to Presidents Ronald Reagan and François 
Mitterrand as well as Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe’s meetings and negotiations 
with Italian and French Foreign Ministers Giulo Andreotti and Claude Cheysson. 
While the British contribution to the MNF was the smallest, and the British joined the 
MNFII last, Thatcher and Howe’s close alliance with the Regan Administration 
means that these papers provide important insights into the other MNF partners. The 
Italian archives are excluded from this research due to access difficulties. Also little 
Lebanese material exists, given the destruction of many of the administrative 
repositories during the Lebanese Civil War. 
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 In addition to this wide range of archival sources, memoirs of Eisenhower, 
Carter, Reagan, Gemayel, Shultz, Haig, Weinberger and former Lebanese Foreign 
Minister Salem have also been consulted. While Reagan’s Presidential Diary is a 
daily account of his time in office, it offers limited analytical insight.79 As Egerton 
argues, the use of memoirs to construct political history should be approached with 
caution, as the line between ‘historical truth and personal apologia’ can become 
blurred, especially with regard to accounts of a public failure during the author’s 
tenure or Administration, as is the case with Reagan.80 Scalmer further argues that 
such autobiographies and memoirs can lead to a more popular, ambitious and 
‘interventionist’ flavour than the historical truth might have provided.81   
 Last, but certainly not least, the archives of key international newspapers such 
as the Washington Post, New York Times, L’Orient Le Jour, Maariv, La Repubblica 
and Le Monde were consulted, to establish the chronology and provide a perspective 
on the public discourse on the Lebanese conflict, the MNF partners, and US decision-
making. 
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Chapter One 
Lebanon: A crowded state without a nation 
 
Two events are credited with sowing the seeds of one of the Middle East’s most 
complex civil conflicts. On 26 February 1975, the Mayor of Sidon and founder of al-
Tanzim al-Sha’aby al-Nassery,1 Marouf Saad, was assassinated by an unknown sniper 
while protesting at the popular fishermen strikes in Sidon. These protests were 
organised against former Lebanese President and Chairman of the Maronite National 
Liberal Party, Camille Cham’un’s, decision to monopolise the fisheries along the 
coast. Many Lebanese sympathized with the fishermen, viewing the industrial 
monopolization as detrimental to the social economy. Saad’s assassination sparked 
violent confrontations between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the 
predominantly Sunni protestors, ending in 16 casualties.  
 On 13 April 1975, five hooded gunmen drove past the convoy of the founder 
of the Martonite Christian Al Kata’eb al Loubaniyya party, Pierre Gemayel, and killed 
four of his security entourage. Gemayel was attending Sunday mass as the gunmen 
attempted to assassinate the anti-Palestinian Kata’eb leader. In response to this 
attempted assassination, Christian militiamen ambushed a bus carrying Palestinian 
and Lebanese Muslim football fans who were passing through Ain Rummaneh on 
their return from a match, killing 27.2  
                                                
1 Otherwise known as the Popular Nasserite Organisation (NPO). 
2 Wade Goria, ‘Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976’, (London: Ithaca Press, 
1985), pp. 181-183 & Yusif al-Haytham, ‘Battles of Survival’, Middle East Research and 
Information Project, No.44, February 1976, p.12. 
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While neither of these events was exclusively responsible for the 15-year conflict that 
followed, they are widely recognised as the events that ignited what was an already 
fragile Lebanese political landscape.  
 The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War was in some ways foreseeable as it 
arose from the communal tensions that had predominated since the state’s 
independence in 1943. However, the conflict’s protracted nature was surprising, even 
to the factional leaders and militias who participated in the violence. At the heart of 
the communal tensions lay the challenges that Lebanon faced with regard to its 
national identity formation. The Phoenician, Syriac, Roman and Ottoman legacies, 
coupled with Lebanon’s more recent French colonial experience from 1920-1943, 
resulted in the emergence of a fragmented yet fused, distinctive but vulnerable 
syncretistic identity which was institutionally represented by Lebanon’s 
consociational political system. As this system started to break down, communal 
allies became enemies and historical enemies became aligned. The resulting internal 
power struggle between the key sectarian factions – (Maronite) Christians, Sunnis, 
Shi’as and Druze – illustrated the degree to which military, religious, national and 
communal discontinuity had been fuelled by the Lebanese consociational system.3 It 
also invited Lebanon’s neighbours, Syria and Israel, to intervene, further complicating 
the fragile political dynamics.  
This chapter looks at the origins of communal tensions in Lebanon and the 
1975-90 Lebanese Civil War, which must be understood as an amalgamation of 
                                                
3 Consociationalism in the Lebanese context will be defined as constitutionalised power 
sharing along politico-religious lines. Referring to the broader parliamentary system, it is 
separated from sectarianism, which will be defined by social, religious, intra-communal and 
inter-communal relationships. Arend Lijphart, ‘Consociational Democracy’, World Politics, 
Vol. 21, No. 2, 1969, p.207-215 & Oren Barak, ‘Intra-communal and Inter-communal 
Dimensions of Conflict and Peace in Lebanon’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
Vol. 34, No.4, 2002, pp.619-644. 
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numerous smaller conflicts, both internal and external, in order to situate the 
intervention by the US in 1982. Unlike the seminal works on the Lebanese Civil War 
by Hudson, Hanf, Salibi, Deeb, Goria, Petran, Beydoun and Kassir, this chapter does 
not aim to provide a detailed account of the constantly vacillating political or military 
histories.4 Rather, it will subdivide Lebanese history into five sections to create an 
overview of the development of Lebanese identity and the history of the Civil War. 
The first section looks at the Mutasarrifiyya during which the foundations of 
communalism were laid. The second section analyzes the French Mandate period 
which established the consociational political system. The third section discusses the 
1958 crisis also known as the first Lebanese civil war. The fourth section looks at the 
internal dynamics of the second Lebanese civil war while the fifth section explores 
the external influence focusing on the Palestinians, Syria and Israel. This brief 
analysis of Lebanese identity and the Lebanese conflict will serve as a basis for 
assessing the extent to which the Reagan Administration accurately comprehended 
Lebanon’s internal dynamics in the lead up to and during the US intervention. Indeed, 
it will serve to illustrate that the US developed a foreign policy that was exclusively 
focused on the conflict’s regional characteristics, as if the Lebanese Civil War were 
merely an extension of the broader Arab-Israeli or Middle East tensions.  
                                                
4 Michael Hudson, ‘The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon’, (Boulder 
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Mutasarrifiyya: laying the foundations of communalism  
Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi proposed that ‘to create a country is one thing; to 
create a nationality is another.’5 Indeed, it could be argued that Lebanon has never 
managed to create a unified national identity, one that encompasses all of the 
country’s diverse religious and social groups. Similarly, Reinkowski maintains that 
modern Lebanon’s construction involved the establishment of a state but not of a 
nation-state, largely due to the Lebanese system, in which communally-apportioned 
executive leadership roles and religious representation in the political structure form 
the bedrock of the parliamentary system.6   
 Lebanese nation-building began during the Ottoman Empire’s Tanzimat 
period. The Tanzimat reforms gave rise to the creation of the semi-autonomous state 
or mutasarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon. They also legislated for religious tolerance 
across the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, edict 10 of the 1856 Imperial Reform, Hatt-ı 
Hümayun, stated that: 
As all forms of religion are and shall be freely professed in my dominions, no 
subject of my Empire shall be hindered in the exercise of the religion that he 
professes, nor shall be in any way annoyed on this account. No one shall be 
compelled to change their religion. 7 
 
This progressive legislation, while affirming the Ottoman Sultan’s authority as 
supreme leader, allowed each religious sect’s patriarchal leader to preside over social 
jurisprudence issues. The system defined broader concepts of equality whereby all 
subjects held equal class of entry for education and mixed religious tribunals. It was 
under this initial reform that many elements of religious nationalism were espoused. 
                                                
5 Salibi, ‘A house of Many Mansions’, pp.19-37. 
6 Maurus Reinkowski, ‘National identity since 1990’, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik und 
Wirtschaft des Orient, Vol.39, 1997, p.493. 
7 Hatt-ı Hümayun, ‘Edict 10’, Atatürk Institute of Modern Turkish History, Boğaziçi 
University, Online: 
http://www.ata.boun.edu.tr/Department%20Webpages/ATA_517/Rescript%20of%20Reform,
%2018%20February%201856.doc, (The translator is unknown), Accessed June 2011. 
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This established a social and religious system that was equitable and yet divided, 
introducing communalism in an attempt to bring about greater religious and sectarian 
freedom.  
This communalism meant that each subject belonged to a religious community 
within this system, although their definitive membership was still within the 
Sultanate. The communalist system was not simply characterised by religious 
divisions. These divisions were further extended by differences in communal wealth, 
culture, international alliances and competing perspectives regarding national identity 
and Lebanese sovereignty.8  As such, these factors strengthened the individual’s 
communal identity and, in the long run, elevated communal over national identity. 
This marked the birth of confessionalism in Lebanon and these constitutional reforms 
ultimately became one of the greatest influences on the National Pact, which was 
decreed fewer than 90 years later.9 
 During the nineteenth century sectarian tensions between the Christians, 
Druze and Muslims resurfaced, this time with British and French backing. Lebanese 
Christianity comprises a majority Maronite population who, unique to the Levant, 
derive their beliefs from Eastern Syriac Orthodoxy. The remainder of Lebanese 
Christianity includes Melkite Christian Orthodox, Greek and Armenian Orthodox, 
Roman Catholicism, Protestantism and, to a lesser extent, Coptic Christianity. The 
Druze, like the Maronites, are unique to the Levant and follow an Ismaili Shi’a 
denomination though they do not consider themselves Shi’a or identify as a part of the 
broader Lebanese Muslim population.  
                                                
8 Kais Firro, ‘Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State Under the Mandate’, (New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 2002), pp.43-46. 
9 Ralph Crow, ’Religious Sectarianism in the Lebanese Political System’, The Journal of 
Politics, Vol. 24, No.3, August 1962, p.493. 
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With French support and open opposition to the Ottoman Empire, the 
Maronite Christians battled with the Druze (supported by a British-Ottoman coalition) 
for supremacy over Mount Lebanon. This sectarian war began with hostilities 
between the Sunni-born Christian convert Bachir Sahib II, the Wali of Mount 
Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley and Jabal Amel, and Bachir Jumblatt, feudal leader of the 
Druze community. 10 Bachir II attempted to break the parochial feudal system in 
favour of a Christian-dominated protectorate and further resentment was fermented in 
the Druze community after Bachir II executed Bachir Jumblatt. As Traboulsi argues, 
such violent actions led the Ottoman Sultanate to justify further divisions of Mount 
Lebanon along sectarian lines in an attempt to ease the tension. The European support 
in splitting Mount Lebanon into two protectorates or Qaimaqams each led by a Druze 
or Maronite Wali only divided the communities further and, as such, religiously-
charged attacks raged. 11  
The Druze retaliated against the Christian population who had risen up in 
1859 against the Druze leaders in the peasant revolt of Kisrwan. Petran and Fawaz 
both argue that the conflicts such as the 1860 Battle of Deir al Qamar left an inedible 
mark on the development of Lebanon’s nation-building as they ‘hardened its sectarian 
outlook.’ 12 As civil war broke out between the Druze and Maronites, with the Druze 
and Sunni massacre of Maronite civilians and monastics, the war ultimately spread as 
                                                
10 Wali means the provincial or district Governor, in this case of Mount Lebanon. 
11 Fawaz Traboulsi, ‘A history of Modern Lebanon’, (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp.37-42. 
12 Leila Fawaz, ‘Zahle and Dayr al-Qamar’, in Nadim Shehadi & Dana Haffar Mills, eds., 
Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus, (London: I.B. Tauris: 1988), pp.51-59 & 
Petran, ‘The Struggle over Lebanon’, p.24. 
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far as Damascus where three days of ethnic cleansing took place in July 1860, leading 
to the death of thousands of Christians.13   
In response to the European outcry at the massacre of Christians in the 
Ottoman Empire, Napoleon III established a European and Ottoman convention in 
August 1860 to discuss a resolution to the conflict. Driven by France’s self-ascribed 
historical role of protectors of the Christian population as well as the desire to 
increase French influence over the Ottoman Empire and the silk trade, Napoleon III 
took the lead in mediating a European intervention in Mount Lebanon and Greater 
Syria. By 5 September, the French Emperor’s agreement had been signed in Paris, 
inaugurating, in effect, a multilateral peacekeeping force known as Réglement 
Organique. While the French contributed half of the 12,000 troops and held the 
ultimate responsibility in leading the force, the Réglement Organique also included 
British, Austrian, Prussian and Russian contingents. Relevant to the later chapters on 
the MNF, Réglement Organique in many ways represented the first Western 
peacekeeping force in Lebanon, notably led by the French. This also illustrated that, 
even before the state of Modern Lebanon was created, communal coexistence relied 
heavily on outside intervention when the system broke down.14  
Akarli highlights that this primarily French force intervened to establish a 
power-sharing system within Mount Lebanon that would protect the Maronites’ 
existence and Orthodox interests while also recognising the Druze and to a lesser 
extent Sunni and Shi’a populations.15 However Akarli also argues that the French 
system that came with this intervention, ‘Réglement et protocole relatifs a la 
                                                
13 Meir Zamir, ‘The Formation of Modern Lebanon’, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp.1-38 
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reorganisation du Mont Liban’, was ineffective in increasing inter-communal socio-
political dialogues. Hence without a consensus on social norms and political 
institutions, these administrative reforms only led to further communal separation. 
The war of 1860 and subsequent reforms fomented a deeper ‘confessional setocracy’ 
that penetrated the fabric of administrative, social and political life.16 As Makdisi 
notes,  
In the aftermath of 1860, a culture of sectarianism developed in the sense that 
all sectors of society, public and private, recognized that the war and the 
massacres marked the beginning of a new age - an age defined by the raw 
intrusion of sectarian consciousness into modern life.17 
 
Mount Lebanon’s inherited violent history, coupled with its confessional legacy, 
highlighted the need to handle these ongoing religious and communal differences with 
great sensitively in order to maintain a tense but sustained peace. While underlying 
confessional tensions continued throughout the early nineteenth century, a negotiated 
peace was established under a tenuously united Mount Lebanon. 
 
The French Mandate: formalising the consociational democracy 
The Ottoman Empire’s break-up after World War I paved the way for the 
establishment of Greater Lebanon. 18  Modern-day Lebanon’s foundations were 
internationally proposed in 1920, under a League of Nations Mandate. The Muslim 
population wanted a British controlled, Arab-centric constitution, even going so far as 
to side with the Hashemite, pan-Arab, Faisal ibn Husayn, in Syria.19 The Lebanese 
Sunni did not want to be separated from their Sunni brethren in Syria. In contrast, the 
                                                
16 Petran, ‘The Struggle over Lebanon’, p.26. 
17 ibid. 
18 Zamir, ‘The Formation of Modern Lebanon’, pp.38-96. 
19 Faisal ibn Husayn was King of Syria for four months in 1920 and was controversial in his 
support for the Zionist movement, mostly due to the British support for his leadership. In July 
1920, when the French Mandate was announced in Syria, Faisal was removed.  
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Christians saw Lebanon as French or Europe-oriented and wanted to create a Greater 
Lebanon, which encompassed territory beyond Mount Lebanon in order to ensure 
economic viability that was separate from Syria. The Armenian and Greek Orthodox 
community ultimately had the swing vote which otherwise would have cut off the 
isolated Maronites from their co-religionists in the rest of the Arab world.  
 The modern state of Lebanon would include the urban ports of Beirut, Sidon, 
Tyre and Tripoli. It would extend east to the Bekaa Valley as far as Baalbeck and 
Rashayya. Salibi states that this expansion made no sense to Maronite objectives for 
Christian control because it ultimately meant taking in Muslim populated areas and 
thereby an increased population of Sunni, Shi’a and Druze in the proposed Christian 
territories.20 The Maronite community, however, saw the boundaries as being more 
culturally, economically and nationally defined, due to their profound Christian 
Maronite sense of the Lebanese homeland as well as a sense of historical and 
civilizational connectedness to the Phoenicians who predated the Arabs. 21  The 
Lebanese Maronites immediately welcomed the French as liberators, freeing them 
from the Arabist chains under Faisal’s influence.  
 With French support the Lebanese Christians won the League of Nations 
debate with the declaration of the French Mandate over Lebanon at the San Remo 
Conference in April 1920 and the ensuing Treaty of Sèvres in August that year.22 
However, as Fieldhouse notes,  
                                                
20 Salibi, ‘A House of Many Mansions’, pp.19-37. 
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Greater Lebanon was a nation only in the eyes of the Maronites and some of 
their Christian allies. For the rest of the population it was an imposed state 
dominated by the Maronites in which they felt less at home than they had been 
when they were part of the Ottoman vilayet.23 
 
This ensured that, from its conception, the modern state of Lebanon saw ‘a force 
called Arabism, acting from outside and inside the country’ standing ‘face to face 
with another exclusively parochial social force called Lebanism,’  
…and the two forces collided on every fundamental issue, impeding the 
normal development of the state and keeping its political legitimacy and 
ultimate viability continuously in question…it was certainly no accident that 
the original proponents of Lebanism in the country were almost exclusively 
Christians, and for the most part Maronites, while the most unbending 
proponents of Arabism, as a community, were the Muslims.24  
 
This issue over Muslim and Druze Arabism and Maronite Lebanism plagued the path 
of state and nation building from the start. It undermined the state, making it unable to 
placate the communal tensions in the lead up to Civil War. Similarly, the Christian-
Muslim spilt on a broader level was used to justify the periodic Christian proposals 
for the partition of Lebanon between North and South.25 Salibi makes the most 
important point concerning the country’s ‘Lebanist’ identity. He argues that unlike 
many of the post-war Arab nations constructed by the French or British mandate, the 
Maronite majority themselves ‘willed it [Lebanon] into existence.’ Lebanon, 
therefore, was not dictated its confessional or communal terms.26  
However Modern Lebanon’s very foundations contained a rift between the 
Maronites on one hand and the other Lebanese communities over the vision of a 
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unified Lebanon. If Lebanon as a confessional state was to thrive, the relationship 
between these communal groups needed to be formalised. As such the Ottoman 
Empire’s legacy and development of a divided Lebanese identity are crucial for 
understanding how the 1943 Lebanese National Pact was formed.  
Christian President Bishara al-Khouri and Sunni Prime Minister Riyad al-
Solh’s unwritten agreement stipulated that the Lebanese Christians would relinquish 
European protection on condition that the Muslim population (exclusively represented 
by the Sunni elite at that time) abandoned its pan-Arab ambitions. The National Pact 
also demarcated leadership positions along communal lines, with the Christians 
holding sway, followed closely by the Sunnis. The Druze and Shi’a were relegated to 
lower positions, without executive control. This was justified as a proportionate 
political and social allocation and based on the out-dated 1932 census data that saw a 
6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims, respectively. Odeh states that the ‘usage of 
Muslim/Christian categories, to the exclusion of virtually all others, robs the Lebanese 
of his humanity.’27 Yet, the fact that formalised confessional politics had played a role 
in Lebanon’s instability since the National Pact is undeniable.  
 According to Arend Lijphart’s consociational democratic theory, Lebanon 
provided the perfect environment in which to develop an overarching sense of 
Lebanese nationalism that would have reduced the Muslim-Christian cleavages and 
enhanced the potential opportunities for minority or subgroup participation.28 Lijphart 
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defines consociationalism as rare cases of ‘fragmented but stable democracies.’29  
However, Lijphart’s consociational democracy model relies on a continuum of control 
by communal elites over their own clients as well as the other minority communities. 
This presumes that there is a modicum of inter-communal cohesion. In Lebanon, the 
development of a formal Lebanese political power-sharing model was directly 
affected and undermined by a dynastic clientelist system, which, in turn evolved into 
a deeply sectarian social system. This created socio-communal divisions that extended 
beyond the politicized confessional lines.   
 Clientelism dominated the modern Lebanese political landscape such that it, as 
Hamzeh describes, represented an ‘“addendum” to the central institutional modes of 
organization, interaction and exchange.’30 While the patronage system is not unique to 
Lebanon, the degree to which the client-patron relationship transcended many of the 
national system’s components makes clientelism particularly important in post-
independence Lebanon’s development.31 It also meant that the relationship between 
the community and their clientelist leaders was stronger than the relationship with any 
regional or national leadership, fundamentally undermining the power-sharing system 
that the National Pact was supposedly formalising. The Za’im and Qabaday’s roles 
are an important component of the Lebanese clientelist system as the Zu’ama were 
notable families within each community that controlled the Lebanese political context 
at a local and social level.32 Khalaf argues that this Za’im-led clientelist system 
created stability on a communal and local level where consociationalism and the 
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National Pact could not.33 Hudson correctly rejects this, arguing instead that the 
patronage system was yet another inefficiency of the Lebanese system where any 
national democratic electoral program becomes redundant if communal leadership 
and control remain uncontested. As Hudson explains, Lebanese consociational 
democracy was tenuously developed upon unstable, unrepresentative ‘democratic’ 
institutions, which both limited social mobilisation and distorted the distribution of 
wealth and modernisation.34  
This was a reality that meant that the control of local politics was not 
determined by the state but rather by the most powerful or wealthy parochial 
dynasties.35 This domination reflected, not each sect’s demographic proportions, but 
rather each Za’im’s economic wealth.36 The subversive culture which existed between 
the Zu’ama and the community ensured that the less wealthy remained economically 
dependent upon their leaders and hence were submissive to their political decisions. 
The few elite families who held control over each area also regulated the 
community’s wealth and political decisions. These relationships between the Za’im 
and clients were far from being an equal exchange, but rather driven by a trade-off of 
welfare services and state patronage distributions. In return, the client would 
guarantee the patron electoral support, again undermining any true sense of 
democracy. 
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The 1958 Crisis: Arab Nationalism, awakening and identity 
The exponential economic growth during ‘Lebanon’s Golden/Gilded Age’ in the 
1940s and 1950s challenged the fledgling Lebanese system’s flexibility.37 The rise of 
economic prosperity was concomitant with a social and intellectual awakening in 
Lebanon, where previously subordinated communities and minority leaders contested 
what they believed was the disproportionate representation within the broader 
political system.  The first major challenge to the Lebanese system was the 1958 Civil 
War, which illustrated the flexing of pan-Arabist ideological muscle.38 The decline 
into civil war can be traced back to the Suez Crisis and the decision by Sunni Prime 
Minister Rashid Karami to side with Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, while 
the Maronite President Camille Cham’un refused to break ties with Western powers 
in line with other Arab League states. Nasser’s rise as the great pan-Arab leader after 
Suez ensured that Nasserism played a significant role in Lebanon’s 1957 
parliamentary elections. This was further consolidated by the establishment of the 
United Arab Republic (UAR) under Nasser’s leadership in February 1958 and 
attempts by parts of northern Lebanon to secede in order to join the UAR. Equating 
Nasserism with communism, Cham’un called for US assistance under the Eisenhower 
doctrine in an attempt to secure his second, unconstitutional, term as president. In 
July, US Marines landed in Beirut to assist the Christian-led Lebanese Army to ease 
the tensions.  
Considering this episode from the perspective of the National Pact, both the 
Sunni and Christian leaders had openly undermined their promises to uphold unity 
and stability. The 1958 Civil War was the precursor to the Lebanese State system’s 
full breakdown and vividly illustrated the degree to which the system had fuelled the 
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confessional divide. The conflict ultimately forced newly-instated President Fouad 
Chehab to reform the administrative system with an equal split between Christians 
and Muslims, placing the Sunni community almost exclusively in charge of 50% of 
the state civil service functions. The 1958 Civil War, the Chehabist national unity 
reforms and Nasser’s ideology’s interregional strength led some Lebanese Sunni to 
believe that their pursuit of Arab Nationalism had paid off. These initial victories 
paved the way for pan-Arab expansion within Lebanon, fundamentally undermining 
the national system. The miraculous economic growth that had characterized the early 
1960s under President Fouad Chehab, faded under his successor, Charles Helou. The 
1966 Intrabank crash, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and rural discontent led to a 
growing ‘revolution from below.’ 39  Increased social mobilisation and rapid 
urbanisation meant that the urban population increased in proportion from 27% to 
60% within a decade.40   
 The top-down conditions that Lijphart deems crucial for a successful power 
sharing system had broken down and the Chehabist veneer of national unity meant 
that only a semblance of true communal participation and social order had been 
achieved.41 The Sunni-led al-Musharakah (participation) campaign demanded a more 
proportionate sharing of the executive control, which the Sunnis had enjoyed under 
Chehab’s alliance with Karami. This was followed by both Shi’a and Druze 
campaigns for greater representation under Imam Musa Sadr and Kamal Jumblatt 
respectively. 42  However Crow argues that the lack of Lebanese communal 
participation neither created the political instabilities that were evident in a Chehabist 
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Lebanon nor would Lebanon have stabilized had the inter-communal inequalities 
been removed.43 In fact, Khalaf, Entelis and Harik see these sectarian groupings as an 
opportunity for development and stability in Lebanon rather than simply creating 
divisiveness.44  
 However, in the prelude to the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, Hudson argues 
that the divisions precipitated by consociationalism were to blame for the power-
sharing experiment’s failure to establish nation-building and thus led to the outbreak 
of the war.45 From an exclusively consociational perspective, such as Lipjhart’s work, 
it is easy to assert that the post-independence Lebanese identity formation was merely 
characterized as an extension of an oversimplified confessional split. Odeh argues that 
this would reduce the tensions in Lebanon to a cursory Muslim-Christian contest 
without understanding their innate social or communal identity undercurrents.46 
Similarly, Goria argues that, while Chehab held the factional tensions at bay in the 
early 1960s, he did little to deal with the structural holes that were growing in the 
Lebanese system.47 From 1970-1975, the abolition of Chehab’s Deuxième Bureau, 
which had kept the population under close surveillance, also signalled a reduction in 
central administration control. When Druze leaders called for an intervention by Syria 
and the fast transition of power to President Suleiman Frangieh, the Lebanese system 
as a concept broke down.48  
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The structural weaknesses that plagued the Lebanese system, by 1975, had led 
to an inability to create a nation out of a state and thereby had led to an unstable 
environment in which the participants, both internal and external could exploit these 
insecurities. The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War was a vivid reminder that 
consociationalism was merely a tool for coexistence rather than the product of long-
term nation building.49 It was inevitable, given the deeply divided sectarian ruptures 
that the internal religious dynamics eventually undermined the wider state 
structures.50   
  
Internal dynamics of war: The Lebanese Civil War and Sectarianism 
Consociationalism alone, however, was not to blame for the outbreak of the Civil War 
or indeed its prolonged duration. Without the continual destabilization by the various 
internal sectarian actors, Lebanon’s political system would not have collapsed.51 Hanf 
regards the complex sectarian disputes between the Lebanese factions as essential to 
understanding how the communal instabilities escalated to war from the first phase 
until the Syrian intervention in 1976.52 Stewart also argues that the outbreak of the 
conflict was a result of the sectarian elite’s inability to coalesce. ‘In 1975, just as in 
1860 and 1958, while the ruling elites fought amongst themselves, the Lebanese were 
either drawn into conflicts not of their own making, or else subjected to their 
consequences.’53 Makdisi highlights the relationship between these elites and the 
undercurrent of sectarianism that emerged from it:  
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The popular sectarianism accentuated the untenable contradictions upon which 
the nation was anchored. Whereas compromises between the elites were meant 
to divide power among different communities, they in fact divided power 
among elites of various communities at the expense of the divided and 
disenfranchised majority.54 
 
Understanding Lebanon’s sectarian dynamic also requires recognition of the 
essentially inter-communal characteristics that transcend the formal national 
parliamentary system. It also means acknowledging that the differences between the 
sectarian groups were more than merely religio-political divisions but also reflected 
complex social dynamics. This sectarianism weakened the fragile national system to 
the point that, as Norton argues, the regional powers were in fact drawn in by the 
internal Lebanese factions to challenge other Lebanese sectarian parties. 55 Hanf’s 
work on the relationship between the internal and external parties illustrates how this 
deeply-rooted sectarianism led to a conflict momentum that transformed it from a 
civil into a regional conflict.56  
 By October 1975, with the April ambush on the bus carrying Palestinian and 
Sunni Lebanese football fans still firmly in people’s memory, al-Mourabitoun, a 
Sunni-majority Nasserite militia, opened fire on Christian positions and civilians from 
the Murr Tower in the Minet-el Hosn area of Beirut. In response, the Maronite 
paramilitary force Kata’eb (also known in French as Phalanges Libanaises) under the 
leadership of Pierre Gemayel’s son, Bachir Gemayel, and William Hawi ordered the 
militia to take up position within the occupied hotels there, launching the ‘Battle of 
the Hotels.’57 The sectarian war was fought between the Christian Kata’eb on one side 
and a Palestinian and pan-Arabist coalition, Al-Harakat al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya 
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(Lebanese National Movement, LNM) coalition on the other. During this time, four 
Kata’eb militiamen’s bodies were found in East Beirut and the murders were blamed 
on the LNM. In revenge, Kata’eb militiamen drove throughout the area, firing into the 
crowd, indiscriminately killing and abducting Muslims. Roadblocks were set up 
throughout Beirut’s main streets, with Kata’eb checkpoints preventing Muslim and 
Palestinians from entering Christian-controlled neighborhoods. Frequently, if their 
identity card revealed Palestinian or Muslim community membership, civilians were 
shot dead on the spot. This retaliation was known as Black Saturday.  
 Following Black Saturday, on 18 January, 1976 East Beirut’s PLO-controlled, 
Muslim-majority Karantina slum was overrun by Kata’eb and al-Noumour fighters, 
who slaughtered over 1000 Syrians, Palestinians and Armenians. As a result, pro-
LNM, Palestinian fighters attacked Damour, a Christian village south of Beirut, 
killing hundreds of Christian civilians and scores of Kata’eb militia. A ceasefire 
between the Kata’eb and the LNM was called in April 1976 and brought to an end the 
Battle of the Hotels. The sectarian violence that occurred during the Civil War’s first 
phase led to the establishment of the ‘Green Line’, which separated the Christian East 
Beirut from the Muslim and Druze West Beirut.  
 In January 1976, the significant threat of a national partition was almost 
realized. The National Dialogue Committee in October and November was a 
reconciliation committee divided along confessional lines, attempting to seek a 
resolution to the violence that had characterised the early part of 1975.58 As the Sunni, 
Druze, Shi’a and LNM leaders challenged the Christian monopolisation of the 
parliamentary system, the Kata’eb pushed for Lebanon’s partition.59 The Kata’eb 
leaders wished to create a separate, autonomous Christian state out of historically 
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Christian lands, namely East Beirut, Jounieh and Mount Lebanon, with a separate 
Muslim state outside. Lebanese President Suleiman Frangieh as well as Maronite 
leaders Pierre Gemayel and Camille Cham’un, sensing an imminent military defeat 
for the Lebanese Christians and Maronites formally invited Syrian President Hafez 
Asad into Lebanon in the hope that Syria could force a ceasefire on the leftist 
Muslims and Palestinians. This gave Asad a carte blanche to exploit further 
Lebanon’s geopolitical opportunities.  
  The clear sectarian conflict during the war’s initial phases was accompanied 
by more permanent, intra-communal sectarianism, which became increasingly evident 
from the growth of the more radical Islamist groups in terms of their number and 
power. Dekmejian, Dessouki and Rougier refer to the rise of Shi’a groups, such as 
Hizbullah, Harakat Amal, or Sunni groups, like al-Mourabitoun and al-Jamma’a 
Islamaiyah. This illustrated the split within the communities as much as between 
them.60 For example, both Shi’a militias, Harakat Amal and Hizbullah, fought each 
other in April 1988 for control of southern Beirut. Similarly, the Sunni organisations 
al-Jamma’a Islamiyah and Harakat at-Tawhid al-Islami were opposed over the issue 
of Lebanese nationalism and pluralism.61 While the first two years of the Civil War 
are often attributed to internal Lebanese sectarianism, the undercurrent of sectarian 
and factional conflict continued until the very end. Moreover, various Lebanese 
factions invited regional actors into Lebanon in an attempt to boost their own 
position. Israel, Syria and the Palestinians, in turn, manipulated their Lebanese allies 
for their own domestic and regional political agendas. 
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The Civil War and External Influence: Syria, Israel and the 
Palestinians  
The Lebanese Shi’a spiritual leader, Sheikh Muhammad Fadallah, ‘likened Lebanon 
to the lung through which the problems of the area breathe. Thus, Lebanon was not 
created as a national home for its citizens but a laboratory for international political 
experiments in the region.’62 Indeed, as the Lebanese state system collapsed and 
sectarian violence came to characterize the Lebanese landscape, any remaining 
resistance to regional influences also disappeared.  
Khalaf defines Lebanon’s Civil War as ‘largely a reflection of destabilizing 
interplay between internal divisions and external dislocations.’63 Goria asserts that 
Lebanon’s nation-building’s overall failure left it vulnerable to regional and 
international intervention. 64  Similarly, Hudson’s criticism of Lebanon’s political 
system is rooted in the belief that the national system’s breakdown left it unable to 
protect the nation-state against Palestinian, Syrian and Israeli influence. 65  This 
regional involvement thus created the necessity for international forces (UNIFIL, 
MNFI and MNFII) to mediate and intervene between the warring nations.66 Schou 
argues that it was this regional and subsequently international interference that 
compelled the domestic forces to continue the war, even when the outcome was far 
from guaranteed.67 Hanf sees the regional Arab-Israeli conflict’s impact on the 
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Lebanese conflict as creating a playground for superpower politics between the US 
and Soviet Union.68 Internationalising the conflict had the overall effect of increasing 
the instability and violence throughout the early 1980s such that the conflict’s 
momentum became unstoppable.69 These various regional influences (that will be 
briefly outlined here and discussed in greater depth below) became entangled in the 
regional politics that were being played out in Lebanon.  
 
The PLO and the Palestinians in Lebanon 
 
The role of the Palestinian diaspora and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) is 
relevant to the discussion about the causes of the Civil War’s outbreak and escalation. 
The PLO’s umbrella organisation of smaller groups, such as al-Saiqa, Al-Jabhah al-
Sha'biyyah li-Tahrir Filastin (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - PFLP), 
PFLP’s General Command, Al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiya Li-Tahrir Filastin (Democratic 
Front for the Freedom of Palestine - PDFLP) and Al-Fatah, created obstacles to 
Palestinian unity and identity in Lebanon. The groups did not work well together and 
Gabriel argues that the PLO was not unified on any social or political agenda, more 
specifically, Israel’s position or indeed the Palestinians’ role in Lebanon.70 Gabriel 
also argues that Al-Saiqa, founded in 1967 in Beirut and Damacus, was controlled and 
owned by the Syrians.71 Conversely, the PFLP, controlled by George Habash, was 
established not as a nationalist but as a radical, anti-Israeli ideological movement. The 
PDFLP was a PFLP splinter group, with a Marxist ideology and greater ties to the 
Soviet Union and Syria. In 1969, the Cairo Agreement was signed, giving the PLO 
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areas of operation outside the national parliamentary system and the strict Christian-
led Deuxième Bureau monitoring of the Palestinian refugee camps was terminated. 
The expulsion of the Palestinians from Jordan in 1970 and 1971 resulted in creating a 
‘state within a state’ in southern Lebanon that commonly became known as 
‘Fatahland’ situated along Israel’s northern border which gave the PLO a strategic 
vantage point for renewed attacks.   
 Between 1970 and 1973, Syria increased its funding and arming of PLO 
fighters, particularly Al-Saiqa, sending them to Lebanon in order to weaken further 
the central government and increase Lebanon’s future vulnerability to Syrian 
influence.72 In order to avert the challenges posed by the Jordanian war in 1970, the 
now strengthened and militarized PLO established strong ties with Lebanese Muslim 
groups, thereby creating substantive fears among the Christian community of 
becoming significantly outnumbered. Feghali argues that while in 1910 the Christian 
Lebanese community was seventy per cent of the population, by 1971 it accounted for 
a mere thirty per cent. With over three hundred thousand Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon, the threat of the Palestinians and PLO creating closer ties with the leftist 
Muslim factions led the Christian population to become significantly anxious.   
Beyond acting as the conflict’s catalyst in 1975, the Palestinians also had 
considerable links to its internal sectarian dynamics. Norton illustrates how in the 
early days of the civil war Al-Fatah represented the Lebanese Sunni community, 
whereby ‘as the fortunes of the PLO have waned in Lebanon, so have those of the 
Sunni community.’ 73  Rougier also highlights the inherent Sunni identity of 
Palestinians in Lebanon, but notes that the PLO’s main objective in the face of both 
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Syrian and Israeli intimidation was focused more on attaining Palestinian legitimacy 
regionally than pursuing a Lebanese Sunni identity.74  
Although the PLO became entangled in the Lebanese conflict, the Palestinian 
agenda was never concerned with domestic issues of Lebanese stability. This caused a 
fluctuation of relations between the Palestinian movement and the internal Lebanese 
groups. Moreover, other sectarian factions, including the Druze and Shi’a, showed 
some degree of solidarity with the PLO leading up to the war but mainly as a way to 
confront the anti-Palestinian, Christian establishment.75  
 
Al-Asad’s desires for Lebanon: creating a pax Syriana 
 
Syrian ambitions for dominance in Lebanon are founded on a historical pax Syriana 
and the claim of a Greater Syria, which included modern Lebanon, Israel and 
Palestine. This precedes the Ottoman Empire to a time when Syria ruled the regional 
caliphate of Bilad al-Sham. Researchers such as Kaufman, Rabil, Hourani, El-
Husseini and Koury, who have focused on Syria’s claims over Lebanon and the 
Levant, refer to this historical relationship’s importance. 76  In the contemporary 
discussion of Greater Syria, Ma’oz argues that Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad’s 
strategy of creating a new empire under a modern Greater Syria naturally included the 
desire to control Lebanon as a vital geostrategic post on the frontline against Israel. 
Ma’oz also claims that Asad’s interest in Lebanon arose from a need to control the 
anti-Syrian groups that were growing in Lebanon; to establish Syrian military 
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positions in Southern Lebanon aimed at threatening Israel; and to maximize the 
economic trade opportunities through the port of Beirut.77 Prior to the 1976 Arab 
League’s Riyadh Summit decision to deploy the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) in 
Lebanon, Asad had armed and supported the Syrian-aligned PLO fighters and their 
continued battle with the Kata’eb forces. By 1976, as the PLO grew in strength and 
joined forces with the leftist Lebanese Muslim factions, Asad questioned if his 
Greater Syria strategy would be more easily implemented with a weak Christian 
government. Had there been a partition of Lebanon, Israel would have been brought 
into the conflict. As such, Asad turned against Kamal Jumblatts’ Al-Hizb al-
Taqadummi al-Ishtiraki or Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the Palestinian 
forces, with Syria launching attacks against them until October 1976 with only 
minimal success. Deeb argues that Syria’s influence at this time was largely 
responsible for the conflict’s escalation through both the ADF and Syrian Armed 
Forces (SAF). He also claims that the Lebanese system’s vulnerability and instability 
intrinsically justified Syrian opportunism.78 Avi-Ran regards the Syrian intervention 
in 1976 and Syrian power’s consolidation in Lebanon throughout 1981 as the primary 
motivation for the 1982 Israeli invasion.79   
 At the Arab League and President Frangieh’s invitation, Asad was invited to 
contribute the majority of troops to the ADF in Lebanon. The ADF was loosely 
mandated as a peacekeeping force, although objective peacekeeping measures were 
never established. 80 The ADF was ultimately a Syrian intervention, disguised as a 
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collaborative peacekeeping force, and although Frangieh invited Syria to intervene in 
Lebanon, Syria’s aim was to replace the Lebanese leadership with a Syrian-dominated 
one.81  
In February 1978, Syrian forces, through the ADF, and Christian Lebanese 
Forces (LF) fought over the increased Syrian presence in East Beirut, known as ‘La 
Guerre des Cent Jours.’ The attempts to curb Syrian hegemony failed on all fronts 
and, following heavy Syrian shelling of Christian positions, a ceasefire was reached. 
On 26 October 1978, the ADF mandate was extended by Prime Minister Salim al-
Hoss, leading the Lebanese Christians accurately to prophesize the possibility of total 
Syrian domination. Avi-Ran maintains that the Syrian intervention fundamentally 
undermined the domestic Lebanese factions’ legitimacy within the national system, in 
turn increasing their dependence on Syria.82 Even following the ADF’s disbandment, 
Syria used the superficial peacekeeping pretext, claiming that the LAF was unable to 
control the situation and refusing to withdraw the SAF. Hanf’s views the Syrian 
presence in Lebanon as significantly responsible for the international involvement and 
the Israeli invasion under Operation Peace for Galilee.83 The divisions between the 
pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian Lebanese groups obstructed any possibility of national 
reconciliation and Syria remained in Lebanon throughout the remainder of the Civil 
War and up until 2005.84 Chapters Four and Five examine, in greater detail, Syria’s 
emerging role, its alliance with the Soviet Union and the impact of this on US policy 
decisions in Lebanon.  
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Israel’s invasions of Lebanon 
 
Operation Litani and Operation Peace for Galilee are the most well known Israeli 
actions recognized during the Lebanese Civil War. However, Israeli policies and 
actions toward Lebanon are not merely contained by these two physical battles nor 
can Israel’s policy toward Lebanon be superficially explained by the PLO-Israeli 
conflicts. There had been a string of confrontations between Israel and the PLO in 
Lebanon prior to the Civil War’s outbreak. Rabil argues that Operation Spring of 
Youth in 1973 demonstrated that Israel’s pursuit of influence in Lebanon was only 
partially driven by an Israeli desire to control the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel was also 
seeking out the geopolitical opportunities that a weakened Lebanese system 
presented.85 As Caplan argues, the Camp David Accords spearheaded by US President 
Jimmy Carter from 1977-1978 heralded a new path for Arab-Israeli ‘cold peace’ 
which delivered security but little opportunity. While Israeli Minister of Defense 
Ariel Sharon claimed that Israel’s actions in Lebanon were driven by security 
concerns and the pursuit of an Israeli-Lebanese Peace Agreement, Sharon or Israeli 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s reluctance to establish negotiations suggests that 
the Israeli military invasions formed part of a broader control strategy in the region.86  
 On 14 March 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon in response to a Palestinian 
hijacking and attack on an Israeli bus traveling from Haifa to Tel Aviv on 11 March. 
The attack left 37 Israelis dead and 78 wounded but also created an opportunity for 
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Israel to establish greater control over the region’s geopolitical context. Operation 
Litani was officially proposed by the Knesset as an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) 
mission to establish a buffer zone between the Palestinian military positions and 
Israel’s northern border. However the underlying Israeli intention was to punish the 
Palestinians for the hijacking and to demolish all PLO infrastructure south of the 
Litani River.87 The Israeli invasion also bolstered the Lebanese Christian idea of a 
possible national partition. While Lebanese President Elias Sarkis supported the 
partition, Lebanese Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss shared Asad’s view that this would 
strengthen the Christian-Israeli coalition.  
The invasion of Lebanon, which occurred under Operation Peace for Galilee 
on 6 June 1982, not only heralded another Israeli-led invasion but also signalled the 
arrival of international troops that Odeh argues were sent to placate Arab disquiet 
about an Israeli-Western conspiracy.88 The invasion was justified by Sharon as 
proportionate retaliation for Palestinian attacks throughout 1981 under the ‘War of the 
Kaytushas’ which saw thousands of civilians flee from Israel’s northern region.89 
However UN and international condemnation of the Israeli actions argued that 
the military mission was not proportionate to the threat that the PLO posed in 
southern Lebanon and, in fact, illustrated Sharon and Israeli Foreign Minister Itzhak 
Shamir’s broader military strategy in the region. Salem believes that the Israeli 
invasion of 1982 was key in transforming the Civil War from sectarian ‘violence’ into 
an international war, arguing that the Syrian and Israeli invasions of 1976 and 1978 
respectively lacked a sense of global urgency, and hence the precursors to 
internationalize the conflict were lacking. However, Operation Peace for Galilee not 
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only regionalised the conflict by antagonizing the Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian 
forces present in Lebanon, but also provided an incentive for the Reagan 
Administration to establish the MNFI. This ultimately diluted the domestic Lebanese 
conflict’s importance, transferring attention to the regional players instead.90 Later 
chapters will examine the Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-American relationship in 
greater depth as a key component of the establishment of US policy in Lebanon. 
 
Conclusion 
Lebanon’s consociational system formalized communal divisions that date back 
hundreds of years. The Ottoman Empire Mutasarrifiyya, subsequent French Mandate 
and evolution toward Modern Lebanon illustrate the complexities associated with 
establishing nation-building in such a fragmented and disjointed context. The 
seemingly progressive confessional reforms passed down by the Ottoman Empire 
ultimately became inherent weaknesses within the Lebanese system, which relied on 
stability to ensure a measure of success in the power-sharing model. Lebanon’s 
identity is a unique amalgamation of regional histories that led to the equally 
complicated Lebanese Civil War. The war was an inescapable frontier of 
interconnected communal, national, regional and international tensions.  
 The subsequent chapters do not detail the machinations of every Lebanese 
faction and their engagement with the complex Civil War, but separating the 
Lebanese context from the analysis of the US-led MNF would lead to the same 
mistakes that this thesis argues occurred under the Reagan Administration, which 
often overlooked these same intrinsically Lebanese dynamics, viewing the war instead 
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as being essentially caused by regional tensions and thereby merely an extension of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
US policy has always been ill-fated in Lebanon because every US President 
and Administration has failed to understand accurately the country or conflict’s 
dynamics, although it also could be said that, at the apogee of the Lebanese Civil 
War’s chaos, neither could many Lebanese leaders predict what would happen next.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Discontinuity and Legacy: US policy in Lebanon and the 
Middle East 
 
On 5 January 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered a passionate speech to 
the US Congress that would become the hallmark of his Administration’s policy 
toward Lebanon. The President outlined what is informally known as the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, a broad foundation to guide the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign policy 
goals, as well as the values of subsequent US administrations.1 Eisenhower set a 
precedent not only by attempting to leave his mark on the Middle East’s political 
complexities, but also by using Lebanon as a means to demonstrate the potency of the 
US presidency, through direct military intervention, diplomacy or a combination of 
the two.2  
Lebanon’s geostrategic position and internal divisions made it particularly 
susceptible to regional influences and conflict, as evidenced by the two modern 
Lebanese Civil Wars, in 1958 and from 1975-1989. This vulnerability also extended 
to international interventions by European and US governments seeking to advance 
their own foreign policy goals. Hence this chapter takes a closer look at US policy 
toward the Middle East and Lebanon before the Reagan presidency in order to 
understand the historical relationship between the US and the region and the 
conceptions, misconceptions, and ‘historical baggage’ that comprised the context for 
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the Reagan Administration’s Multinational Force (MNF) in the 1980s. It will start 
with a brief discussion of US foreign policy construction and then analyze the 
emergence of the US as the leading Western power under President Truman, the 
changes in the balance of power after the Suez Canal crisis, the formation of 
Eisenhower’s Middle East Resolution, Washington’s pro-Israeli shift under Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson and the effects of détente on US foreign policy in the Middle 
East.  
The focus, however, will be on two key periods in US-Lebanese history, 
namely the Eisenhower Administration between May and October 1958 and the 
Carter Administration between 1978 and 1980. The first period will examine the US-
led Operation Blue Bat in 1958, which was the first and the only other direct US 
military intervention in Lebanon, in light of the question of lessons learnt and legacies 
created. The second period, the Carter Administration, will be examined in order to 
understand why the Reagan Administration made such a distinct policy shift away 
from diplomacy.  
This chapter advances three arguments. First, it argues that while Operation 
Blue Bat created a precedent for US intervention in Lebanon, the Reagan 
Administration’s interventionist approach was not inherited from his predecessor. 
President Carter did not consider Lebanon a policy frontline because he believed 
Lebanon represented an unrealistic challenge and he did not want to jeopardise his 
work on the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks for an unlikely victory in Lebanon. Second, 
it argues that the Reagan Administration inherited a complicated context in Lebanon, 
characterised by US policy discontinuity.3 The vacillation between interventionist and 
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non-interventionist policies resulted in the creation of a complicated and contradictory 
history for US foreign policy in Lebanon. Third, this chapter further argues that 
Reagan’s actions in the 1980s demonstrated that his Administration had not learnt 
important lessons from Eisenhower’s military intervention or Carter’s diplomatic 
manoeuvring around the respective Lebanon crises.  
 
War Powers and Washington’s foreign policy construction 
The US military involvement in World War II illustrated that Washington’s 
isolationism had been replaced by an internationalist approach. This meant US 
foreign policy became increasingly more important as each post-war US 
administration sought opportunities for international influence and control. Dowty 
identifies the following seven important factors of foreign policy development that 
relate to the Reagan, Carter and Eisenhower Administrations: small nations’ 
vulnerability, US actions’ legality, indirect aggression, danger to the state, the need 
for economic development, the non-permanent U.S. presence and the need for arms 
control. 4  As a result, there is an ongoing struggle for the balance of power between 
US foreign policy goals, international order, moral agency and ‘extraregional 
hegemony.’5 Layne, Dobson, Marsh and Herring argue that US motivations for 
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greater international influence were driven by US desires for global hegemony in a 
shattered post-War international system.6  
Indeed it was this fractured international landscape that created both a 
challenge and opportunity for the US. As the US took up the mantle as the leading 
western power, a growing rift ensued between the restraints of the US constitutional 
system and the agency and power of the foreign policy machine.7 Expanding this rift 
was the distribution of power within Washington specifically between the legislative 
and executive branches. On the one hand the President holds the chief executive 
authority and responsibility for broad US diplomatic actions including the deployment 
of US troops overseas and the inauguration of broad doctrinal policies. This also 
includes the Department of State and Department of Defense as the key cabinet 
bureaucracies responsible for US foreign policy.8 On the other hand, the US Congress 
is the constitutional legislature exerting influence and limiting controls over the 
authority of the US Presidency. An example was the War Powers Resolution of 1973 
which theoretically gave greater controls to Congress to limit Presidential executive 
powers by requiring the approval of Congress for the deployment of troops and the 
operational strategy. This technically meant that the President had to declare US 
intentions to commit troops overseas 48 hours before a deployment, as well as, 
limiting such a deployment to 90 days. Any escalations or extensions thereafter also 
required congressional approval.  
While the aim of the Was Powers Resolution was to ensure greater executive 
branch accountability, there were alternative avenues for the executive authority to 
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overcome these bureaucratic and legislative controls.9 For instance, if an intervention 
is launched under an ‘executive agreement’ then under the 22 August 1972 Case-
Zablocki Act (USC 112a & 113) the President is required to submit the text and terms 
of the agreement to Congress for pre-approval before it can be officially ratified.10 
However, if the intervention or treaty is considered an understanding between the US 
and a foreign country then it is not required to be pre-approved. This distinction was 
fundamental to Reagan’s deployment of the MNF in Lebanon because the terms and 
mandate of the force were outlined under a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between 
the Christian Lebanese Government and the US, rather than an international executive 
agreement.11 The Reagan Administration circumvented the authority of Congress over 
the intervention in Lebanon so as to avoid statutory limitations being placed on the 
flow of economic or military aid as had occurred in 1982 with the Contras fight 
against the Sandinista Junta in Nicaragua. In this case, while the Congressional 
directives proved relatively ineffective, Congress actively tried to prohibit the 
Administration and CIA from furnishing the Contras with military aid.12  
Because of the numerous occasions that the executive authority circumvented 
these Congressional controls, Rosati and Scott argue that controls over Washington’s 
purse strings are ‘only somewhat’ useful in advancing Congress’ authority over the 
President. Yet the threat of a statutory economic block, nonetheless, is an obstacle for 
any Administration requiring Congressional approval to implement a foreign policy 
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agreement.13 This issue becomes more significant when the US develops its active and 
interventionist foreign policy. As such this is more relevant, for example, during the 
Carter years than during the Eisenhower era which, in part, accounts for why 
Eisenhower had little resistance when he launched the enormous 14,000-strong 
intervention in Lebanon under Operation Blue Bat. 
The flexibility of foreign policy decisions also fluctuate depending on the US 
House of Representatives and Senate majorities in the Congress. Given that a two-
thirds Senate majority is required for diplomatic appointments and international 
treaties, congressional support varies depending on a Democratic or Republican 
majority, especially in the Senate. While Carter enjoyed a rare dual House and Senate 
Democratic majority throughout his Presidency, Reagan benefitted from a Republican 
majority in the Senate. Indeed, this was the first Republican majority in either 
chamber since the 83rd Congress which occurred during Eisenhower’s first two years 
from 1953 to 1955. Conversely Democrat President Harry Truman struggled through 
what he labelled a ‘Do-Nothing Congress’ with both chambers holding a Republican 
majority. It made the justifications of Truman’s foreign policy vital to being able to 
pass his bills through the Congress.14 
  
 
The Truman Doctrine:  laying the foundations for US Middle East 
policy 
Although the ‘Do-Nothing Congress’ obstructed Truman’s domestic and international 
decision-making process, the President still managed to transform the US from an 
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inward looking country into actively seizing the international opportunities presented 
by the aftermath of World War II. While this transformation is usually discussed with 
respect to the post-War reconstruction of Western Europe and containing Soviet 
expansionism, this section will argue that the Truman doctrine also created the 
foundations for an active and interventionist US foreign policy in the Middle East.15 
Groisser argues that ‘before 1947 the United States did not have a clearly thought-
through policy in its dealings with the Middle East…the United States relied on 
Britain and France to represent and protect its vital interests.’16 However by 1947 the 
French mandates in Lebanon and Syria as well as the Italian colonial occupation of 
Libya were over. As such, Britain was left as the only remaining European power in 
the region. Yet British dominance was waning as it continued to struggle through the 
economic downturns after the World War.17  
On 21 February 1947, the British government, under Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee, announced that by 31 March British military and financial assistance, which 
had previously been given to Greek King Geórgios II to protect the Greek monarchy 
from a communist overthrow by factions unified under the Ethniko Apeleftherotiko 
Metopo or National Liberation Front, would cease. As there had been few directs 
links between the Soviet Union and the Greek communists the mere withdrawal of 
British assistance from Geórgios did not justify US intervention in and of itself. 
However, Soviet actions, in the other nearby northern tier states, Turkey and Iran, in 
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the pursuit of oil resources and geopolitical control triggered the US into action.18 The 
‘Truman Doctrine’, announced on 12 March 1947,19 saw its first priority in providing 
four hundred million dollars of economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey to 
combat the communist forces as part of its broader policy of Soviet containment by 
actively confronting communist threats in the ‘free world.’ 20 
The Truman Administration also supported the creation of the state of Israel as 
a means of solidifying the US position in the region.21 Truman himself gave de facto 
recognition to the Jewish state before it had even been declared, angering many in his 
own Administration, particularly the State Department. 22  Truman’s decision to 
effectively become ‘the midwife of the State of Israel’ was as much to do with the 
unstoppable momentum of the Jewish state in Palestine as the threat of Soviet 
influence in supporting and recognising the Israeli state first.23 Bryson argues that 
Truman’s decision to recognise and support the creation of the Israeli state was an 
‘aberration in the nation’s foreign policy’ because it threatened the US relationship 
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with the oil producing Arab states upon which the US depended.24 However, given the 
USSR’s aggressive actions in Europe in 1948, namely the blockade in Berlin and the 
Soviet annexation of Czechoslovakia, Truman’s desires to contain Soviet influence 
and create a strong Middle East ally in Israel, seemed justified.25 Truman also 
personally believed that establishing Israel was the morally right thing to do in light 
of the Holocaust and therefore, in part, created Judeo-Christian religious justifications 
for the Zionist movement and bond between the US and Israel. 
The early 1950s also illustrated a key time in the evolution of US policy in the 
Middle East as the US developed stronger economic and military ties with countries 
where British influence was in decline. This could be seen in Egypt throughout 1950 
and 1951 where the ruling Egyptian Hizb al-Wafd party and the growing Egyptian 
nationalist movement called for the removal of the British from Suez26 and in Iran 
following the May 1951 nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by Iranian 
Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.27 While the British appealed to the US to 
assist with a military intervention at the Abadan oil fields, Truman refused to 
overthrow the Iranian leader while the US continued negotiating with Iran for oil 
supplies. Even though he took a hard public line against Mossadegh, Truman saw him 
as the only option in Iran throughout 1952 going as far as providing economic and 
military assistance to Iran to keep them away from the Soviet Union.28  
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The Eisenhower Doctrine: curbing Arab Nationalism 
While the Truman Administration was inherently concerned with Soviet expansion, 
Podeh, Donovan and Lenczowski claim that the last years of the Truman presidency 
both aggravated American-Soviet relations and also led to the failure to secure US 
interests in the Middle East.29 As a result President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was 
inaugurated in January 1953, launched a more active Soviet containment policy.30  
A significant difference between the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations 
came with Eisenhower’s handling of Mossadegh. Moving away from supporting the 
Iranian leader, Eisenhower approved a CIA mission known as Operation TP-AJAX, 
in collaboration with the British, to topple Mossadegh. The covert operation 
succeeded and the US supplanted British dominance with the appointment of the US-
backed Shah Reza Pahlavi’s. 31  The Iranian operation illustrated Eisenhower’s 
commitment to military, albeit covert, intervention in protecting US resource interests 
and confronting Soviet influence in the region. Indeed with respect to this, many 
scholarly arguments focus on the impact of the Soviet Union on Eisenhower’s US 
foreign policy making.32 Dawisha, Halliday, Taylor and Smolansky posit that Soviet 
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containment lay at the heart of foreign policy decision-making under the Eisenhower 
Administration. However, Magnus accurately notes that the Soviet Union did not 
enter the Arab-Israeli context until 1955 with the Soviet Union's sale of arms to Egypt 
through Czechoslovakia.33 The Czech crisis was ultimately about the US not selling 
arms to Nasser. As a result the Egyptian leader began buying arms from the Soviet 
Union through Czechoslovakia. The Egyptian-Czech arms crisis signalled both the 
Soviet entrance into the Middle East and the possibility of an arms race in the region. 
This, in turn, as Polk argues almost led Syria and Saudi Arabia following in Egypt’s 
footsteps in requesting aid from the Soviets, as well as, the end of US mediated 
‘northern tier’ security.34 It created a heightened awareness in the US of Soviet 
influence in the Middle East and it set the ball rolling for the 1956 Suez Crisis.35  
Reacting to what the US perceived as Egypt sliding into the Soviet camp, the 
US cut the funding of the building of the Aswan Dam. In need of money to continue 
the construction of this prestige project Nasser nationalised the Anglo-French Suez 
Canal Company on 26 July 1956. Fearing that the loss of control of the West’s key oil 
channel would precipitate a loss of colonial control throughout the Middle East and 
North Africa, France and Britain colluded with Israel to attack Egypt in order to 
depose Nasser on 29 October 1956.36  
Eisenhower publicly condemned the attack on Egypt, concerned that it could 
provoke the Soviets into action if the French, British and Israelis refused to withdraw. 
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Placing considerable pressure on the European leaders to withdraw Eisenhower was 
able to, on 7 November, effect a ceasefire and a UN peacekeeping force in Egypt, 
followed by British and French withdrawal on 22 December 1956.  
Eisenhower’s diplomatic wrangling during the Suez Crisis became the 
bedrock of the US president’s management of policy in the Middle East that included 
protecting Western interests and preventing Soviet control. 37  The Anglo-French 
political misfortunes of Suez created an opportunity for a new beginning in US 
foreign policy which US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed led to the 
need for an ‘American moral superiority.’38 Yet, as Lenczoswki argues, it also 
bolstered Soviet influence on Arab leaders at the expense of the Western powers.39 
Both became the underpinnings of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was a response to 
the spread of Nasser’s Arab nationalism and the emergence of a growing 
revolutionary Arab nationalist movement rejecting the US. 40  The Eisenhower 
Doctrine, signed on 9 March 1957, stated, 
that the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any 
nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East desiring such 
assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the 
maintenance of national independence.41 
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Under the resolution US allies, such as Lebanon, were guaranteed economic 
assistance and an assurance that their country’s integrity was the Eisenhower 
Administration’s priority.42 The resolution’s aim was twofold: firstly, to confront 
Soviet expansion in the Middle East and secondly to counter the destabilising, anti-
Western effects of Nasser’s pan-Arabism on US-aligned Arab governments. The 
resolution further outlined that, 
to this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States 
is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such 
nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country 
controlled by international communism.43 
 
This was the start of a policy that would see the Arab world on the frontline of an 
emerging US imperialism because it created an avenue for threatened leaders to 
request US support. However, the Middle East Resolution ultimately represented an 
opportunity for the region’s leaders, such as Lebanese President Camille Cham’un, to 
get their houses in order with the assistance of the US military and political machine. 
Indeed Cham’un, who wanted a second term as Lebanese president despite 
constitutional restrictions to one term, blamed the Arab nationalists for the political 
turmoil in the 1957 parliamentary elections and the communal tensions triggered by 
his personal ambitions. Pointing an accusing finger at Nasser, Cham’un met with the 
US Ambassador to Lebanon, Robert McClintock, in 1958 asking for US support as he 
was now critically threatened by communist forces.44  
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The 1958 Lebanon Crisis and Operation Blue Bat 
The history of US policy in Lebanon often begins with the deployment of US Marines 
on the beaches of Beirut under Operation Blue Bat on 15 July 1958.45 Indeed 
Operation Blue Bat has been referred to as Eisenhower’s ‘finest hour’ because he 
successfully placated communal and regional tensions as well as instituting change in 
the Lebanese leadership.46   
The existing scholarly literature regarding Eisenhower’s motivation for 
intervening in Lebanon advances two key arguments, one focusing on regional, the 
other on the internal justifications. With respect to the former, Traboulsi maintains 
that the regional build up of Nasserite Arab nationalism (and its tacit alignment with 
the Soviet Union) was the US administration’s main interest in Lebanon.47 Similarly 
Mehta, Taylor and Saltonstall claim that the US attempted to create a ‘ring of steel’ 
around the Soviet Union where Lebanon was merely an extension of this superpower 
frontline. They argue that an aggressive policy of encircling the Soviet Union meant 
strengthening US Arab allies such as Cham’un.48  
With respect to the latter Alin posits that it was the internal political 
instabilities in Lebanon that led Cham’un to turn to Britain, France and the US to 
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intervene and save his presidency rather than merely a Nasserite threat. 49 Alin, 
Gendzier and Little argue that the close relationship between the US and Lebanon was 
more a result of economic security of the lucrative Trans-Arabian Pipeline 
(TAPLINE) and the relationship between the US and the Lebanese bourgeoisie that 
had developed under Cham’un rather than the broad ideological anti-communist or 
anti-Nasserite movement.50  
This thesis places its argument between these two positions, carefully 
separating the motivations that influenced Cham’un to invite the US to intervene in 
Lebanon and those fundamentally underpinning the US decision to intervene. The US 
decision to intervene in Lebanon was the product of growing ideological debates in 
Washington that were heightened by the 14 July 1958 coup against the Iraqi 
monarchy. Given the Europeans had failed to secure the Suez Canal, Eisenhower saw 
the pro-British monarchy’s swift overthrow in Iraq and the impending crisis in Jordan 
as a sign of radical changes in the region.51 The deployment of 14,000 conventional 
US troops to Lebanon ultimately symbolized Washington’s commitment to protecting 
US regional allies against the threat of both Arab nationalism and communism. 
Whether or not it succeeded is questionable. However this thesis agrees with Alin that 
Cham’un’s request for assistance was ultimately driven by the leader’s fear for his 
presidency rather than the broad ideological threats that the region faced.  
 
Operation Blue Bat 
 
At 2:30pm on 14 July 1958, Cham’un sent an urgent message to Eisenhower, 
requesting immediate military support to intercede in the Lebanese tensions within 48 
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hours. In making this request Cham’un was invoking the Eisenhower Doctrine’s 
Middle East Resolution, claiming that Lebanon’s sovereignty was under threat of a 
Communist and Nasserite takeover.52 Cham’un’s claims of a communist or Nasserist 
uprising were unverified and the perceptible threat to his presidency was 
questionable. 53  Although Cham’un was democratically elected he had failed to 
manage the influx of Nasserite forces from the United Arab Republic (of Egypt and 
Syria) and control the internal communal tensions portraying him as politically and 
militarily impotent.54 The State Department believed that Cham’un was a ‘panicky 
individual’ who had turned to the US for a quick-fix solution given the crisis affecting 
Jordan and Iraq. Even Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev challenged the legitimacy of 
Cham’un’s leadership.55  
Yet, the Eisenhower Administration’s recognition of Nasserite and Soviet 
influences in the Middle East did not, in itself, justify costly military intervention in 
Lebanon. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles even asked, ‘has Lebanon any 
intrinsic value - isn’t there a less costly way of blaming Nasser than this?’56 While the 
US publicly acknowledged ‘the perception that Arab nationalist and Western interests 
stood poised against one another in the Middle East’, caution was also exercised to 
avoid further polarising the Arab leaders and running the risk of pushing them to take 
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sides with Nasser or the USSR.57 On the one hand Dulles strongly questioned whether 
military intervention was the right way to handle the tensions that were playing out in 
Lebanon.58 On the other, however, a failure to act quickly would also have been the 
death knell for the Eisenhower Doctrine and would have illustrated US reluctance to 
fulfil its promise to the Middle East. 
As key US regional allies became concerned that the Nasser-led UAR would 
become an existential and strategic threat to Lebanon, the US was forced to consider 
some sort of intervention. Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal told the US that if he did not see 
tangible US action relating to the Lebanon crisis, then the Saudis would be forced to 
cooperate with UAR policies.59 Similarly, as Shlaim argues, Israel’s Prime Minister 
Ben-Gurion, worried that should the UAR’s influence spread across the Middle East 
Israel would be surrounded by pan-Arabist groups that rejected Israel’s existence.60 
Ben-Gurion argued that the immediate threat to Lebanon could not be solved simply 
through dependence on the US but rather that it would be cutting off Nasser and his 
Arab nationalist support for the internal Lebanese groups in Lebanon that would 
ensure this.61  
Even once the final decision to deploy troops in Lebanon was made, 
Eisenhower remained reluctant to commit himself to a possible intervention.62 As 
Eisenhower stated,  
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There were a few minor unpleasantnesses until the news of Iraq came and the 
fact that Lebanon had, under the Eisenhower Doctrine, asked for our aid…. 
The decision had apparently been made to go into Lebanon…The second and 
more important question is do we, or do we not, stick by our friends, in this 
case, Chamoun. The answer has to be that we do.63 
 
Consequently, he stated that the ‘landing should be [a] surprise’ for all domestic, 
regional and international parties including Cham’un. 64  Neither Eisenhower nor 
Dulles wished to issue a forewarning either to Cham’un or the other factions in Beirut 
that the US was going to enter Lebanon, in order to continue the pressure on all 
parties to negotiate.65 Furthermore Dulles was certain that he was not sending US 
troops into Beirut to support the upcoming possible ‘re-election’ of Cham’un as 
president. Rather, Dulles focused instead on instating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 
Commander, General Fouad Chehab, as president at the end of the US mission given 
that the Lebanese general enjoyed considerable popularity within the Muslim 
communities and because the US Secretary of State believed that ‘Cham’un will fall 
after we get out.’66 
 By 15 July 1958, the US marines had landed in Lebanon and additional US 
tanker aircraft and military divisions were prepared for deployment.67 By 16 July 
Eisenhower had decided to send former Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Robert 
Murphy, to Lebanon as the President’s key aide.68 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
situation report on 16 and 17 July indicated that all US Marines had landed without 
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disruption and that Beirut was once again stable.69 While Chehab had committed fully 
to the US intervention, the growing discontent amongst the Sunni elites meant that he 
did not believe that the LAF’s non-Christian contingents would support him.70  
There was also a heightened risk of the US encountering aggressive resistance 
from Nasser or UAR fighters, meaning that the effort it would take to shape a 
definitive victory was no longer practical.71 Within four days of the US troop 
deployment in Lebanon, Eisenhower, Dulles and the State Department realized that a 
negative outcome of the Lebanese intervention could have serious implications for the 
Administration’s foreign policy elsewhere. All too late, the State Department alleged 
that further pressure to make Cham’un consider reconciliation terms would have been 
more appropriate than the deployment of US troops.72 Realising Eisenhower’s worst 
fears, the mission became a threat to the Administration as it quickly realized that 
Lebanon was a political vacuum where little justification for US actions existed.  
As a result it is questionable whether Operation Blue Bat had in fact been 
Eisenhower’s ‘finest hour’ or whether perhaps the US President had, in part, been 
lucky. First, Cham’un’s removal and Chehab’s inauguration meant that stability 
returned to Beirut.73 Although Chehab’s ‘election victory’ raised the possibility of 
future Nasserite influence in Lebanon, the incoming president was the only viable 
leader who had the power to resolve the crisis and ultimately bring peace to 
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Lebanon.74 Chehab’s election fundamentally enabled the US to consider a withdrawal 
before any catastrophic damage to US credibility occurred. However the fate of 
Cham’un’s presidency was already sealed prior to the US intervention given the 
internal and regional momentum for his removal by May 1958. 
Second, because there had been no major loss of US personnel during the 
operation Eisenhower had not faced much domestic criticism and was easily able to 
justify the intervention as a deterrent peacekeeping mission. Eisenhower painted the 
intervention as an ‘unswerving adherence to the principles’ of the UN’s peacekeeping 
charter and that military force was necessary to overcome the aggression faced by a 
democratically-elected President. 75 However, not only had the UN Secretary-General 
Dag Hammarskjöld opposed the US’ hastiness to militarily intervene but also had the 
mission become entangled in a protracted offensive between the US forces and the 
internal Lebanese or UAR-sponsored militias it could have quickly changed from a 
deterrent peacekeeping mission into a US combat force. 76 
Combined, it is arguable that these two factors allowed Eisenhower and 
Washington’s decision makers to claim victory and sense of accomplishment in the 
deployment of the troops in Lebanon.  
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Courtship, Détente and Dissonance: 1961-1978 
It would be twenty-four years between the withdrawal of US troops under Operation 
Blue Bat and the next official US-led military intervention in Lebanon under 
President Ronald Reagan. And while Eisenhower’s animated concerns over Nasserite 
and communist influences in the Middle East led to military intervention in Lebanon, 
the following two decades saw Lebanon take a back seat in US foreign policy.  
This section will briefly outline the development of US foreign policy under 
the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon and Gerald 
Ford as a background to the Carter Administration. Particularly this section examines 
the US decision-making policy shifts in reference to the Soviet Union and Israel. 
Three key arguments are advanced. First, both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson laid 
the foundations for a decisive pro-Israeli shift in US policy in the 1960s. Second, 
there was a waning influence of the Soviet Union with the introduction of détente 
under both Nixon and Ford meaning the relevance of Soviet influence in US policy in 
the Middle East diminished by 1974. Finally, the outbreak of the 1973 Yom 
Kippur/Ramadan War demonstrated the fundamental limitations of détente but also 
elevated the position of Egypt in the lead up to the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks in 
1978.  
 
Divorce and Courtship: Nasser and Israel 
 
While the election of President Kennedy in 1961 saw a continuation of the global 
Soviet containment policy as under both Truman and Eisenhower, Kennedy 
decisively shifted away from the anti-Arab nationalist ideology that had been a part of 
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US policy in the Middle East during the previous decade.77 As a coup d’état in Syria 
in September 1961 led to Syria seceding from the UAR, the grand Nasserite vision for 
pan-Arab unity faded.78 As a result Kennedy worked to overcome American fears of 
Nasser and reach out to the Egyptian president and other regional Arab nationalist 
leaders. Kennedy believed that an economically strong and independent Egypt, free of 
both Soviet and Western control, could in fact support long term US interests in the 
region. It would also show that globally ‘the United States could live with political 
and economic diversity.’ 79  
Kennedy truly believed that increased aid to Egypt and greater US 
participation in Arab-Israeli mediation would further cut off the Soviets in the Middle 
East. As such, Kennedy managed to briefly convince Nasser into a working 
partnership while US aid money flowed steadily into Cairo. However, by September 
1962, with the Nasserite supported republican revolutionary Abdullah as-Sallal’s 
coup d’état in Yemen over royalist leader Imam Muhammad al-Badr, the US-Nasser 
relationship was tested to breaking point.80 Not only did the crisis demonstrate that 
Kennedy had failed to create a sustainable alliance with Nasser, both practically and 
ideologically, but that regional US allies such as Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were 
rapidly growing concerned with the ambiguity of US policy. Specifically they worried 
about Kennedy’s view that Nasser and the Arab nationalists may hold the solution to 
the tensions in the Middle East.81  
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By 1963 the Yemeni crisis and Nasser’s refusal to cooperate with US requests 
to withdraw Egyptian troops, created the basis for the Kennedy Administration to 
undermine the three-year US rapprochement with Egypt and return to healing the 
bruised relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Kennedy’s idealism in attempting 
to reconcile US influence with the Arab secular nationalists had come further than 
other US presidents but still failed to produce a long lasting relationship.82  
This resulted in another important shift during the 1960s to a more pro-Israeli 
foreign policy. While Kennedy’s assassination cut short his constantly changing 
Middle East policy, his initial policy changes with Israel sowed the seeds for his 
successor, President Johnson, to become the most pro-Israeli US President up until 
that period. 83  As Bass highlights, without significant consultation with his 
Administration, Kennedy manoeuvred around the State Department and opened up 
legislation allowing unlimited arms sales to Israel in 1962.84 In 1965, Johnson decided 
to begin the sale of M48A3 Tanks and A-4 Skyhawk Aircraft to Israel believing that 
this would deter Nasser and the Soviets from creating an Arab arms race in the 
Middle East.85 
The new found closeness between Israel and the US was not without its 
limitations and the Six Day War in 1967 demonstrated that above all, Johnson did not 
want to become entangled in another direct military intervention in the region, 
especially if it was to be seen as unequivocally supporting Israel against Arab nations, 
allies or otherwise.86 Johnson referred the crisis to the UN to find a solution but did 
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not demand an immediate Israeli withdrawal of occupied territories that Israel had 
won until after a sustainable peace settlement could be found.87 Quandt astutely 
proposes that Johnson genuinely wished to avoid war but had ultimately given a 
‘yellow light’ to the Israelis when he realized that war was unavoidable. That is, the 
policy shift was subtler than the simplistic argument of US-Israeli collusion or a US 
‘green light’ for the Israeli attacks. However, the shift is still significant because it 
created the bedrock of the US-Israeli special relationship in the wake of the 1967 
War.88 
 
Détente and the Middle East 
 
The 1960s came to a close and with the new decade came a wide spread reduction in 
Soviet influence in US foreign policy internationally. The days of Truman, 
Eisenhower and Kennedy’s confrontation with the Soviets in the ‘Third World’ 
waned. As Hanhimäki argues, détente was a conservative policy that was aimed at 
reducing the Soviet threat to the US brought on by the nuclear arms race and 
Vietnam. Similarly this section argues that détente with the Soviet Union overall led 
to a relaxed US position in the Middle East while US Presidents Nixon and Ford 
attempted to extricate themselves from the Vietnam war and its aftermath.89  
Aside from the continued Soviet sponsorship of Syria there was a thawing of 
superpower tensions in the Middle East between 1969 and 1973. However, the 
October 1973 Arab Israeli war threatened this rapprochement. The US had believed 
the Israelis would win the war quickly and wanted to keep the Soviets from 
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intervening in support of Egypt and thereby risking a direct superpower conflict.90 
Egyptian successes as they moved into the Sinai bolstered morale that had been 
shattered by the 1967 War. While the war ultimately demonstrated the limitations and 
vulnerability of détente it also led to a shift in the position of Egypt regionally as 
Nixon was forced to accept Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s new found power as 
‘Batal al 'ubur’ or Hero of the Crossing. As a direct antecedent to Carter’s Camp 
David Accords, the 1973 War illustrated Israel’s complacency and Egypt’s elevated 
importance in any Arab-Israeli negotiation.91 
Feeling the effects of Nixon’s Watergate scandal, a US economic recession 
and a burgeoning public discontent, Ford’s forays in Middle East were limited. The 
lack of progress on the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations after the 1973 War, the 
emerging power of the political lobby groups and public opinion in foreign policy 
meant Ford had little recourse when Lebanon erupted into conflict in 1975.92 With 
congressional blocking of military aid to Vietnam and the announcement on 21 April 
1975 that the US involvement in the Vietnam War was over, Ford was unable to 
request funds for an intervention in Lebanon, especially where no proven US interest 
existed.93 Even when US Ambassador to Lebanon Francis Meloy Jr. was assassinated 
by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Ford refused to militarily 
respond and risk further derailing the Egyptian-Israeli talks.94 The CIA inquiry into 
Meloy’s murder cited that it was done to ‘induce a state of tension and chaos’ and 
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because of ‘anti-American attitudes’ that came from the US’ regional Arab-Israeli 
involvement rather than anything exclusively or uniquely Lebanese.95 The extent of 
Ford’s engagement with Lebanon was to order the evacuation of US diplomatic and 
civilian personnel from Beirut in 1976. As though a precursor to the Carter 
Administration’s policy in the region, Ford demonstrated that Lebanon was far from 
being a priority for US policy in the region.96 
 
Carter and US policy towards Lebanon 
US President James Earl Carter is often portrayed as being one of the key Presidential 
peacemakers in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 97  Carter’s pursuit of a 
diplomatic solution to the regional tensions resulted in the Camp David Accords on 
17 September 1978, which formed the basis for an Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement 
in 1979. Carter’s personal mediation between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin 
and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat resulted in the Carter Administration receiving 
international recognition.  
The reinvigoration of the moribund talks between Begin and Sadat was 
Carter’s greatest accomplishment and represented the US President’s patch on the 
complicated, volatile Arab-Israeli quilt. However, while the announcement of the 
peace accords sent rapturous congratulations to Washington from all over the world, a 
volatile war was still being played out in Lebanon. Carter believed that Lebanon 
represented an unrealistic challenge to the type of diplomatic resolution for which the 
US President was being celebrated elsewhere. This section examines how the Carter 
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Administration circumvented the conflict in Lebanon and analyzes the principal 
reasons for this.98 
 
Lebanon on the periphery 
 
By 18 September 1978, the six-month-old UN Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon 
had failed to enforce a recognised ceasefire between the Lebanese factions, the PLO, 
Israel and Syria. Carter did not favour US involvement in Lebanon, either military or 
diplomatic, as he believed, correctly, that it would backfire on his Administration. 
This thesis argues that Lebanon was not a policy frontline for the Carter 
Administration but was, in the main, disregarded, even though the President 
recognised the seriousness of the conflict. One reason for Carter’s seemingly 
uninterested, detached policy toward Lebanon was the Egyptian-Israeli talks and the 
careful strategy that Carter employed to avoid upsetting or distracting either of the 
leaders, Begin or Sadat. While Carter acknowledged Lebanon’s ‘chronic troubles’, 
‘sense of hopelessness’ and the tragic humanitarian quagmire, Carter chose to do 
nothing, despite his deep commitment to human rights.99 No more appropriately could 
Carter’s policy in Lebanon be exemplified than in the President’s own memoirs, 
where Lebanon is only referenced casually.  
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Sadat asked if I had devoted much time to this problem [Lebanon], I had to 
admit that since direct American interest was aroused primarily in moments of 
crisis, we had not mounted a concerted effort to find a permanent solution to 
the continuing Lebanese tragedy.100 
 
There is a tension between how Carter recognised the ‘tragedy’ in Lebanon and the 
way he openly admitted that this did not constitute what his Administration saw as 
vital to US national interest. Lebanon was in many ways doomed not to be a policy 
frontline from the beginning of Carter’s Presidency.101  
Another reason for Carter’s refusal to become involved in Lebanon was that 
the he no longer saw Soviet military influence in Lebanon of concern. Moreover, the 
Arab communist parties throughout the region had been decisively crushed by the 
Carter period. As Assistant to the National Security Advisor, William Quandt, 
explained, 
The USSR has progressively lost ground over the past eight years in the 
booming Middle East and North African market, according to a CIA report. 
Although the loss of economic contact with Egypt is apparent, the Soviets 
have also seen their market share decline in such nations as Iraq and Syria102  
 
In fact, during US Ambassador to Lebanon John Gunther Dean’s meeting with the 
Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon, Alexander Soldatov, a cooperative dialogue between 
the two superpowers was suggested. Soldatov wanted the Soviet Union to be kept 
abreast of all US aid and support programs in Lebanon to establish a shared platform 
on which to collaborate. ‘I remarked that the USSR and the US seemed to have some 
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policies in common in Lebanon, i.e., maintenance of the cease-fire and strengthening 
the central government.’103   
 
Operation Litani  
   
In January 1978, the Carter Administration became aware that the Israelis saw Syrian 
influence in Lebanon as ‘naughty’ and further claimed that the,  
growing armed build-up in south Lebanon as a worrisome factor and the 
possibility that Boumediene “running around the area” was a prelude to some 
kind of blow-up in south Lebanon which ‘would be the last thing we need at 
this moment.104  
 
The Israeli position was clear in that ‘Israel preferred the vacuum in south Lebanon be 
filled by the terrorists rather than the Syrians.’105 The Israelis wanted the territories in 
the south to be handed back to President Sarkis and the LAF, despite the fact that it 
was clear that both lacked the military or diplomatic capital needed to monitor the 
Palestinians or the Syrian-led Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) presence. Israel argued 
that Sarkis, whom they considered an impotent leader, coupled with an unruly region, 
was better than Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad’s hegemony so close to Israel’s 
northern border.106  
As a result, on 15 March 1978, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) moved into 
Southern Lebanon in a targeted attack against the Palestinians stationed there. Israel 
claimed that retaliation was justified due to the Coastal Road Massacre, which was a 
fatal PLO hijacking of an Israeli bus from Haifa on its way to Tel Aviv on 11 March. 
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The Israeli invasion was known as Operation Litani and Schmitt argues, evidenced by 
the operation’s name, that Israel’s primary goal was to push the Palestinian forces 
north beyond the Litani River.107 Containing and forcing the Palestinians north was, 
however, not the only reason for the Israeli invasion.  
Authorised by Begin, Operation Litani signalled the beginning of Israel’s 
interventionist policy in Lebanon. In April and May 1978, Israeli Special Forces made 
another incursion into the Lebanese cities of Beirut and Sidon to raid the Popular 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) and Fatah.108  While 
Operation Litani had all the hallmarks of a clear-cut international invasion of a 
sovereign nation and also illustrated Israel’s broader agenda of controlling the 
geopolitical opportunities arising from Lebanon’s instability, Carter decided to remain 
neutral. Carter believed that the Lebanese conflict’s cessation and the removal of the 
IDF was ultimately the responsibility of the Lebanese leadership and the LAF. 
Obviously, the responsibility for resolving the Lebanon question rests 
primarily on the shoulders of those who live there… We gave them some aid 
so that the President of that country can control the affairs of the country 
itself.109 
 
Aside from Carter’s prayers and the symbolic planting of a Cedar of Lebanon in the 
White House grounds on 28 April 1978, the US President did little to address the 
Lebanese conflict. While acknowledging the difficult, violent situation, no tangible 
support was offered outside a proposed strengthening of US-Lebanese relations.110  
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However, the Carter Administration placed more pressure on Lebanon than on 
Israel, in an attempt to force Sarkis to pass a Lebanese defense bill, which was 
amenable to the majority of fractured Lebanese communities.111 The proposed bill 
mandated that the LAF would take control of those areas currently under the ADF and 
UNIFIL within a few months.112 Yet the reality of Sarkis being able to reconcile all 
parties to enable this to happen was improbable, as Carter was aware. He stated, ‘the 
Lebanese government could not even send troops into its own southern territory.’113  
As a result, Sarkis turned to France in order to bolster his position and reassure 
the Lebanese Christians that their political status in Lebanon would remain secure.114 
Sarkis’ discussions with France effectively relieved Carter of the obligation to resolve 
the Lebanese crisis and allowed the US to forge ahead with the Israel-Egyptian 
process.  
 
The Camp David Accords  
 
The Israeli-Egyptian negotiations leading up to the Camp David Accords 
demonstrated President Carter’s commitment to a diplomatic solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. When Carter ‘looked at the Arab-Israeli conflict he was not 
particularly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task. He thought it could be 
resolved.’115 However, the commencement of the negotiations required Carter’s active 
participation, given that both sides were hesitating following Sadat’s visit to 
Jerusalem in November 1977. Progress in the talks was not simply about coaxing 
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Begin and Sadat to the negotiation table but also about defusing the growing tensions 
in the region that threatened to derail the peace process. 
 Carter’s challenge regarding the Camp David Accords was two-fold. First, 
Carter had committed the US to revitalising the waning Egyptian-Israeli peace talks. 
Second, he realized that there were significant cleavages between Israeli Prime 
Minister Begin’s government and Egyptian President Sadat who was facing severe 
criticism by Arab leaders for his discussions with Israel.116 The Lebanese crisis and 
the 1978 Israeli invasion were directly threatening Carter’s mediation between Sadat 
and Begin as it was fuelling the growing hostility among Egypt’s Arab neighbours. A 
significant fear for the Administration was that Sadat would walk out of the peace 
negotiations.117 If the US intervened militarily in Lebanon in order to appease the 
Arab states, this would have exacerbated the political fractures within Begin’s cabinet 
over a viable US-mediated Egyptian-Israeli agreement. 118  Thus, Carter kept 
Washington’s position non-committal despite Egypt’s desire for US intervention in 
Lebanon.119  
While the signing of the Camp David Accords in September was hailed as a 
victory for the Carter Administration, the President faced great political challenges in 
its aftermath. The large majority of the ‘Framework for Peace in the Middle East’ 
agreed at Camp David covered the terms of Palestinian autonomy and a solution to 
the ‘Palestinian problem’ to be agreed by Egypt, Israel and Jordan. 120  These 
arrangements ignored the fragmented Palestinian voice and proved ineffective in 
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creating a unified Palestinian movement. Yet they are important as they establish 
issues of legacy for the Reagan Administration from 1981 onwards.  
Although generally in lockstep on Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, the Carter 
Administration’s foreign policy team had obvious cleavages by March 1979. While 
Carter’s Secretary of State Cyrus Vance remained committed to the administration’s 
ideals in the Palestinian autonomy talks, he exploded during an NSC meeting in 1979 
over the concern that Carter’s appointment of Robert Strauss as envoy to the 
autonomy talks meant that the president did not want Vance engaged in Middle East 
diplomacy, including the Lebanon crisis. Importantly this suggests that the Carter 
Administration, which was so focused on the Arab-Israeli arena, had clearly 
miscalculated in assuming that the Palestinian issue in Lebanon was not linked to the 
broader Arab-Israeli dispute.121  
As 1979 came to a close and Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon, Carter saw 
the Lebanese conflict as of lesser concern than the situation in Iran. Strikes and 
protests paralysed Iran leading to the overthrow of the pro-western Iranian monarch, 
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, by the Islamic revolutionary Ruhollah Khomeini and 
his loyal forces in April 1979.122 In November, Iranian students from Dânešjuyân 
Mosalmân Piru Xatt Emâm stormed the US Embassy taking fifty-two American 
personnel and civilians hostage for over a year. The Carter Administration was 
criticised for its handling of the crisis and Carter himself was seen as a weak and 
indecisive leader. The Iran hostage crisis and its impact on the Carter Administration 
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was twofold.123 First, it was clear that the success of Carter’s trademark diplomacy 
during the Camp David talks was not easily exported to other parts of the Arab and 
Islamic world. Second, there were now clear signs of an anti-American Islamic 
movement in the Middle East using radical violence to achieve its political goal.  
However, while Carter and Brzezinski continued to believe in creating an 
Islamic ‘green-belt’ with pro-American Islamic leaders in order to keep the Soviet 
Union out of the region, they both failed to handle the Iranian and growing Islamist 
crisis effectively.124 Carter’s soft-handed approach in the face of the hostage crisis 
sent the opposite message he had hoped to send to Arab and Islamic leaders. Instead 
of being resolute and strong in the face of a threat to the US, Carter inadvertently 
showed that his Administration would hesitate and crumble. Hence, coupled with a 
poor US economy, Carter’s attempts to mediate the Iranian crisis cost him re-election. 
In 2014 Carter stated:  
…well I could've been re-elected if I'd taken military action against Iran, 
shown that I was strong and resolute and, um, manly and so forth. But, er, I 
think if I, I could have wiped Iran off the map with the weapons that we had, 
but in the process a lot of innocent people would have been killed, probably 
including the hostages and so I stood up against all that…125 
 
With the political fallout of the Iran hostage crisis looming over Reagan, the question 
was not if he would take strong, resolute military action in the Middle East, but rather, 
when. 
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Legacy or Discontinuity? Lessons from the Eisenhower and Carter 
Administrations 
Eisenhower and Carter’s policies for handling the Lebanese crisis and conflict 
represent two poles of US foreign policy, from the use of military intervention on the 
one hand to restrained, limited diplomacy on the other. Eisenhower and Carter, not to 
mention all of the post-WWII presidents, inherited significant unrest in the Middle 
East. However, not all presidential decision-making has been the same and not all 
decisions achieved a similar outcome. No more apparent is this discontinuity than in 
Lebanon’s case.  
 
Eisenhower: the military intervention precedent 
 
This thesis argues that Operation Blue Bat created a precedent for direct US military 
intervention as a policy vehicle in Lebanon. This mission’s legacy was to create a 
practice whereby, should US national interests be threatened in Lebanon, a US 
Administration had both the proven capability and willingness to launch a unilateral 
military operation without concern for the UN frameworks.126 This therefore gave 
birth to the idea of a non-UN ‘peacekeeping’ force, illustrating that even if a 
consensus could not be achieved between UN Security Council members, specifically 
the Western powers and the Soviet Union, the US would establish an independent 
‘Free World Force.’127 Given Eisenhower’s insistence on every country’s unanimous 
participation in the UN, the formation of a US-led, non-UN sanctioned military force 
in the Middle East appeared something of a contradiction. However, this contradiction 
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came about due to a major failing of the Middle East Resolution as no quantifiable 
measures were established that set out the degree to which a ‘communist threat’ 
needed to be confirmed rather than perceived. Without such measures or clear 
definitions, the impending crisis in June and July 1958 created an obligation for the 
US to uphold its ambiguous promises.  
Several key issues were created by the legacy or, as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Policy Planning Gerard Smith called it, the ‘backwash’ of Operation Blue 
Bat. These are important to consider in the context of subsequent US policy in 
Lebanon. Most importantly in these findings, Smith stated that ‘if anything 
approaching a constructive solution comes out of this episode, it will result in an 
increased appetite in some quarters for other resorts to force.’128 While Eisenhower 
recognised that the outcome of Operation Blue Bat would lead to a future obligation 
to protect other threatened nations, the President stated that ‘if we had let Lebanon 
down, not a single free country on earth would again feel secure in its freedom.’129  
 Much of the Eisenhower Administration’s apparent success arose due to two 
key military strategies which represent significant differences between Operation 
Blue Bat in 1958 and the MNF from 1982 to 1984. The first was a strategy of 
deterrence rather than combat and the second was a military strategy of limitation. In 
Lebanon in 1958 it is questionable as to what degree the Nasserite-sponsored forces 
would have engaged US troops. Primarily this was because the 14,000-strong US 
force was so intimidating in its sheer size, that it did not encounter any offensive 
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combat.130 This is particularly relevant to later chapters that deal with the MNF in 
Beirut, as the size and ambiguity in the MNF’s deployment was held directly 
responsible for the duality of US mission between a peacekeeping deterrent on the 
one hand and pre-emptive combat on the other. Similarly the US in 1982 remained in 
Lebanon exponentially longer than the short three-month mission launched in 1958, 
thus making the MNF a part of the internal landscape. The extended deployment 
period resulted in the force becoming entangled in the prolonged and violent 
Lebanese Civil War. 
 
Discontinuity and a ‘Neglected’ Lebanon: Carter   
 
In hindsight, Carter’s views on the ‘sense of hopelessness’ over a possible US 
intervention in Lebanon were proven correct, evidenced by the most negative 
outcomes of Reagan’s brainchild in 1982 through the MNF’s establishment. 131 
Carter’s forays in the Middle East and marginalisation of Lebanon created both 
elements of legacy and discontinuity for the Reagan Administration.  
The most important issue relates to foreign policy legacy. Reagan inherited a 
‘neglected’ Lebanese conflict which had not been considered a frontline of the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Even though the Palestinian autonomy talks collapsed, Carter’s 
success in the Camp David Accords created an obligation for Reagan to also influence 
the Arab-Israeli crisis. However, there was a distinct policy reversal as Reagan’s 
Secretary of State, George Shultz, moved his attention away from the Camp David 
successes to the belief that Lebanon held the key to the Palestinian-Israeli issues. As 
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such, this new focus towards Lebanon also obliged Reagan to make headway on the 
escalating conflict that ignited with the Israeli invasion in June 1982.  
Unlike Reagan, Carter saw the UNIFIL’s formation as commensurate with his 
participation in a peacekeeping solution in Lebanon. The Carter Administration had 
decided that it would only engage in the Lebanese crisis through a UN framework. 
Given that Carter would not readily alienate Israeli or Arab members at a critical 
point in the negotiations, it was implausible that he would intervene either militarily 
or politically outside UNIFIL.132 If the US had actively interfered in Syria’s agenda in 
Lebanon, Carter believed that he would also have had to interpose similar restrictions 
on Israeli, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian and even Lebanese involvement. Without an 
even-handed approach to all internal and external parties in Lebanon the US could 
never expect to see a regional consensus. However, no one in the Reagan White 
House had the foresight to see that objectively or diplomatically transcending the 
divisive inter-communal and regional conflict that characterised Lebanon in the 1980s 
was an impossible task.  
 
Conclusion  
The Eisenhower and Carter Administrations are important in demonstrating the 
degree to which US policy in Lebanon follows no specific formula. US foreign 
policy’s discontinuity in Lebanon in the 1980s can be explained, in part, by Reagan’s 
inheritance of both interventionist and non-interventionist policies. Ultimately, neither 
policy proved able to secure long-term peace in Lebanon nor engage with the 
Lebanese reconciliation’s structural issues. No US president is likely to step in to take 
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high-profile, executive action on foreign policy unless it is either a major strategic 
threat and/or has a prominent domestic political component. In the Carter years, as 
opposed to those during Eisenhower’s presidency, rightly or wrongly, US 
policymakers did not view Lebanon through either of those lenses. 
While Eisenhower’s military intervention served to create the image of a 
strong, unrelenting president, Carter’s soft-handed response was geared at finding a 
sustainable diplomatic solution for the wider Middle East issues. Eisenhower 
deployed a considerable US force in Lebanon to deter opposition to the Lebanese 
President, Camille Cham’un, while Carter ultimately marginalised Lebanon, given his 
primary focus on the Israeli-Egyptian treaty.  
However, most importantly both the Eisenhower Administration and Carter 
Administrations had an operational strategy of neutrality. Lebanon was and still 
remains a communally and ideologically-charged context. From Arab nationalism, 
Communism, regional proxy wars, internal factionalism and radicalism the only way 
to handle Lebanon is with an operational strategy that takes on none of these broad 
ideological goals and remains limited in its mission. Unfortunately this lesson was not 
taken on board by the Reagan Administration. If the Administration had foreseen the 
challenges that would arise from intervening in Lebanon both Reagan and Shultz 
would have avoided it. Rather, into this context, Reagan deployed the Multinational 
Force I as a means of securing peace, credibility and strength for the US regionally. 
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Chapter Three 
Operation Peace for Galilee and the Establishment of the 
MNFI 
Multinational Force I (6 June- 28 September 1982) 
 
President Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, inheriting a worsening conflict 
in Lebanon. There was a marked increase in the Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s 
(PLO) military presence in Southern Lebanon where its confrontations with Israel 
were escalating. The Syrian-led Arab Deterrent Force’s (ADF) actions illustrated 
none of the force’s alleged peacekeeping strategies. Rather, the ADF was the vehicle 
for Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad’s greater political agenda in realizing Syrian 
dominance in Lebanon. As the pro-Israeli Kata’eb party began to resist Syrian 
domination, with Israeli support, the Lebanese Civil War entered into another violent, 
ruinous phase. Yet, despite the aggression from non-Lebanese forces inside Lebanon, 
the Reagan Administration, throughout 1981, did not see direct military intervention 
as serving US interests.1  
 This changed in June 1982, with Israel’s Operation Peace for Galilee when 
Lebanon became the frontline for a dramatic Palestinian-Israeli military 
confrontation. Freedman argues that the June 1982 Israeli invasion was a turning 
point not only for Lebanon but also for the entire region. He claims that Operation 
Peace for Galilee significantly weakened PLO leader Yassir Arafat’s position in the 
Israel-Palestinian conflict, further ignited PLO-Syrian tensions, drew the US directly 
back into the conflict and drove Jordanian King Hussein to consider peace 
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negotiations with Israel.2 Had these been the only outcomes that Israeli Minister of 
Defense Ariel Sharon had achieved the operation might have been considered an 
unmitigated success for Israel. However, Sharon’s military mission backfired 
domestically, leading to his removal as minister and ultimately the replacement of his 
conservative Likud Party with the National Unity government led by the moderate 
Shimon Peres. 
 While Operation Peace for Galilee sent shock waves throughout the Middle 
East, heralding a new chapter in regional aggression, the invasion also surprised 
Washington. At the same time Sharon’s actions presented the Reagan Administration 
with the perfect political justification to enter the Arab-Israeli conflict and leave 
Reagan’s mark as the primary international peacemaker.  
 This chapter considers the Reagan administration’s Lebanon policy in 1981 
and 1982, starting with Washington’s relaxed diplomacy over the 1981 Zahleh Crisis 
and culminating in Reagan’s direct involvement after Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 
1982. It examines the shift in US policy from diplomacy to military intervention, 
exploring the extent to which Reagan’s initial non-interventionism was a Carter 
administration legacy. It then analyzes the establishment of the Multinational Force I 
(MNFI) in Lebanon in the context of the Israeli invasion, focusing on the MNFI’s 
peacekeeping mandate and how it compared to the actions of the UN Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon.   
 This chapter advances three key arguments. First, it will argue that Reagan 
adopted the diplomatic legacy left by the Carter Administration and its handling of 
Lebanese conflict which meant Lebanon continued to be marginalised for the first 18 
months of Reagan’s Presidency. Second, that this soft-handed diplomacy and side-
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lining was replaced by a clear military interventionist strategy with the resignation of 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the appointment of George Shultz. This led to 
a focus on the US-Israeli relationship and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict thus 
becoming the central reason for the creation of the US-led MNFI. Third, that US 
interpretations of the Lebanese conflict overstated the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, thus 
downplaying the internal undercurrents that also characterised the Lebanese Civil 
War. Indeed, it was this early misreading of the Lebanese situation that led to 
Reagan’s false sense of accomplishment, allowing him to consider the Multinational 
Force II (MNFII) as merely an extension of the MNFI mission which, as subsequent 
chapters show, was manifestly not the case.  
 
Reagan’s refusal to intervene: the 1981 Zahleh Crisis 
The Zahleh crisis began in April 1981. Zahleh, the third largest city in Lebanon, was a 
majority Christian city, located in the Bekaa Valley, a strategically important point 
along the main Beirut-Damascus route. This location led to Syria’s influence in the 
city since October 1976 following the Arab League’s announcement of ADF 
deployment.3 This placed the ADF on the road to confrontation with the Kata’eb, who 
not only saw the ADF as an occupying army but who were also committed to 
protecting Zahleh’s Christian residents. In the winter of 1980-81, the Kata’eb, who in 
the meantime had merged, with the Tigers Militia, into the Lebanese Forces (LF) 
started constructing a road to link isolated Zahleh to the Christian enclave in Mount 
Lebanon.4 In an effort to prevent this link-up the Syrian air force repeatedly bombed 
it. In April 1981, the confrontation between the LF and Syria escalated when Syria 
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laid siege to Zahleh with some 20,000 troops in order to trap and wipe out the 
estimated 1000 LF inside the city. The siege of Zahleh drew in Israel in support of its 
Maronite allies. On 28 April 1981, Sharon ordered a limited but damaging air strike 
against the Syrian positions on Zahleh’s periphery.5 Two Syrian helicopters were shot 
down by Israel, leading the Syrians to deploy Surface to Air Missiles-6 (SAM-6) to 
the Bekaa Valley. What had begun as a battle between the ADF and LF became a 
direct Syrian-Israeli confrontation, with Israel threatening to bomb the Syrian missiles 
sites. If Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin had ordered the bombing of the 
Syrian missiles it would have undoubtedly ignited a greater war against Israel which 
would have included Syria, the PLO and possibly Soviet Union support. However, as 
Boykin states, neither Begin nor Asad wanted to engage in a direct war against one 
another and, while the aggressive rhetoric raged between both sides, US Middle East 
Envoy Philip Habib became the diplomatic lifeline for both to avoid an escalation.6 
 The Syrian assault on Zahleh continued for another three months, with the 
siege finally ending on 31 June 1981 when Habib and the Arab League mediators 
negotiated a ceasefire.7 Despite claims by the LF that the Christians were victorious, 
Bachir Gemayel and the LF were forced to retreat to Beirut, leaving Zahleh firmly 
under Syrian control.8  
 The Zahleh crisis indicated the Reagan Administration’s reticence for the US 
to intervene directly in Lebanon, despite the congressional pressure to do so. The US 
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Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee (CFAC) sent Reagan a signed five point 
congressional petition in April 1981, requesting immediate action in the Bekaa Valley 
in support of the anti-Syrian LF. The CFAC argued that, should Syria continue to 
occupy the city, it would undermine the Christian government’s stability and security 
under Lebanese President Elias Sarkis. The Congressional petition also raised 
significant concerns over Syria’s position in Lebanon under the ADF which it saw as 
a front for broader Syrian interests.9 This petition was supported by the US Senate’s 
Foreign Relations Committee who viewed the Syrian occupation as the fundamental 
cause of Lebanon’s destabilization.10 In May 1981, during the Battle of Zahleh, US 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig was questioned about where the Reagan 
Administration saw the ‘red line’ in Lebanon.11 These questions were left unanswered 
and, although substantive evidence existed to show that the Syrian and Palestinian 
military positions in the Bekaa Valley had strengthened, the Reagan Administration 
ignored this, continuing to see Lebanon as a ‘diplomacy only mission’ headed by 
Habib.12   
 Reagan wrote to President Sarkis in May, committing the US to an exclusively 
diplomatic presence and arguing that negotiations between Christians and Syrians 
would assist ‘Lebanon’s national goals and your country’s unity, sovereignty, 
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territorial integrity and pluralistic democracy.’13 However, the negotiations did little to 
bolster the Christian position. This neutral diplomatic posturing was reconfirmed on 
22 June with the arrival of the new US Ambassador to Lebanon, Robert Dillon, who 
was charged with continuing the ‘diplomacy only’ line of communication with Sarkis. 
Reagan still refused to offer anything more than moral support and a ‘channel of 
communication between us [Lebanon and the US].’14 The main reason for US non- 
intervention militarily was that it was obvious to Habib that both Syria and Israel 
wished to avoid entering into direct combat. As Langhorne, Weisbrode and Goodby 
argue diplomacy is nurtured as a substitute for war when both sides are reluctant to 
fight and the opportunity cost of an unguaranteed offensive is too great.15 Asad knew 
that the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) were still too weak to resist an Israeli Defense 
Force (IDF) ground attack in the long term and did not want to jeopardise Syrian 
influence through the ADF mandate. Begin, also, did not believe that the Zahleh crisis 
or the threats to the LF warranted an expensive war, which the Knesset would see as 
unjustified. While Habib had successfully kept the communication channels open 
between Syria and Israel, the conflict between Israel and the PLO continued.16 
 
 
Israel threatened: ‘War of the Katyushas’ and the Arab Peace Plan 
 
At the beginning of July 1981, the PLO began a ten-day offensive, launching 
Katyusha rockets into northern Israel, forcing the flight of over 5,000 Israeli civilians 
                                                
13 Message from Reagan to Sarkis, [Presidential message for President Sarkis], 5:26pm 7 May 
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14 Message from Reagan to Sarkis, [Presidential Letter for President Sarkis], 3:41pm 22 June 
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State Files, RRPL, pp.1-2. 
15 Richard Langhorne, ‘Contemporary Diplomacy’, Global Society, Vol. 23, No.1 , 2009, 
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with many camping outside Begin’s residence as a means of pressuring the 
government to retaliate. This Palestinian attack, known as the ‘War of the Katyushas’, 
did provoke an Israeli response and, on 10 July 1981, the Israeli Air force began 
bombing the PLO positions in Southern Lebanon.17 The Israeli casualties equalled 
only a fraction of those suffered by the Palestinian and Lebanese, with Israel’s 
disproportionate use of force labelled a contravention of the UN Security Council’s 
Resolution 467.18 The Security Council also condemned the Israeli breaches of 
Lebanon’s territorial integrity and the subsequent Security Council Resolution 490, on 
21 July 1981, criticized the ‘deplorable events’ taking place in Lebanon.19  
 In response, the PLO returned fire on IDF positions until Habib brokered a 
ceasefire on 24 July. Sarkis urged Reagan to reconsider the Palestinian issue in 
Lebanon as the Lebanese President believed that a lasting peace could only be 
achieved if all parties were considered and this also meant the Palestinians in 
Lebanon.20 The PLO’s provocation was still not considered severe enough by the 
Reagan Administration to warrant an intervention and as a result Israel continued to 
feel that it did not enjoy the same relationship with Washington as it had under 
Presidents Carter and Ford. Cobban claims that Reagan believed that the US-Israeli 
relationship was driven more by seeing Israel purely as a strategic asset for the US 
than by a traditional or moral explanation.21  
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 Furthermore, Israel became defensive with the announcement of the eight-
point Fahd Peace Plan on 7 August 1981, sponsored by the Saudi Arabian Crown 
Prince, Abdul Aziz bin Fahd. Referencing UN Resolutions 242 and 338, the peace 
plan demanded an Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories back to the 1967 
boundaries.22 Begin stated that ‘the problem of the so-called Saudi peace plan’ was 
that it ‘in fact is a plan of how to liquidate Israel in stages.’23 Much of this came from 
Begin’s broadly defensive and nationalist worldview. Begin argued that ‘borrowed 
freedom is not freedom.’24 Gordis claim’s Begin believed ‘the Jewish people would 
not survive without military power and a willingness to use it.’25 The plan heightened 
concerns within Israel of regional Arab posturing over the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process and Israel’s neighbours’ increasing interest to turn to the Soviet Union for 
support.  
 King Hussein divulged to Washington, after a meeting with the Soviet 
leadership, that the Soviet Union was attempting to create cordial relations with Saudi 
Arabia and that Saudi Arabia had given Asad $3 billion to purchase Soviet SAMs. 
Hussein also told President Reagan that he himself had accepted $200 million dollars 
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of Soviet arms, because Washington’s doors had been closed to Jordan, and that Iraq 
had also requested a significant arms deal, prioritizing short-range artillery.26  
It was in this context of rapid Arab arms modernisation that Israel complained 
that neither the UN nor the US had provided adequate support. The Reagan 
Administration did not wish to exacerbate Israeli-US tensions but was concerned that 
the Soviet Union was coordinating arms deals with historical US allies. In response, 
the Reagan Administration announced one of the largest ever arms deals in US history 
with Saudi Arabia. Although the $8.5 billion sale of US Airborne Warning and 
Control Systems (AWACS) to the Saudis garnered both internal (Congressional and 
US Israeli Lobby Groups) and external protests from Israel, the move illustrated 
Reagan’s solidarity with the pro-Western Gulf state.27 In a speech on 5 September 
1981, Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir emphasized Israel’s concerns with the Reagan 
Administration’s tacit support for the Saudi kingdom’s role in mediating various Arab 
issues.28 
This is not to say that our problems with America are all settled to our entire 
satisfaction. In spite of our very close relationship, there are, at times, 
differences of opinion…Thanks to its considerable financial capacity, Saudi 
Arabia is covering the expenses of Syria's occupation of Lebanon and is 
contributing toward the continued rape of Lebanon by the Syrian army. Even 
more ominous is the fact that the Saudi government is heavily subsidizing the 
P.L.O. and its share in the destruction of Lebanon in addition to which it is 
supplying the terrorists with quantities of arms.29 
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In November 1981, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig (the leading pro-Israeli 
decision-maker in the US Administration) stated that overt pressure would not come 
from the US for Israel to sign an Arab-sponsored peace proposal with the Palestinians 
which he believed ‘could cause Israel to lash out into Lebanon.’30 However, Reagan 
remained determined to contain Soviet alliances by drawing in the Arab leaders and 
adopted a policy pressing Israel for ‘total withdrawal for total peace’, including from 
the West Bank and Gaza territories. 31 The cracks began developing within the White 
House as this difference in opinion between the President and his Secretary of State 
grew. Reagan stated that ‘we have to make sure that we don’t go after this with one 
side asking for the moon and the other side asking for “green cheese.”’32  
 The Israelis believed that Habib’s ceasefire agreement with the PLO did not 
serve the long-term objectives of demilitarising the PLO in Southern Lebanon.33 In 
fact, they thought that the US and UN’s failure to act militarily was allowing the PLO 
to regroup and Syria to increase its SAM positions in the Bekaa Valley. Israel’s 
passing of the Golan Heights Law on 14 December 1981 extended Israel’s territorial 
claim over that area, the fertile region on the Israeli-Syrian border, sparking Reagan’s 
fury. As a result, the US President suspended the memorandum of understanding 
between Israel and the US, which Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and 
Sharon had negotiated in November of that year.34 The message to the Israelis was 
clear: the Reagan Administration would not unconditionally support them. While 
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31 ibid. 
32 ibid.  
33 M. Habib affirme que " toutes les parties intéressées " souhaitent le maintien du cessez-le-
feu au Sud-Liban’ Le Monde, 10 March 1982. 
34 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [Golan Heights Law], 14 December 1981, Online: 
http://www.MNFa.gov.il/MNFa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/golan%20heights%20law.as
px, Accessed 3 March 2014 & UNSC Res 497, [Golan Heights Law and Israel], 17 December 
1981, S/RES/497, in UNSCR Public Files, UNARMS, p.1.  
 115 
Israel was a key strategic ally in furthering US policy regionally, it could expect 
resistance if it jeopardised the Reagan Administration’s relations with its Arab allies.35  
 It was also evident that the Israeli leadership under Begin, Sharon and Shamir 
had little time for the Reagan Administration except for Alexander Haig, who 
continued to see Israeli intransigence in the light of Sharon’s claims of PLO 
terrorism.36 Haig tied the Israeli-Palestinian conflict directly to the Lebanese conflict. 
He believed that, if the PLO could demonstrate responsible action and 
demilitarisation in Lebanon, the US and UN could convince Israel to concede on 
points in other areas that the Israeli state otherwise refused to negotiate. Haig’s 
special relationship with Begin would ultimately be the US Secretary of State’s 
downfall as he was considered to have become too close to Israel, a policy 
incongruous with Reagan’s hard line on Israeli aggression. Haig was also criticized 
for having offered tacit support for Israel’s invasion of Lebanon long before June 
1982.37  
 On 18 December 1981, Saudi Arabian Minister Ahmad Zaki Yamani, having 
seen the Israeli response to the ceasefire agreement, the Fahd Plan, and the suspension 
of the US’ strategic cooperation agreement, ominously warned Reagan to prepare for 
an impending major Israeli strike against the PLO in Lebanon.38 As Sharon began 
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secretly developing plans for an attack, the Reagan Administration naively believed 
that Israel would never invade Lebanon without a solid legal justification and, more 
importantly, informing the White House. 39  
 Significant doubt hung over the Reagan Administration’s policies that saw the 
Lebanese conflict as little more than a diplomatic frontline for PLO-Israeli tensions, 
throughout 1981. First, despite Syria’s occupation of Zahleh, the US refused to 
intervene.40 Second, even though it was clear to the Reagan Administration, and 
specifically Haig, that Israel’s focus on Arafat and the PLO’s presence in Lebanon 
would eventually lead to a confrontation, Reagan concentrated on Arab proposals for 
peace between Israel, Lebanon and the Palestinians, inciting protest and derision from 
the Israeli leaders, Begin and Sharon. The US Administration’s relations with Israel in 
late 1981 to early 1982 were strained. As a result, the distance created between Israel 
and the US meant that the Reagan Administration had little influence over Israeli 
decision-making leading up to the June 1982 invasion.41  
 
Operation Peace for Galilee 
On 6 June 1982, Sharon launched Operation Peace for Galilee, a military operation 
aimed to ‘liquidate the Palestinian question’ and the PLO infrastructure in Southern 
Lebanon and Beirut.42 The motivations for the Israeli invasion have created much 
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speculation by historians. More than simply focussing on the PLO, Feldman and 
Rechnitz-Kijner accurately argue that Sharon had four dominant motives in launching 
the operation: namely the creation of a 43km PLO buffer zone, an ADF and SAF 
withdrawal, the ‘destruction’ of the PLO forces and headquarters in Beirut and the 
signing of a peace treaty with the Maronite Christian President.43 Ball argues that 
Sharon’s geo-political vision for Lebanon grew from the Zionist belief that Lebanon 
represented a ‘detachable weak link.’44 That is to say, a significant opportunity existed 
to disintegrate the anti-Israeli Arab-Islamic movement while supporting the Maronite 
Christians toward a partition. Furthermore, Pollock states that, under the ‘thinly 
disguised’ justification of carving out a security zone, Sharon intended to install 
Bachir Gemayel as President and thereby consolidate Israeli control over the 
Lebanese government and LAF-controlled territories.45 However, Schulze argues that 
Sharon and Shamir had, in fact, devised the Operation in January to link up ‘Bashir’s 
quest for the presidency with a large-scale Israeli Operation.’ 46  This meant a 
coordinated and aggressive Israeli attack alongside the Lebanese Forces against the 
PLO in Lebanon. Moreover, Parkinson maintains Sharon had always viewed Lebanon 
as more than a growing PLO stronghold; it was also an opportunity for Israel to widen 
its reach throughout the region and, in particular, strike a direct blow at Syrian 
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influence.47 Jansen argues that Sharon’s claims of defending Israel were merely 
superficial and that the Israeli Defense Minister was trying to bate the Palestinians 
into a provocation to justify the Operation which had been planned since February 
1982.48 In fact, Operation Peace for Galilee had been previously planned under 
another name, ‘Pine Tree’, 18 months before the operation but was readapted in 
January 1982, ready for the invasion.49  
 Although Sharon denied the accusations that he had long planned an attack in 
Lebanon as a means to creating strategic control for Israel the speed at which the IDF 
mobilized and entered Lebanon was evidence that Israel was already prepared to 
invade prior to Abu Nidal’s assassination attempt on the Israeli Ambassador to the 
UK, Shlomo Argov.50 Argov’s attempted assassination was publicly tied to Abu Nidal 
(Sabri al-Banna) and his splinter organisation providing Sharon weak but sufficient 
justification to launch the offensive against the PLO. This is a contested issue because 
Abu Nidal had split from the PLO in 1974, and had been sentenced to death by it, in 
absentia, later that year. Hence, Abu Nidal did not represent the Palestinian movement 
or PLO in Lebanon.51 Sharon coupled this with the recent PLO Kaytusha rockets fired 
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into Israeli territory and rationalized the invasion as a ‘defensive’ IDF response.52 The 
fact that Sharon had lied to the Israeli population and the Knesset about the Israeli 
invasion led to domestic outrage and criticism.53  
 International reaction to the Israeli aggression was unanimous, citing Sharon’s 
violent incursion into Lebanon as counterproductive, unjustified and aggressive, 
especially given Lebanon’s continuing instability.54 Mitterand stated, 
Tout fait redouter, dans les fleures qui viennent des combats tragiques qui, à 
Beyrouth même, viendraient s'ajouter aux souffrances déjà endurées par les 
populations du Liban.55  
 
The UN issued Security Council Resolution 508 on 5 June 1982, appealing to all 
parties involved in the violence in Lebanon to cease.56 The UN directly condemned 
Israel in Security Council Resolution 509 and demanded the IDF’s immediate 
withdrawal. 57  The Resolutions, approved unanimously, called for an immediate 
ceasefire between the IDF and PLO but this did little to curb the Israeli invasion or 
violence in Southern Lebanon.58 Sharon showed little concern for the UN or UNIFIL 
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arguing that UNIFIL had failed adequately to police the Palestinians’ militarization in 
southern Lebanon.   
 Operation Peace for Galilee represented the most significant intervention by 
Israeli troops since the 1978 Operation Litani, when the IDF crossed the Lebanese 
border to create a buffer zone between Israel’s northern border and the PLO fighters 
in southern Lebanon. However, Sharon had learnt lessons from Operation Litani, 
which saw the Palestinians eventually returning to southern Lebanon, and in greater 
strength. Sharon wanted to damage the PLO irreparably so that Arafat could not 
remobilise the forces once Israel withdrew.59 Begin favoured invading Lebanon with 
the intention of destroying the PLO infrastructure while staying away from the SAF 
positions or SAMs. Begin also wanted to intervene to save the Lebanese Maronites 
from genocide. He viewed this war through a moralistic rather than strategic lens and 
wanted Israel to do what the world had failed to do during the Holocaust thereby 
showing Israel’s moral superiority toward protecting the Christians and their support 
for Zionism. However, Sharon wanted to wage all-out war against the PLO and Syria 
at the same time. Hence Thomas and Gabriel argue that Sharon attempted on 
numerous occasions to provoke Syrian aggression in order to justify an IDF 
engagement with the SAF forces in southern Lebanon.60  
 As such, by 9 June 1982, the Israeli mission had been extended to attack 
Syria’s positions in southern Lebanon, which included Soviet-sponsored SA-2, SA-3 
and SA-6 SAMs. As the SAF realized that the Israeli focus was not simply directed 
toward the PLO, Asad sent thousands of troops into the Bekaa Valley to confront the 
IDF. As the IDF pushed through Southern Lebanon, it aggressively collided with the 
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Syrian forces that had positioned Soviet-sponsored SAMs along the Beirut to 
Damascus road. Feldman and Rechnitz-Kijner state, ‘Israel did not simply stumble 
into the Syrians in the Beqa’a. Nor did Israeli troops reach Beirut by accident.’61 
Conversely, the Syrians had attempted to avoid a confrontation with the Israelis to 
escape being forced to withdraw from Lebanon.62 The Syrian and Israeli conflict did 
not last long and three days later, on 11 June, a ceasefire was negotiated by US 
Middle East Envoy Philip Habib. Sharon and Begin appealed to their ally in the 
Reagan Administration, Haig, for more time to execute the IDF mission, which was 
determined to reach Beirut. Sharon argued that the 1981 ceasefire between Israel and 
the Palestinians was now broken, adding that Israel could no longer wait for US 
support because Reagan would not give Israel the justified support it wanted to 
remove Palestinian ‘terrorism’ from Lebanon.63  
 The debate within the Knesset and throughout the Israeli public questioned 
Sharon’s legitimacy and strategy in the initial invasion and the continuing Lebanese 
conflict. Although Begin authorized Sharon to use large-scale forces to remove the 
immediate PLO military infrastructure, the Palestinian and Lebanese civilian 
casualties that resulted from the mission’s imprecise targeting provoked the Knesset 
to call for an end to the mission. There was division between Sharon and the Knesset 
with regard to the former’s ‘Big Plan’ for Lebanon.64 Sharon’s destructive saturation 
bombing attempted to decimate the PLO leadership. Yet, the ten-week mission failed 
                                                
61 Feldman & Rechnitz-Kijner, ‘Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon’, p.21. 
62 Deeb, ‘Syria’s Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process’, pp.71-73. 
63 Speech by Sharon, [Statement in the Knesset by Defense Minister Sharon], 8 September 
1982, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Online: 
http://MNFa.gov.il/MNFA/ForeignPolicy/MNFADocuments/Yearbook6/Pages/74%20Statem
ent%20in%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Defense%20Minister%20Sh.aspx, Accessed 20 
March 2014. 
64 Feldman & Rechnitz-Kijner, pp.21-25. 
 122 
to shatter the Palestinian forces although it had succeeded in establishing a strong 
Israeli military occupation throughout Southern Lebanon.65  
 As Sharon and the IDF pushed on with the offensive, it culminated in the 
Siege of Beirut, with Sharon intent on pressuring the PLO into full retreat.66 Sharon 
was dissatisfied with the Palestinians’ withdrawals and retreats in the south. Arafat 
had successfully dug the PLO underground and into caves throughout West Beirut, 
which Habib argued strategically meant that the PLO could withstand an attack for 
some time.67 The Israeli Siege of Beirut began on 13 June, with a barricade drawn 
around Beirut cutting off food and water to the Palestinians and civilians in West 
Beirut. Israel’s dropped large amounts of explosives, shells and cluster bombs into the 
blockaded West Beirut, causing extensive civilian casualties, while the PLO’s 
response was limited and weak.68 As such, Ball argues that the Siege of Beirut 
‘critically compromised Israel’s standing as a humane nation.’69  
 On 18 June another unanimously-adopted Security Council resolution was 
passed, extending the UNIFIL deployment period and activities in an attempt to 
reduce the IDF-PLO conflict.70 Moreover, the US pushed for a diplomatic solution to 
the conflict, again led by Habib. Following Washington and Reagan’s vehement 
admonishment, Israel accepted US mediation for a ceasefire and PLO evacuation 
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from West Beirut. 71  By August 1982, the IDF had ceased its seven-week 
bombardment of West Beirut although it was clear that a diplomatic solution to 
Lebanon’s Israeli occupation was going to prove essentially ineffective. Neither Israel 
nor the PLO was heeding Reagan’s calls for a long-term ceasefire, leading the US to 
question if any incentives existed for the sides to enter negotiations.72  
 
The Israeli invasion and the Washington awakening 
 
Although Israel, the Palestinians, the Lebanese and the Syrians had been in 
confrontation since the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, there are three distinct 
differences between the political landscape from 1981 to early 1982 and the period 
signalled by Operation Peace for Galilee that changed how the Reagan Administration 
viewed the US’ role in the conflict. 
 First, Israel’s direct confrontation with the Palestinians and Syrians in 
Lebanon forced the US to concede that the conditions in Lebanon had become 
precarious enough at a regional level that they now critically threatened any possible 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 73  The heightened Palestinian-Israeli aggression 
under Operation Peace for Galilee and the Siege of Beirut was considered an 
internationally significant humanitarian concern and Reagan was not about to be the 
first US President to be seen to have failed so significantly to make progressive steps 
toward a peace process.74  
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 Second, by June 1982, with the Lebanese government’s failure to extend the 
invitation to the ADF to stay in Lebanon, the Syrian occupation was viewed as little 
more than an effort to control Lebanon.75 The collapse of an Arab-based solution to 
the conflict and the Israeli invasion also created a sense of US obligation to intervene, 
not least in order to counter the growing perception that the US, and specifically Haig, 
had tacitly supported the Israeli invasion. Previously, the US had been careful not to 
confront the ADF, not necessarily out of fear of upsetting Syria but rather to avoid 
alienating the US’ Arab allies that had sanctioned the Arab peacekeeping mission.76 
 Finally, the existing regional peacekeeping missions’ role suggested to the US 
that there was a way to intervene to create peace without relying on the UN. The 
implementation of the MFO on 20 March 1982 in Sinai demonstrated to the US a new 
way of undertaking active diplomacy in the region through engaging in collaborative 
international peacekeeping missions outside UN operations.77 This precedent of not 
working through UNIFIL therefore opened up further opportunities for Reagan to 
illustrate his role as the primary ‘peacemaker’ in the region.78 The MNFI was, in part, 
launched on this sense of success. 
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Reagan’s watershed moment: ‘outrage’79 over the Israeli invasion 
The Israeli media in the aftermath of the invasion stated that Israel would only accept 
a ceasefire if the PLO fully disarmed; there was constant monitoring by an 
international peacekeeping group and an international guarantee that worldwide acts 
of terror against Jewish or Israeli targets would cease.80 The Israeli newspaper 
Ma’ariv reported that Reagan was unaccommodating to the Israelis and was 
borderline anti-Israeli, given the US condemnation of the IDF’s attack.81 The Reagan 
Administration exhibited firm, unapologetic action in sanctioning limited economic 
and aid embargoes until an IDF withdrawal. Israel believed that, if negotiations with 
Habib did not produce a tenable ceasefire and withdrawal arrangement, Reagan would 
support anti-Israeli sanctions, such as the suspension of military equipment sales.82 As 
the Israelis had believed, Reagan did consider blocking US aid to Israel in order to 
signal that the Administration thought Israel had crossed the political and military 
‘red line.’83 Reagan was furious that Begin had authorised Operation Peace for 
Galilee, which the US President had been assured would not occur.84  
 Conversely, US press commentary illustrated that public consciousness of the 
tragic realities of the Lebanese conflict were high and disapproval of the Reagan 
Administration’s hands-off approach was growing. Reagan told reporters, on 1 
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August 1982, that ‘the President says he's going to get tough.’85 The media reported 
the Israeli, Syrian and PLO conflict as exclusively the thrust of the current war in 
Lebanon. It was perceived that the Israelis either wanted water, land or the PLO’s 
eradication, while the PLO and Syrians were preparing to fight Israel.86  
 However, while there were reports of possible US punitive action against 
Israel, the situation in the UN told a very different story. Although Washington 
predicted a Soviet veto at the UN Security Council,87 it was in fact the US that 
presented the veto vote on 8 June 1982 against the Security Council draft Resolution, 
condemning Israel’s violation of Resolution 508 and 509.88 The US vetoed the draft 
Resolution on the basis that it ‘is not sufficiently balanced to accomplish the objective 
of ending the cycle of violence and establishing the conditions for a just and lasting 
peace in Lebanon.’89 The US was as much to blame for the UN stalemate at this time 
as the USSR. Sadeghi argues that Reagan hesitated to punish Israel because the 
President was pursuing his own desire for a pax Americana regionally and needed 
Israel as a bargaining chip, especially with the Soviets.90 Le Monde reporter, Cornu 
stated that 
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Les Israéliens commencent à reconnaître qu'ils ont souvent exagéré par 
anticipation les risques de "punition" de la part des États-Unis. Pour éprouver 
la solidarité des relations israélo-américaines, le déclenchement de la guerre 
au Liban a été un test amplement positif.91 
 
Despite Reagan’s posturing on sanctions, it was clear that the Administration would 
not actively embargo Israel.92  
 The communication between Brezhnev and Reagan on 9 June indicated that 
the Soviet Union would not involve itself in Lebanon but was watching ‘with utmost 
concern of developments of the situation in this region which is located in the 
immediate proximity of our southern borders and where we have no shortage of 
friends.’93 Reagan responded by issuing a warning to Brezhnev that ‘your government 
bears no little responsibility for the current crisis in the Middle East by its failure to 
support the Camp David Accords and its readiness to furnish a steady supply of 
weapons to PLO forces in Lebanon.’ 94  However, direct threats over Soviet 
interference in Lebanon were minimal, as evidenced by NSDD 32.95 This directive 
shows that, while the Administration was focused on curbing Soviet influence 
internationally, Lebanon was left out of a detailed list of countries that the US saw as 
the Soviet-US policy confrontation frontline.  
 On 10 June 1982, the NSC and State Department sent a report to Reagan 
regarding the ongoing Israeli-Lebanese conflict. While the statements failed to 
indicate how the US would engage in Lebanon, it was clear that some form of 
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peacekeeping force, led by the US, was imminent. On 29 June 1982, President Sarkis 
issued an appeal to all the Heads of State requesting the countries ‘to contribute to the 
salvation of Beirut from imminent disaster threatening it.’96  As such, the Marine 
Amphibious Unit (MAU) naval fleet stationed just off the shore of Lebanon signalling 
that the US was preparing to intervene.97  
 
Changing of the Guard: Israel’s greatest US ally resigns 
 
Throughout June Haig had ordered Habib to negotiate an unconditional ceasefire on 
three levels. These were the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon 
(Syrian, Palestinian and Israeli), a commitment to the Lebanese state’s sovereignty, 
integrity and security for Israel’s northern border. Haig’s tripartite policy laid the 
foundations for the Reagan Administration’s policy in Lebanon throughout the entire 
MNFI deployment (as well as that of MNFII, as examined later).98 The policy also 
created unrealistic expectations as it did not fully comprehend the reasons for the 
Syrian and Israeli interventions, as well as underestimating the contribution of the 
various Lebanese factions to the conflict’s continuation. As the French called it ‘Les 
incertitudes de la politique américaine et la crise du Liban’ 99  Thus Haig had 
unwittingly tied the Reagan Administration to an unachievable commitment in 
Lebanon. Because of this Reagan was furious with Haig for his flagrant disregard of 
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the President’s wishes. Reagan had not decided whether to commit the US to the war 
in Lebanon and felt that Haig’s policy gave added justification for Israel’s pursuit of 
the PLO in Beirut.100  
 Haig’s resignation on 25 June 1982 was important as the Lebanese conflict 
played a significant role in his decision. Haig’s personal desire for a monopoly over 
US Middle East policy decisions became incompatible with the US Presidency’s 
authority.101 Haig’s foreign policy vision for the Lebanese conflict was characterized 
by a deep trust of the Israelis, which undermined any objective analysis of the 
conflict.  While he stated, ‘I’d have kicked the shit out of Israel tomorrow if that was 
in the interest of this country’, Boykin argues that Haig’s dogged bias toward Israel 
led him directly to challenge Reagan himself.102 As a result this bias raised issues of 
whether Haig had given Israel a green light for the invasion in June. Rubenberg 
claims, while Haig denied he had ever given direct approval for the invasion, his 
refusal to pressure Sharon to halt the attack plans was easily read as tacit support.103 
Haig’s support for the Israeli northern border militarisation and the Secretary of 
State’s insistence that the PLO must be removed from Lebanon gave Sharon an 
effective US endorsement for an Israeli attack. A meeting between Haig and Sharon 
on 25 May 1982 demonstrated this. Although Haig warned Sharon not to pre-
emptively invade Lebanon without provocation from the PLO, Sharon informed Haig 
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that Israel was preparing a large-scale attack. Even with this, the Secretary of State 
did not insist that Sharon back down.104 
 Haig’s resignation also signalled a change not only in US policy but also in 
US decision-making. Secretary of State George Shultz, who was determined to avoid 
repeating Haig’s mistakes, was careful to be seen to be working for the President. As 
Hopkins writes, ‘at his first meeting with the president he declared, “I consider myself 
a part of the White House and of your team. I am working for you, Mr President.”’105 
This is important because Reagan’s trust in Shultz allowed Reagan’s second Secretary 
of State to wield enormous power over foreign policy, ultimately becoming the MNFI 
and MNFII’s ‘architect.’106 While Reagan continued to hold executive power, it was 
Shultz’s ability to manoeuvre and guide him that had the main impact on the 
Administration’s decision to enter Lebanon. Shultz was aware that there had been 
tensions between the State Department and the White House prior to his appointment 
and was determined to demonstrate the US diplomacy’s collective strength in the 
Middle East.107 Each time Weinberger confronted Reagan about Lebanon, arguing 
that the use of military force was misplaced, Shultz was able to convince Reagan that 
the Secretary of Defense was incorrect (see Chapter Six for a discussion of 
Weinberger and Shultz’s policy disagreement over Lebanon). While Shultz 
confronted Weinberger openly, the Secretary of State managed his relationship with 
Reagan cautiously. Shultz inherited the Lebanon crisis and the commitments made 
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under Haig but regarded the Lebanese landscape as an opportunity for both the 
President and himself.   
 
The decision to intervene 
On 6 July 1982, Reagan ‘agreed in principle to contribute a small contingent’ of US 
Marines to be sent to Lebanon, providing that Habib could negotiate a tenable 
ceasefire between the PLO and the Israelis.108 The following day, Reagan received an 
emotive, cautionary letter from Soviet General-Secretary Brezhnev, stating: 
Today, perhaps, even leaders with stone hearts cannot turn a deaf ear to the 
appeals of those who everyday and every hour are dying in Beirut and 
Lebanon by the hand of the Israeli invaders…what is the reason for not using 
the U.N. military units which are already deployed on the Lebanese soil by a 
decision of the Security Council? We are aware of your statement that you are 
prepared in principle to send a contingent of American forces in Lebanon. I 
must warn you that if this actually takes place, the Soviet Union will conduct 
its policy taking this fact into account.109 
 
Reagan responded to Brezhnev on 14 July in an attempt to curb Soviet fears of a long-
term US intervention in Beirut by saying,  
If deployed in Beirut, U.S. forces would remain there only for a limited time 
necessary to accomplish the objectives I have described. These forces would 
then be withdrawn. This is not only morally sound policy; it is also a course 
dictated by prudence, for as experience shows, any attempt by outside powers 
to impose their military will on the people of the Middle East can only lead to 
such powers becoming bogged down in a bloody and humiliating quagmire.110 
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In a rare display of unanimity, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 516111 on 
1 August 1982, calling for an immediate ceasefire ‘within Lebanon and across the 
Israeli/Lebanese border.’112 The Resolution was directed at the IDF’s continued 
presence in Lebanon, although Israel defended its position on the basis that the PLO 
had committed numerous ceasefire violations by 31 July. While the Soviets, PLO, 
Lebanon and Egypt publicly condemned Israel’s shelling of West Beirut the US 
remained silent.  
 On 2 August 1982, Reagan met with Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir 
to discuss Lebanon. The US President communicated that an immediate cessation of 
the conflict in West Beirut was essential to curb the rising violence in Lebanon. Ball 
argues that the relatively soft-handed approach that Reagan adopted toward the 
Israelis ultimately meant that Begin and Sharon could influence the imminent US 
peacekeeping mission. ‘Never before in modern history had the aggressor been 
permitted to dictate the form and composition of the peacekeeping force its 
aggression had made necessary.’113 Reagan still did not confirm or commit the US to 
the conflict although he did approve US humanitarian support such as food and 
medical supplies.114  
The biggest conflict between Mitterand and Reagan was what the French 
called the ‘coup de tonnerre’ or thunderclap in Beirut.115 Mitterand believed that 
while Haig had been overwhelmingly pro-Israeli, the Secretary of State’s firm actions 
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to neutralize the violence in Beirut had been resolute as opposed to Reagan’s 
dithering and hesitance. Mitterand wanted to enter Lebanon but could not do so 
without the support of a multilateral partnership given the domestic opposition to 
French deployments.116  
 On 4 August 1982, President Sarkis issued a personal, direct plea to Reagan 
requesting direct ‘intervention in the present situation in Beirut.’117 As a result the 
National Security Council met on the same day with President Reagan, Vice President 
Bush, Weinberger and Shultz. The meeting began with concerns over the Israeli 
invasion and Israel’s continued contravention of the ceasefire agreement.118 Shultz, 
gauging the international outcry at the Israeli occupation, argued that Israel must be 
censured both by the Reagan Administration and the UN Security Council or the 
Administration would face further embarrassment. The Secretary of State advised that 
a letter should be sent to Prime Minister Begin ‘that does not contain a threat’ but 
clarifies that Israel’s actions, if continued, would have serious implications for US-
Israeli relations. However, the NSC continued to see the Lebanese conflict as an 
effective proxy of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without further regard for the 
internal security issues or Syrian interference.119 US Ambassador to the UN, Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, known for her deeply conservative approach, steered the meeting into 
more precarious territory, reminding the NSC that even though the Israelis were the 
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first to fire the shots in the conflict, the PLO were international terrorists who were 
working against US interests and committing acts of violence throughout the world, 
supported by the Soviet Union.120 This altered the tone of the entire meeting, not only 
reminding the NSC that the US regarded the PLO as ‘terrorists’ but also leading 
Reagan to shift his focus away from Israel toward the PLO in a clear statement to 
Arafat that ‘their games must stop.’121  
 The Reagan Administration now believed that the only way to force the Israeli 
decision-makers to withdraw was to control the PLO. Reagan’s letter to Prime 
Minister Begin was adamant but unthreatening and illustrated that the US could no 
longer remain quiet on the intervention issue.  
Last night we were making significant progress in the removal of the PLO 
from Beirut. That progress was once again frustrated by the actions taken by 
your forces. There must be an end to the unnecessary bloodshed particularly 
among innocent civilians. I insist that a cease-fire in place be reestablished and 
maintained until the PLO has left Beirut. The relationship between our two 
countries is at stake.122 
 
While Habib’s negotiations had led to a temporary ceasefire between PLO and IDF 
troops in Beirut, the US’ Middle East envoy did not think this could last without US 
intervention. Even if Israel acquiesced to US demands for a short-term ceasefire, the 
ultimate responsibility was now held by the US to oversee Arafat and the PLO’s 
removal, ensure sustainable peace, and monitor the IDF’s withdrawal. Weinberger 
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to Reagan that a US intervention, beyond the 
limitations of diplomacy, into a highly-sensitive issue like the Palestinian-Israeli 
tensions, would expose the US to the regional Arab nations’ potential retribution. Yet 
Reagan and Shultz believed that, without a force that could elicit Israeli acquiescence, 
warning and condemning Israel would prove ineffective.  
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 The Israeli invasion also provided a definitive moment for the Reagan 
Administration to prove regionally that it was prepared to take decisive steps to 
ensure peace. By August 1982, it was clear that the Reagan Administration still saw 
any peacekeeping mandate as more focussed on the Israel-Palestinian challenges than 
on the Lebanese conflict as a whole. In part, the Administration was now committed 
to overcoming its guilt over the controversial debate as to whether Haig had given 
Israel the green light in June.  
 
A United Nations solution? Mistrust, UNIFIL and the MFO 
  
UNIFIL had been operating in Southern Lebanon since 1978 in order to monitor the 
IDF withdrawal after Israel’s first invasion. After the 1982 Israeli invasion, it became 
obvious that UNIFIL was unable to prevent large-scale military conflict on either 
side.123 Skjelsbaek highlights that UNIFIL was limited, not only by its exclusive 
peacekeeping mandate, but also by the restriction on its use of military force.124 It was 
only able to protect civilians by moving them away from the heat of the conflict rather 
than militarily engaging with it. 125  Having proposed UNIFIL in 1978, under 
Resolution 425, the US became frustrated by 1982 with the limitations under which 
the force was operating.126 Breaking the regulations that prevented Security Council 
members from militarily participating in any UN peacekeeping force, France 
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contributed the majority of the military resources to the UNIFIL.127 Neither US 
diplomatic pressure nor the French military presence in southern Lebanon throughout 
1981 could lessen the growing tensions or prevent Syria’s build-up of SAMs in the 
Bekaa Valley. 128  Israel resented UNIFIL’s presence largely because it felt that 
UNIFIL had allowed the PLO and SAF to stockpile arms and SAMs from 1980-82.129  
 The Security Council’s working paper regarding the UNIFIL deployment 
stated that a decision to extend the mandated period of UN presence in Lebanon was 
contingent on the withdrawal of all Israeli and non-Lebanese military forces from 
Lebanon’s borders.130 This simply could not be executed by UNIFIL because of 
Israel’s continued reticence to heed the UN Security Council’s warnings or UNIFIL’s 
commands.  
 The UN’s McBride report later strongly condemned Israel’s invasion (in June 
1982) but Israel’s relationship with UNIFIL was already damaged by the time Sharon 
launched Operation Peace for Galilee.131 Previous events had illustrated to Israel that 
the UN force’s inability to police the growing Syrian, Palestinian and internal 
Lebanese militias could pose a significant threat to Israel’s northern border.132 US 
support for any UN operation in Lebanon also diminished, largely due to Israel’s 
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public contempt for UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon.133 The UN Secretary 
General’s report on 14 June 1982 stated that ‘the United Nations had no capacity for 
direct observation or monitoring of the cease-fire’, further diminishing the possibility 
of Israeli or US support for a UN solution.134 The British also knew that the US was 
very suspicious of the UN but continued to show support for the UNIFIL 
commander.135 The UN’s failure to co-opt both the Israeli and Lebanese forces, 
UNIFIL’s inability to provide adequate military resources and the fear of an almost 
certain Soviet veto meant that the US could not risk trying to strengthen the UN 
peacekeeping mandate in Lebanon. 136  Without the US administration, Israel or 
Lebanon’s sanctioning, UNIFIL was powerless to define its mission clearly.137  
 Equally a working example of an effective non-UN peacekeeping force was 
the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) that Reagan signed in to law on 29 
December 1981 and which became active on 20 March 1982.138 The MFO was 
charged with monitoring the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in the Sinai. 
The UN’s failure to extend the term and scope of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) 
during a Security Council meeting in 1981 illustrated the UN’s weaknesses in 
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developing an effective observer force in Sinai.139 The key reason for the UNEF’s 
failure was the USSR’s opposition to the force, with Moscow siding instead with its 
regional Arab neighbours (particularly Syria) who opposed the Israeli-Egyptian Camp 
David Peace Accords. As a result, the US established the MFO in order to overcome 
the necessity for international and UN Security Council sanctioning.140 In a letter to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives with regard to Reagan’s signing of the 
MFO, the US President stated: 
In fact, it proved impossible to secure U.N. action. As a result, Egypt and 
Israel, with the participation of the United States, entered into negotiations for 
the creation of an alternative multinational force and observers…The Protocol 
established the MFO and provided in effect that the MFO would have the 
same functions and responsibilities as those provided in the 1979 Treaty for 
the planned U.N. force.141 
 
While it seemed reasonable to the Reagan Administration that, given the MFO’s 
successes, the establishment of a similar supervisory multinational peacekeeping 
force to oversee the PLO’s withdrawal was the most rational option, an 
internationally-sanctioned peace treaty had not been ratified between the Palestinians 
and Israel.142 Rather, all that was in place was a temporary ceasefire agreement 
between the PLO and Israel. Although the MFO and the proposed MNFI in Lebanon 
were defined by similar peacekeeping precepts, the Lebanese security context’s 
volatility was characteristically more factional than the situation in the Sinai. Thus, 
the intended MNFI would not be charged with the monitoring of a unanimously-
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endorsed national peace process because it did not have the approval of every 
factional leader in Lebanon.143 Neither did the French, anti-Mitterand and Gaullist 
Rassemblement pour la République party nor the Parti communiste français want 
France to join either the MFO or the MNFI, believing in supporting an exclusively 
UN-led solution in southern Lebanon and the Sinai.144 
 As Ghali argues, the two tests for successful non-UN peacekeeping forces 
must be that the proposed force has the belligerent government and non-government 
forces in the host country’s consensus and the force must be sponsored by a great 
power.145	  Houghton and Trinka set out a list of advantages and disadvantages in 
pursuing a non-UN peacekeeping mission. Amongst the former, they list the ease of 
establishment, financial stability, clearer mandates, management partners’ greater 
commitment and flexibility in the force’s selection as an independent multilateral 
force. The disadvantages include bypassing the UN, the slower start up time, the 
founding partners’ expense, a superpower’s involvement, a lack of prestige and US 
congressional reservations.146 While the MNFI’s backing by the French and US 
governments meant that it possessed all of the necessary financial and military 
resources, the MNFI partners only had the Lebanese government, the Palestinians in 
Lebanon and, reluctantly, Israel’s consensus.147 The missing link was the internal 
Lebanese factions’ support. The PLO was not Israel’s only opponent in the conflict 
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and the MNFI mandate failed to take into account the Syrian or Shi’a militia groups in 
southern Lebanon.148  
 
Birth of the Orca: the MNFI 
After the final details of the Israeli-PLO ceasefire agreement had been reached on 18 
August 1982, the MNFI, a collaboration of US, French and Italian troops, was 
engaged to assist the LAF with the PLO fighters’ safe removal from Lebanon.149 Each 
national MNFI contingent was allowed autonomous command within each region, but 
was ultimately responsible to the LAF command. The MNFI was mandated with the 
sole purpose of performing a peacekeeping, monitoring role in Beirut.150 On 25 
August 1982, 800 US troops under the command of the 32nd MAU, along with 854 
French and 570 Italian troops, landed on Lebanon’s shores under the MNFI’s 
mandate.151 The French termed the MNFI mission, Opération Épaulard I (Operation 
Orca I).152  
 Reagan’s address to the US Marines indicated the moral imperative that he 
was determined to portray,  
You are about to embark on a mission of great importance to our Nation and 
the free world. The conditions under which you carry out your vital 
assignment are, I know, demanding and potentially dangerous. You are tasked 
to be once again what Marines have been for more than 200 years -- 
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peacemakers. Your role in the multi-national force -- along with that of your 
French and Italian counterparts -- is crucial to achieving the peace that is so 
desperately needed in this long-tortured city.153 
 
The MNFI troops’ arrival heralded a distinct period for US policy in the Middle East. 
The force’s establishment proved the Reagan Administration’s willingness to engage 
and participate in the Lebanese conflict, which it had previously refused to do. It also 
demonstrated the US’ disposition to undermine the UN operations under UNIFIL. 
The terms of the agreement between Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros and 
US Ambassador Robert Dillon determined that if:  
withdrawal of the Palestinian personnel referred to above does not take place 
in accord with the predetermined schedule, the mandate of the M.N.F. will 
terminate immediately and all M.N.F. personnel will leave Lebanon 
forthwith.154  
 
Reagan’s speech on 1 September 1982 continued the line that US involvement in 
Lebanon and the Middle East arose from a moral necessity and that the war in 
Lebanon would actually create more opportunities for Israeli-Palestinian peace than 
before.155 That is, the Israeli invasion had created an environment for direct US 
participation and therefore the PLO’s removal.  
The Administration’s naivety was twofold. First, it assumed that the Israeli 
invasion was wholly and exclusively directed at Arafat and the PLO and, second, that 
the PLO’s physical removal from Lebanon to Tunisia would lead to a cessation of the 
conflict in Lebanon. This was far from the truth.156 It is important to see the MNFI 
deployment in the light of the September ‘Reagan Plan’ which saw the MNFI 
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contribution as a vital first step in the Arab-Israeli peace process. While direct conflict 
between the Fatah and the IDF had been reduced by the ceasefire and withdrawal, 
this did not equate to a long-term Palestinian-Israeli agreement.  
 The MNFI troops’ withdrawal on 10 September 1982 signalled the end of an 
internationally-sanctioned, successful peacekeeping collaboration. The MNFI’s 
successful monitoring of Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian fighters led to the PLO’s 
safe withdrawal to Tunisia, without escalating the internal Lebanese conflict.157 
Reagan and Shultz both believed that the PLO represented the greatest obstacle to a 
sustainable ceasefire in Lebanon. The MNFI’s actions in the removal of the 
Palestinian fighters, they believed, would illustrate the US’ commitment to mediating 
peace talks between Israel and Lebanon and ultimately lead to Israel’s full 
withdrawal.  
 
A complete success?  
 
Reagan announced on 1 September 1982, 
today has been a day that should make all of us proud. It marked the end of the 
successful evacuation of the P.L.O. from Beirut, Lebanon…I am happy to 
announce that the U.S. Marine contingent helping to supervise the evacuation 
has accomplished its mission.158 
 
The President followed up by stating that ‘it seemed to me that with the agreement 
in Lebanon we had an opportunity for a more far-reaching peace effort in the region, 
and I was determined to seize that moment.’159  
 The MNFI was hailed as a victorious, unconditional triumph for US-led 
peacekeeping.160 Yet an accurate evaluation of the MNFI’s mission, which ended on 
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10 September 1982 with the redeployment of the US contingent back to the MAU, 
depends on the criteria employed. The significant steps taken by Habib and Reagan to 
abate further conflict between the PLO and Israel garnered the Administration 
international acclaim. If judged on the initial mandate and mission objectives alone, 
the MNFI safely removed the PLO from Beirut. The success often attributed to the 
MNFI was accomplished because the force was limited in terms of both time and 
strategy.  The deployment’s use of military force was also restricted, in line with other 
international peacekeeping mandates, and the objectives were achievable. The 
MNFI’s brief deployment was tightly-controlled and so able to achieve its specific 
goals.  
 If, however, the criteria for evaluating the Reagan Administration’s success 
more broadly included Israel and Syria’s withdrawal and the return of stability to 
Lebanon, the US and the MNFI failed. Houghton and Trinka view the MNFI’s 
strategic outcomes as a ‘complete success’, although they argue that the MNFI and 
MNFII mission as a whole was a ‘flawed holding operation.’161 Had the Reagan 
Administration realized its own miscalculations about the wider political conflict in 
Lebanon, it could be argued that it would never have intervened in the first place.162 
The MNFI’s perceived success created an unjustified sense of victory for the MNFI 
allies, especially the US.163  
 Shultz’s first address as US Secretary of State was made to the United Jewish 
Appeal following the MNFI’s mission’s successful completion on 12 September 
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1982. In a speech entitled ‘The Quest for Peace,’ Shultz referred to Alexander Haig’s 
push for the MFO and in doing so ‘helped make good on the historic Israeli move for 
peace.’164 The speech also extravagantly self-praised Shultz and Reagan’s policy 
under the MNFI, crediting the Administration with securing ‘peace in the Middle East 
and security and success for Israel and her Arab neighbours.’165 Shultz unwaveringly 
stated that the US would not support an independent Palestinian state in the existing 
Palestinian territories. Furthermore he maintained that any Palestinian state creation 
must be avoided to foster peace in the region.166 Meanwhile, the reality of the 
situation in Lebanon did not reflect the successes that Shultz or Reagan announced. 
Israel had not withdrawn, and no tangible steps towards long-term security had been 
achieved in Lebanon. The influence of Syria and Israel had not been significantly 
reduced and the Lebanese conflict continued to grow, even without the Palestinian 
presence. 
 
Conclusion 
The US’ decision not to intervene in Lebanon before August 1982 was not without 
reason. The regional issues’ complexities were focused entirely on Lebanon, of which 
the Palestinian and Israeli conflict was only a part. While Haig had represented a clear 
pro-Israeli influence in the Reagan Administration, he also illustrated a degree of 
moderation in attempting to find a diplomatic solution to the challenges faced. 
Shultz’s introduction into the political landscape engaged the Israeli invasion as a 
measure of credibility for the Reagan Administration, who by June 1982 could no 
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longer remain passive. The MNFI’s establishment heralded an objective peacekeeping 
force that enabled the execution of a compromise between the PLO and the Israelis. 
The PLO’s successful removal from Beirut felt more decisive for the Arab-Israeli 
peace process than many of the diplomatic talks that had occurred under previous 
Administrations. However, the MNFI’s introduction also created a precedent for the 
Reagan Administration. As the MNFI militarily intervened in Lebanon it 
inadvertently committed the US to the Lebanese conflict.  
 While the MNFI’s mandate was limited and clear, the force bound the Reagan 
Administration’s credibility to a peaceful solution in Lebanon. The Reagan 
Administration legitimised a policy outside UN control, because both Reagan and 
Shultz believed that the UN lacked the appropriate mandate, vision and strategy to 
implement a long-term peace settlement. As Reagan became intertwined in the 
Lebanese conflict, he also tied his Administration to a complicated situation which the 
US was now committed to resolving. 
 The crisis in late September 1982 obliged the US to return under the MNFII in 
order to prove that its initial decision to intervene under the MNFI had been 
meaningful.167 Without the decision to deploy the MNFI, it is questionable whether 
Reagan and Shultz would have seen the later crises as a US responsibility.  
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Chapter Four 
Return of the Marines and the Multinational Force II 
Multinational Force II, Phase One (29 September 1982 to 17 May 1983) 
 
On 29 September 1982, some 1,200 American troops intervened for a second time in 
the Lebanese Civil War as part of the US-led Multinational Force in Lebanon. This 
deployment was in response to the assassination of Lebanese President-elect, Bachir 
Gemayel, on 14 September 1982, and the subsequent Sabra and Shatila massacres 
carried out by the Christian Kata’eb supporters of Bachir Gemayel from 16-18 
September 1982.1 The 3,500-strong Multinational Force II (MNFII) was mandated as 
an exclusive peacekeeping force at the invitation of Amin Gemayel, who succeeded 
his brother as president. 
 During the first 12 months of the MNFII’s deployment, the peacekeeping 
mandate underwent several evolutions. The MNFII began as a peacekeeping force 
positioned between the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and the Syrian Armed Force 
(SAF) but quickly found itself intertwined, militarily and diplomatically, in the 
complex Lebanese conflict. In contrast to the Multinational Force I (MNFI) the force 
lacked clear boundaries with regards to the deployment period and the use of military 
force. The MNFII’s strategy was deliberately ambiguous allowing US President 
Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz greater flexibility in pursuing 
US opportunities in Lebanon.  
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This chapter examines the establishment of the MNFII, its initial deployment and the 
evolution of the force’s mandate from 15 September 1982 to the signing of the US-
backed May 17th Agreement in 1983. Discussing the central diplomatic and military 
objectives throughout this period, this chapter demonstrates that the key decision-
makers within the Reagan Administration, namely Shultz and Reagan, did not 
actively choose Lebanon as a policy frontline in September 1982. Rather, US policy 
in Lebanon evolved from the MNFI’s successes and the Reagan Administration’s 
inability to prevent the MNFII from being drawn into the rapidly changing Lebanese 
conflict. The MNFII should thus be interpreted as Reagan’s attempt to strengthen his 
status as the primary peace-broker in the region.2 However, the US’ inability to 
distance itself from the Lebanese crisis after the signing of the Israel-Lebanese 
Agreement on 17 May 1983 resulted in further changes to the rules of engagement 
and ultimately an intensification of US military policy in Lebanon. Reagan and 
Shultz’s failure to predict the political quagmire created by the Administration’s 
meddling led to the military escalation examined in Chapter Five. 
 The focus of the scholarly debate by Hallenbeck, Nelson, Norton, Thakur and 
Kemp has been on MNFII’s mandate and mission, which they have regarded as a 
major failure of the Reagan Administration.3 These scholars argue that by deploying 
the US Marines into Lebanon with unclear objectives, the US implicated itself deeply 
into the Lebanese conflict. Abou Diab agrees that while the inflexible nature of the 
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MNFI’s strategy was in fact to the force’s benefit, the MNFII was overly-ambitious 
and failed to provide a solution to the internal factional tensions that continued to 
plague Lebanon.4 Similarly, Tarrabain argues that the MNFII mission failed because 
of its ambiguity as the strategy was neither truly interventionist nor truly 
peacekeeping.5 The academic literature on the MNFII also highlights two key factors 
that led to the establishment of the force, namely, the possibility that the Reagan 
Administration was concerned with Soviet containment and Reagan’s own pursuit of 
a pax Americana in the Middle East.6 While fears of Soviet influence were indeed a 
factor in the MNFII’s deployment, this argument is overly-simplistic. The Reagan 
Administration, as this chapter argues, was more concerned with the polarisation of 
the regional Arab neighbours and the emergence of a distinctly anti-American 
ideology than with direct superpower confrontation. This chapter further argues that 
the establishment of the MNFII was a result of the Reagan Administration’s flawed 
perceptions of success in the removal of the PLO under the MNFI.   
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The killing of Bachir Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatila massacres 
Former Lebanese Foreign Minister and advisor to the President-elect, Elie Salem, 
claimed that Bachir Gemayel was a young, pragmatic leader who had been elected 
president on 23 August 1982 because of his dogged persuasion and vision in 
embracing a stronger US presence in Lebanon. Israel, too, welcomed his election 
because ‘Bashir had promised Israel the moon’ in the run-up to the invasion.7  
However, once Israeli forces crossed into Lebanon and advanced on to Beirut, Bachir 
Gemayel first reneged on his promise to aggressively deal with West Beirut and then 
refused to sign a peace treaty with Israel. 8 Indeed he tried to keep both Israel and 
Syria at arms length and instead created internal dialogues with leaders in West Beirut 
in order to ‘broaden and consolidate his power base.’9  
On 14 September 1982, while President-elect Bachir Gemayel was addressing 
a meeting of Kata’eb officials in East Beirut, a bomb exploded, destroying the 
building and killing him instantly.10 Bachir’s assassination was thought to have been 
at the hands of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), an anti-Kata’eb militia, 
that was seen as a rogue extension of Syrian intelligence and the Syrian government 
which resented Bachir Gemayel’s seemingly intimate relationship with Israel.11  
At news of Bachir’s death, the IDF launched a troop offensive against West 
Beirut on 15 September 1982, calling for revenge. Israeli Minister of Defense, Ariel 
Sharon went as far as to claim that the IDF intervention was now clearly justified as it 
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aimed to protect Lebanese Muslims and Palestinian civilians who were threatened by 
the Kata’eb’s vengeance.12 However, this was merely a pretext for Sharon’s more 
covert strategic aims namely exerting influence over the post-Gemayel political order, 
as well as aggressively removing the remaining PLO stronghold in West Beirut.13  
At the same time as the IDF moved into Beirut, armed Christian militiamen 
stormed the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut on 16-18 
September, killing many Palestinian civilians. 14  Led by radical Kata’eb militia 
commander Eli Hobeiqa, the Sabra and Shatila massacres were revenge for 
Gemayel’s assassination and as a means to restore the Christian balance of power. 
Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout, wife of Lebanese PLO leader Shafiq al-Hout, conducted 
research on the massacres at Sabra and Shatila through victim and witness testimony. 
She concluded that the invading gunmen all belonged to al-Kata’eb, al-Quwat al-
Lubnaniyeh and Quwat Sa’d Haddad.15 Given Hobeiqa and the commander of the 
Christian Southern Lebanon Army (SLA), Said Haddad’s, known alliance with Israel, 
there was concern that Sharon had sanctioned the murders. Sharon admitted to only 
having ‘coordinated’ with the Kata’eb militiamen but significant concern arose that 
Sharon may have provided a green light for the massacres which would ultimately 
lead to further reprisals against IDF troops in Lebanon.16 Sharon stated: 
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When we agreed to the entrance of the Phalangists into the terrorist camps, 
they were expressly told by the I.D.F.'s senior commanders, and I quote, “that 
a military force will enter the Shatilla camp from the south and west and will 
comb out and mop up terrorists.” It was emphasized in the coordinating 
meeting that “the action is against terrorists and that the civilian population 
should not be harmed, especially women, children and old persons.”17 
 
However, there had been no evidence that the PLO ‘terrorists’ were in the camps prior 
to the attack and even when the Kata’eb found no PLO fighters they continued to kill 
civilians.  
Neither Sharon’s plans in West Beirut nor the Christian actions in the refugee 
camps had produced their desired plans. The two attacks did not remove the PLO 
from West Beirut but rather reduced Israeli influence in the new Lebanese 
government. The situation prompted significant concern for the new Lebanese 
President, Amin Gemayel18, who wished to protect the Christian population in Beirut 
whom he believed would suffer if the Palestinians sought reprisal for the massacres.19 
The urgency precipitated by the massacre justified Gemayel’s call for international 
security and military aid in order to safeguard civilian populations.20   
Furthermore, Sharon’s involvement in the Palestinian massacre led to him 
loosing his Ministry of Defence portfolio after an Israeli inquiry, known as the Kahan 
Commission, found Sharon to have been accountable due to his conversations with 
the Kata’eb before the attack.21  
 After the Palestinian massacres, and as Sharon continued to deny 
responsibility or Israeli involvement, Washington reprimanded the Israeli Defence 
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Minister for the IDF’s presence in West Beirut. The outbreak of violent conflict raised 
major questions over the success of the MNFI and US credibility in the region more 
broadly. Clearly, the MNFI’s achievements in finding a sustainable peace had been 
overstated.22 Its failure to bring about long-term peace in Lebanon occurred because 
US decision-makers overestimated the PLO’s importance as the key to minimising 
both Israel and Syria’s military presence and the US failed to recognise the growing 
internal tensions between the Lebanese domestic factional militias.23 Reagan was 
concerned about alienating his Arab allies and providing Syria with a justification to 
strike out further in Lebanon.24 National Security Affairs Special Assistant, Geoffrey 
Kemp, argued that Reagan’s response was 
an emotional and reactive response to a tragic event, influenced by the feeling 
that the United States had assumed responsibility for the safety of the 
Palestinians and that our friends, the Israelis, had allowed the worst to 
happen.25 
 
The Administration also realized that, if Syria attacked Israel in the short-term then 
the US would feel obliged to defend the IDF, something that it would wish to avoid 
being observed to be doing. Sturkey, Mearsheimer and Walt argue that the Jewish 
lobby and ‘fundamentalist’ Christian groups had a large influence in Washington 
regarding US decisions relating to Israel. They claim that, even as Israel undertook 
controversial actions in Lebanon, the historical relationship, strategic position and 
Israel’s aggressive position toward the Soviet Union meant that Washington would 
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always consider Israel as the US’ most likely ally in the Middle East.26 However, 
Israel’s alleged involvement in the Sabra and Shatila massacres represented a crack in 
the Reagan Administration’s relationship with Israel and a challenge to the previous, 
seemingly successful US campaign in Lebanon.27  
 Although, in the context of the thousands of civilians who had died in 
Lebanon, it is arguable that the massacre did not represent any greater humanitarian 
crisis than the rest of the war had already created, the weight of the responsibility felt 
in Washington and the public outcry internationally triggered the US back into 
action. 28  Had Reagan truly considered the opportunity costs of intervening in 
Lebanon, as Goldstein states, it is questionable whether he would have launched the 
MNFII.29    
 
‘Now is the time for action’: Reconstituting the Multinational Force 
With the troubling events from 14-18 September 1982, President Reagan decided to 
redeploy the US Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) to Lebanon’s shores on 20 
September under the MNFII.30 Reagan stipulated that this second US-led intervention 
was to be determined by a number of key objectives. These were to aid all foreign 
forces’ withdrawal from Lebanon (with specific reference to the IDF invasion in June 
1982) and establish a stable, sovereign Lebanese Government under Gemayel. On one 
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hand the Reagan Administration believed that ‘US interests were well served by a 
moderate, pro-Western Lebanon.’31 On the other hand, the National Security Council 
(NSC) identified US interests in Lebanon as a broader regional mission, in which 
Lebanese sovereignty and independence were neither considered nor valued. The 
NSC stated that Israel’s imminent security, US strategic military and trade bases and 
oil security in the Gulf States were the Reagan Administration’s primary motivations 
for a renewed intervention in Lebanon.32  
By 20 September the conflict in Lebanon had changed significantly. The 
Syrian Army, which had previously suffered major military losses due to the Israeli 
bombing of its SAMs in June 1982, had rearmed with Soviet support. Similarly, even 
after the PLO’s removal, the IDF had strengthened its military occupation in southern 
Lebanon. The continued IDF presence illustrated Sharon’s broader agenda of 
controlling the conflict’s outcome.33 The political and security context in which the 
MNFII had to operate was even more complex than that in which the MNFI 
intervened. 34 The US explained Bachir Gemayel’s assassination and the Palestinian 
massacres as key illustration of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli war which, Reagan 
felt, had been resolved under the MNFI. The US fundamentally underestimated the 
emerging Syrian influence and the strengthened Lebanese factional presence in 
Lebanon that defined the war by September 1982. It could be easily argued that, had 
the US interpreted the worsening Lebanese domestic context as more than an IDF-
PLO conflict, it would have recognised that the MNFII mandate was unrealistic for 
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delivering the force’s objectives. Indeed, the events in the lead-up to 20 September 
were merely symptomatic of the growing uncertainty and tensions now characterizing 
the Lebanese conflict.35 This uncertainly was ultimately reflected in the MNFII’s 
mandate, as the key decision-makers attempted to adapt the force’s operations to a 
context that they did not completely understand.36  
Looking forward, the Reagan Administration continued to see an opportunity 
in the Lebanese conflict to strengthen its Middle East position and extend its identity 
as the sole bearer of international peacekeeping.37 Reagan explicitly stated that the 
leading factor in the US decision-making should be to consider the Lebanon crisis an 
obligation of the US’ ‘vital role as a leader for world peace.’ 38  The Reagan 
Administration naively assumed that this US/Gemayel collaboration also represented 
support from all other Lebanese parties whereas, in reality, no such consensus or 
support existed. This was a major mistake by the Reagan Administration. While the 
MNFII’s deployment was vaguely linked to an objective peacekeeping mission, the 
US had clearly aligned itself to the threatened Gemayel government. Without the 
other Lebanese factions’ recognition or consent, the MNFII was destined to become a 
prejudiced military force, bent on protecting Gemayel, rather than Lebanon’s 
sovereignty.39  
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Contempt for UNIFIL and the US transnational police force 
As Chapter Three highlighted, UNIFIL’s establishment in 1978 set the precedent for 
the international community in Lebanon. Yet, Reagan’s deployment of the MNFI had 
undermined whatever credibility UNIFIL had left in discussing peace between Israel 
and the Palestinians. UNIFIL was only regarded as a humanitarian force only once 
stability and adequate withdrawals had been achieved.40 While the conflict raged 
UNIFIL was limited in its ability to convince any of the regional or internal parties in 
Lebanon to embark on ceasefire or withdrawal talks. Most importantly, Israel held 
significant contempt for the UN force which dated back to UNIFIL’s inauguration 
and was cemented in Israel’s challenge to the numerous Security Council 
condemnations of IDF and Israeli actions.41  
The continued presence of the IDF throughout southern Lebanon and Beirut, 
as well as the violent tragedy of the Sabra and Shatila massacres, proved that UNIFIL 
was unable to handle the growing military aggression or prevent major humanitarian 
casualties.42 Similarly, the Lebanese government rejected any suggestion that the UN 
could monitor the Palestinian civilians, instead calling on the US to provide an 
alternative.43 It was inconceivable that Sharon or Gemayel would participate with the 
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UN when the US, France and Italy had already demonstrated their propensity to rush 
to the rescue under the MNFI.44  
 The US/UN relationship suffered considerable setbacks, mainly because of 
UNIFIL and Lebanon. As Gregg argues, while the US/UN relationship had peaked 
and troughed throughout numerous US administrations, the Reagan Administration 
saw UNIFIL as a mission that had been deployed longer than necessary with few 
results. Gregg also argues that US frustration peaked because ‘the UN is overextended 
and its peacekeeping missions ineffectual.’45 That is, Reagan wished to avoid the 
ambiguity that he saw in the UNIFIL mandate. Murphy, however, argues that it was 
Reagan who undermined UNIFIL from the beginning by failing to support the UN 
force and thus UNIFIL became powerless. He further states that Israel’s belief that the 
UN Security Council opposed them led to UNIFIL’s inability to open up a PLO/IDF 
dialogue. 46  As Thakur states, the UN/US relationship during the Reagan 
Administration lay somewhere between these two arguments.47 Reagan saw many 
pitfalls to the UNIFIL mandate and thereby prevented an international consensus for 
it to operate effectively. The force had been consistently unable to prevent conflict 
between the Lebanese factions or the escalation of regional dynamics. Working 
within a UN framework was clearly not an option for Reagan or Shultz, as returning 
to Lebanon was more of an issue of credibility for Reagan than about defending 
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civilian populations. The administration did not have faith that UNIFIL could ‘fix’ the 
recent outbreak of the conflict, although Reagan also had to overcome the same 
obstacles that UNIFIL had faced regarding the ‘morass of Lebanese politics.’48  
 The MNFII’s establishment also gave the Reagan Administration an 
opportunity to reaffirm its self-appointed role as the ‘transnational police force.’49 
Reagan and Shultz’s movements in creating a US-led international police force 
concerned the other MNFII participants, Italy and France, particularly because 
although Reagan promoted the MNFII’s multilateral character, the force was not an 
internationally collaborative policy vehicle from the outset. France specifically saw a 
US-led command structure as impeding France’s historical and cultural links with 
Lebanon.50 Furthermore, the French troops, which had only recently been transferred 
from UNIFIL to join the MNFII, were still operating under UN command structures 
and UNIFIL’s neutral leadership of commanders, Lieutenant-Generals Emmanuel 
Erskine and William O’Callaghan.51  
Although Washington claimed to be entertaining collaborative decision-
making with the other European partners, this process was superficial in its regard for 
French or Italian objectives.52 Both French President François Mitterrand and Italian 
Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini suspected that Gemayel saw the MNFII as a 
vehicle for pursuing his own political agenda within Lebanon rather than assisting to 
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bring about stability. 53  Italy’s newly-elected Prime Minister, Amintore Fanfani, 
insisted that all MNFII partners must agree that they were entering Lebanon on a 
politically neutral basis.54 The US’ decision to support Gemayel was not agreed to by 
all MNFII partners. However, US arrangements with Gemayel illustrated that the 
MNFII was, in fact, politically biased in favour of the Gemayel government.55 The 
MNFII partners’ distrust of Gemayel and US monopoly over the force’s command 
would ultimately result in overall ineffectiveness and the numerous operational 
revisions throughout the MNFII’s deployment.   
 
An ambiguous peacekeeping mandate 
The terms of the memorandum of engagement agreed on 25 September 1982 outlined 
the working relationship between the Lebanese and US governments with respect to 
the US Marines’ return. 56 Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros noted that the 
MNFII’s return was in line with UN Security Council Resolution 521. 57  This 
resolution, however, merely outlined UN Observers’ free travel within Beirut and 
made no mention of any other military force deployment. The US/Lebanese 
memorandum did not specify an exit date nor did it claim that the MNFII was aimed 
at the restoration of the Lebanese government’s ‘sovereignty and authority.’ 58 
President Reagan twice promised a strictly-limited deployment period for the MNFII 
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although failed to refer to a specific date.59 This was because the understanding 
between the US and Lebanon allowed for a flexible period to be agreed upon once 
Gemayel was satisfied with the foreign forces’ removal, namely the IDF and SAF.60 
The MNFI had previously stipulated a strict 30-day presence in Beirut, 
limiting the scope of the mission to an achievable time period. Had the MNFI failed 
to complete its mission within that time, it was instructed to withdraw. However, 
similar constraints were not placed on the MNFII, which opened it up to the 
possibility of recurrent extensions, ambiguous mission objectives and, indeed, 
mission creep. On 28 September 1982, Reagan stated:  
The marines are going in there, into a situation with a definite understanding 
as to what we're supposed to do. I believe that we are going to be successful in 
seeing the other foreign forces leave Lebanon. And then as such time as 
Lebanon says that they have the situation well in hand, why, we'll depart.61  
 
Yet there was no ‘definite understanding’ of the situation, as Reagan stated, because 
there was no clear strategy for the foreign forces’ removal. While the Reagan 
Administration saw Lebanon as an opportunity to further US interests regionally, 
Reagan’s statement essentially tied the US to the successful removal of the IDF and 
SAF. 62  
 The MNFII was initially conceptualized as an exclusive peacekeeping mission 
although it patently lacked the humanitarian capital or limitations on the use of 
military force that were characteristic of other regional peacekeeping forces (UNEF, 
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MNFO, UNFICYP, UNIFIL). 63  Primarily, the need to shape the mission as a 
necessary peacekeeping initiative came from a post-Vietnam legacy that resulted in 
the Reagan administration seeking ‘how to increase security in the 1980s as a much 
broader task than to consider how to prevent war.’64 Constantly challenging any post-
Vietnam US President was the ‘Vietnam Syndrome.’65 The protests that followed the 
US’ intervention in Vietnam led to domestic and international institutions exercising 
influence over an administration with regard to the issue of military intervention 
through the use of the War Powers Resolution. While the Administration did not 
consider Lebanon a questionable intervention, given the recently purported MNFI 
peacekeeping successes, it was forced to shape the second intervention as equally 
justifiable in a peacekeeping context. Reagan was therefore forced to recognise the 
Democratic Party’s majority in the House of Representatives in 1982 and broad 
domestic criticism of the use of military force in any part of US foreign policy.  
 The MNFII was, from the outset, also more ambitious in its objectives than the 
MNFI.66 Thakur states that the MNFII lacked a consistent, clear mandate from its 
inception, which ultimately led to the US becoming drawn into the conflict.67 
Skjelsbaek maintains that the MNFII’s mandate was as limited as that of the 
UNIFIL.68 Without the ability to trace and apprehend forces on either side, the MNFII 
was limited to retaliating only when fired upon in order to protect its position. The 
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limited ‘self-defence’ mandate stipulated by the UN aimed at preventing an escalation 
on either side (between the PLO, Syria and the Israelis). The UN was not allowed to 
interfere with the domestic government’s operational responsibilities, therefore 
limiting any military assistance to the Lebanese Army.69 On the other hand, the 
agreement between the US and LAF included a considerable supply of arms and 
combat weapon training.  The emergence of this hybrid military intervention and 
peacekeeping force heralded the French troops’ withdrawal from UNIFIL in favor of 
the MNFII in September 1982. Even with Paris’ concerns over US control of the 
force, the French saw the MNFII as a more flexible solution to the immediate conflict 
that would include the provisions of military assistance and training for the Lebanese 
government.70   
 If the Reagan Administration had accurately understood the political changes 
in Lebanon, between August and September 1982, the strategy and objectives 
underpinning the MNFII would have been vastly different. For example, a larger, 
more comprehensive military force could have been deployed, in line with Secretary 
of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s recommendations. Weinberger’s criticisms of the 
force were that there was no significant deterrence with the force’s meagre size and 
also no clear sense of who were the targets to engage.71  
Alternatively, Reagan could have decided to contain involvement in Lebanon 
to a purely diplomatic role, specifically an effort to mediate a realistic, successful 
Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement. Only after this was agreed could the US intervene 
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militarily, if there were clear, simple peacekeeping actions, such as under the PLO-
Israeli agreement and MNFI in 1982. Additionally, the US could have strengthened 
UN involvement by bolstering UNIFIL’s monitoring of the Palestinian Refugee 
camps and pressuring Israel into a dialogue with the UN for an eventual withdrawal.  
However, none of these options were ever considered. Instead, the MNFII 
evolved from its preliminary stages of peacekeeping into a military interposition force 
and thereby found itself in the middle of the conflict between the IDF and SAF. 
 
 
Defining Interposition 
A month after the full deployment of the MNFII in Lebanon, the US realized that the 
initial monitoring and peacekeeping objectives were unrealistic. This section will 
outline how the Reagan Administration’s push for a greater military role in Lebanon 
in fact led the MNFII to become interposed between the SAF and IDF. 
 President Gemayel strongly warned the US that it was unrealistic to expect 
persuasive peacekeeping alone to force both Syria and Israel’s withdrawal, given that 
this patently conflicted with both countries’ intentions, believing that only force 
would do.72 Gemayel believed that the three foreign forces (PLO, SAF and IDF) 
formed a triangulated ‘alliance’ to promote continuing instability in Lebanon. He 
stated that there was a 60 per cent chance that the remaining PLO would leave 
Lebanon without any fighting if the US could guarantee Israeli and Syrian forces’ 
withdrawal from the southern and northern parts of Lebanon respectively.73 Israel 
strongly protested that it would only consider withdrawing its forces once it observed 
the SAF’s withdrawal along with the remaining Palestinian forces’ demilitarization. 
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This political stalemate became the Reagan Administration’s first major hurdle to 
achieving a successful conclusion to the MNFII’s deployment. 
 The revamped MNFII continued to operate under a strict non-engagement 
policy with the internal militia and the administration believed that this alone would 
limit the possibility of retribution or offensive attacks. 74 However, National Security 
Advisor William Clark warned that, if the US were to escalate the force, the highest 
priority should be to prevent significant US casualties being caught in the SAF/IDF 
crossfire.75  
 As the US sought greater opportunities in Lebanon through a military rather 
than a diplomatic campaign, Reagan and Shultz saw potential opportunities with 
respect to the US’ broader Middle East foreign policy.  
By taking the lead in obtaining the withdrawal of Israeli and other foreign 
forces from Lebanon and tangibly demonstrating our willingness to promote 
the security of that troubled country, we will earn the respect of the Arab 
world and show that US leadership can make a decisive difference in 
promoting peace and security in the Middle East.76  
 
With this vision for creating a greater sense of US authority between Arab neighbours 
came the need for Reagan to show success in Lebanon in the short-term.   
 The Department of Defense believed that, as the US contingent of the MNFII 
continued its efforts in Lebanon with the structure of its initial September 1982 
deployment, it was bound to become embroiled helplessly between the Israeli and 
Syrian forces.77 Therefore, within a month of deployment, the Department of Defense 
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and State Department called for increases in the numbers of US military troops. The 
Departments argued that significant increases in the military apparatus were required 
if the US were to implement its mission realistically.  
 Weinberger, while also pessimistic about a quick success for the MNFII, 
argued that no possible results would be seen for six months, thereby implying a 
withdrawal date in mid-1983. He also claimed that there would have to be realistically 
longer delays in achieving the objectives of PLO resettlement outside Lebanon.78 
More importantly, Weinberger’s key recommendation was to rapidly increase the US 
contingent to the MNFII which was now described as a sluggish and ineffective 
‘interposition force between Israel and Syria.’ Weinberger believed that swift, 
aggressive military force by a larger conventional force was required to pressure all 
parties to leave Lebanon and reduce the possibility of US casualties. 79  
 By the end of October, the Administration realized that its initial mandate for 
the MNFII would remain unfulfilled by December 1982 and therefore sent special 
envoys, US Ambassadors Morris Draper and Philip Habib, to pressure the Israelis into 
considering a mediated agreement.80 Habib, having been instrumental in the PLO-
Israeli Agreement in August, presumed that both the Lebanese and Israeli leaders 
would readily accept the talks.81  While a number of minor informal agreements were 
reached, Israel refused to formalize the negotiations until 28 December, following 
Reagan’s direct intervention.  
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The Administration believed that Gemayel was an uncharismatic leader who 
had lost much of the support of the other factions and would require US support to 
renew his negotiation position at the talks. Sensing US pressure to reach an 
agreement, Gemayel stated that his government would not have required the MNFII’s 
intervention if the US had simply assisted him with the challenges that faced his 
presidency. 82 This was Gemayel’s way of requesting further military capital to 
solidify his own internal leadership position in the lead-up to any future Israeli-
Lebanese negotiations.83 The US entertained this request through an $80 million arms 
deal, thereby creating a precedent of biased support for the Lebanese President’s 
ailing government. The deal also included an extensive military training program, 
aptly known as the ‘crash effort with the LAF.’84  
The US made these deals with Gemayel without any confidence that they 
would produce a tenable solution or ceasefire. Serious concerns were raised in a NSC 
meeting regarding this militarization of the Gemayel government and the public 
implications for US regional policy, specifically as to how it would be seen by 
Israel.85 However, Reagan and Shultz felt that it would send a strong message that the 
US was not merely predisposed to support the Israelis in the upcoming negotiations. 
Reagan also argued that a reduction in support for Gemayel could lead to the 
possibility of a Syrian-dominated Lebanon.  
Our strategic interests today must be considered in light of prospects for 
eventual Syrian domination in Lebanon, which is now clearly the objective. 
Such domination is clearly inconsistent with U.S. vital interests.86  
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However, the US Congress began to question how realistic the prospects were of 
removing Syria from Lebanon. By December 1982, it was clear that the US-led 
MNFII had failed to move either the IDF or SAF at all. Even though the Reagan 
Administration recognized the growing threat of becoming stuck in Lebanon, it 
disregarded the possibility that the MNFII could be exacerbating the conflict or in fact 
enhancing Asad’s legitimacy in developing the Syrian positions in Lebanon.87 Reagan 
and Shultz, in appeasing the US Congress, needed to seek further diplomatic 
measures by which to complement the US military presence in Lebanon.  
 
 
The Reagan-Shultz duality: force or ceasefire?  
The US State Department initially claimed that a full withdrawal of all foreign forces 
should occur by 22 November 1982: a six-week operation. However, Reagan 
recognised that the MNFII’s short term presence in Lebanon was neither sufficient to 
establish internal security nor strong enough to prevent a long term Israeli/Syrian 
conflict. While still wanting to remain firm in his commitment to ‘peace-making’ in 
the Middle East, the issue of US military involvement and credibility was beginning 
to force Reagan to consider a defeat.88 Shultz and Reagan therefore attempted to find 
a parallel, diplomatic solution to the Lebanese crisis that would illustrate US 
willingness to find a negotiated resolution to the conflict while in the meantime 
keeping the MNFII in Lebanon.89  
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 This section examines the issues affecting US decision-making from October 
1982 to May 1983 and the conflicting interests within the administration. The policy 
engaged by the US administration created a conflicting environment for the MNFII. It 
both extended and undermined its presence in Lebanon and led to the 18 April 1983 
bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut as the US entangled itself both militarily and 
politically within the Lebanese crisis. It is important to examine US involvement in 
the May 17th Agreement, particularly Shultz’ role in renewing US-Israeli relations.90  
 Three key issues affected US decision-making in Lebanon throughout this 
period. First, the Reagan Administration and Israel’s growing tensions over the 
unconditional withdrawal had led to direct USMNF and IDF conflict.91 Second, the 
Administration was concerned that a protracted mission in Lebanon would lead to 
congressional and public outcry without any guarantees that an extended mandate 
would produce Reagan’s initial objectives. Finally, domestic, regional and 
international pressures on the US administration to withdraw the USMNF contingent 
would leave UNIFIL as the only force able to monitor a Syrian/Israeli ceasefire and 
withdrawal. The Reagan Administration could foresee that an MNFII withdrawal 
would negatively affect US standing as the military strongman in the Middle East. 
Realizing that the MNFII’s mandate would not be implemented by the year-end, 
Reagan sought rapidly to increase the US marine contingent in the force. At the same 
time, yielding to the growing congressional disquiet regarding the deployment of US 
marines in Lebanon, Shultz continued pressuring the Israeli and Lebanese 
governments to begin negotiations for a sustainable ceasefire.92 
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The use of military force 
National Security Advisor William Clark heavily criticized the October 1982 ‘State 
Paper on Lebanon’ which saw a full withdrawal of all foreign forces as realistic.93 The 
paper recommended that a 90-day deployment period from 29 September could be 
reasonably enforced for the MNFII to execute its mission.94 Clark argued that the 
MNFII had not yet provided any significant motivation for either Syria or Israel to 
comply with US pressure to withdraw from Lebanon and that it would require further 
time to establish these incentives. The Reagan Administration saw a near-term US 
withdrawal leading to a perceptible defeat, believing that, should the US abandon its 
objectives and interests in Lebanon, ‘there will be a measured loss of US prestige 
internationally in as much as we will be seen as having been intimidated by a Soviet 
client.’95 In response, Reagan was clear that, should any foreign forces remain in 
Lebanon, the MNFII would use aggressive military force to remove them.96 The 
withdrawal of any foreign force from Lebanon would be followed by a secondary 
program of LAF capacity building and militarization. Reagan stated that US would 
only withdraw the MNFII if the IDF and SAF also successfully withdrew.97 This 
policy was a highly contentious decision, as it bound the US and the other MNFII 
partners to a completely unrealistic condition. Furthermore, the MNFII was relatively 
small, certainly far smaller than the 14,000 troops that Eisenhower had launched in 
1958. Bell argues that this indicated that the MNFII was merely a symbolic force to 
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signal the Reagan Administration’s strength.98  If the force was symbolic, then why 
did Reagan place so much faith in the completion of the MNFII’s mission? 
 Added to this, Weinberger warned of the impending catastrophe as he 
challenged Shultz in a heated debate over the conditional use of military force, which 
he argued Shultz ardently applied without any guarantee of a positive outcome. 
Weinberger stated that there was no overwhelming evidence that the US mission 
could guarantee a victory in Lebanon with the current size of the force, convinced that 
the US would only incur great losses while retreating hastily.99 The Department of 
Defense recommended instead that a transition should occur for the LAF to take 
control of Lebanese domestic security issues. However, Weinberger concurrently 
voiced his concerns that the LAF was incapable of doing so and would require 
significant resources and training if Lebanon were to remains stable in the long-
term.100   
 While it was clear to the administration that the MNFII could not fulfil its 
obligations as outlined in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 64 under its 
current structure, questions over Reagan’s credibility were being voiced throughout 
Washington, especially within Congress. Persuading both the US public and Congress 
was challenging at the best of times. Expanding the USMNF’s military capabilities 
began to raise concerns in Congress about another Vietnam War scenario.101 The 
National Security Council report in November 1982 concluded that international 
views of the MNFII were ‘mostly negative’ and that contributors to the MNFII were 
                                                
98 Coral Bell, ‘The Reagan Paradox: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s’, (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), p.88. 
99 Lou Cannon, ‘President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime’, (New York: Public Affairs, 
2000), pp.353-355 & ‘Interview with Caspar Weinberger’, Frontline, PBS News, September 
2001. 
100 [DOD/State Position], pp.1-2. 
101 Notes for Reagan, [Broad Actions for Presidential Decisions], 7 September 1983, 
NSDD103 File, Box 91291, Executive Secretariat, NSC Records Series, RRPL, p.1. 
 171 
limited.102 Similarly, the USMNF strategy’s direction and its proposed medium-sized 
escalation led to tension with the French Multinational Force (FRMNF) command. 
The French questioned US strategy in the MNFII, vehemently opposing an escalation 
of the conflict. The Reagan Administration conveniently interpreted this as a lack of 
French commitment to both US policy and sustainable peace in Lebanon. In response, 
the US strategically contacted local Arab neighbours, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates, to take the lead on any future Lebanese redevelopment while 
removing French contractors from key construction and infrastructural projects.103 
This did little to alleviate the already strained relations between Paris and 
Washington. 
 On 1 November 1982, Shultz sent Reagan an urgent memorandum on 
Lebanon. It stipulated that international pressure was mounting for the US to block all 
military and economic aid to Israel. Should the US fail to find a tenable solution to the 
Lebanon crisis and, more specifically, the Israeli invasion, Reagan would need to 
handle the public fall out.104 Clearly, the Administration, while it would continue to 
request Israeli withdrawal, would not place sanctions on Israel if it failed to comply.105 
To Shultz, Lebanon had become the key frontline of the Arab/Israeli conflict and he 
believed that the US should move forward militarily to illustrate that the 
Administration was searching for a solution to the conflict between Israel and her 
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neighbours.106 Shultz was only superficially conscious of the public outcry regarding 
the initial Israeli invasion both in the US and Israel.107 He believed that a negotiated 
Israel/Lebanon peace, an unconditional withdrawal and PLO resettlement in 
neighbouring Arab states would lead to a full Syrian withdrawal and the ultimate 
cessation of the conflict. However, Shultz’s continued focus on the PLO, which had 
become marginalized since the MNFI, illustrated the administration’s lack of 
understanding of the wider Lebanese conflict. 
 Seeming to yield, in part, to Congressional demands to withdraw US marines, 
Reagan outlined a timed strategy for foreign forces to withdraw throughout November 
1982. This plan had not been devised to be implemented in actuality but rather to 
prove to Congress that the Administration would consider a withdrawal if necessary.  
 Instead of truly contemplating any such withdrawal, Reagan embarked on an 
escalated military program for the Gemayel government without consulting 
Congress.108 Gemayel flew to Washington in November to secure US military aid 
beyond the Congressional limits that had been set at the MNFII’s inception.109 By 8 
November Reagan had approved a $150 million military assistance program under its 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) policy. As in the case of US military sponsorship in El 
Salvador, that began under President Carter, the use of the Military Assistance 
Program (MAP) and FMS enabled both the Reagan and Carter Administrations to 
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supply significant military assistance without congressional approval.110 Carter had 
funded considerable military aid to the El Salvadorian government in its civil conflict 
against the Farabuno Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). By 1983, the Reagan 
Administration continued this policy, equipping and modernizing the national 
paramilitary squad, Organización Democrática Nacionalista. 111 The Reagan 
Administration used the ‘Foreign Assistance Act, Section 506’ to bypass the need for 
congressional approval of arms transfers.112 This move to militarize the LAF rapidly, 
along with the plans for MNFII expansion, demonstrated that Reagan and Shultz were 
not committed to a US withdrawal after all.113  
 The MNFII’s military objectives by December 1982 remained focussed on the 
Syrian and Israeli forces simultaneous departure from Lebanon. The Reagan 
Administration’s decision-makers, specifically Shultz, Clark and Reagan, had 
foreseen a final cessation of the conflict with the foreign forces occurring by 31 
December, with only a USMNF and UNIFIL contingent remaining to monitor the 
continued peace on both Lebanon’s northern and southern borders.114 This timeframe 
was both impractical and injudicious, as no credible steps had been taken to compel 
the SAF or IDF to comply with the MNFII goals.115 While Reagan moved to extend 
the USMNF’s military intervention in Lebanon, Shultz realized that the 
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Administration had to maintain diplomatic pressure on the Israeli and Lebanese 
governments to begin negotiations. This was the only way for the Reagan 
Administration to sidestep the criticisms associated with the MNFII’s failure to meet 
its deadlines and goals. The next phase of diplomatic negotiations around the May 
17th Agreement would lead the US into an even more politically treacherous and 
entangled position throughout 1983. 
 
The race for diplomatic credibility 
The 18 April 1983 US Embassy bombing, which killed 57 people, including 17 US 
marines and diplomatic staff, was a direct result of the US becoming intimately tied to 
the Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement.116 Whilst the US blamed Iran for sponsoring 
the attack, it recognized that there was growing resentment toward the US presence in 
Lebanon, spearheaded by Syria.117 Prior to this attack, the USMNF command had 
become entangled in Shultz’s peace negotiation attempts. The US administration 
found itself perceptibly split from its exclusive engagement with the MNFII in that it 
was creating policy within Lebanon without the other MNFII partners’ approval 
(France, Italy and now Britain). Considering the Israeli government inflexible over 
the Syrian issue, Shultz stated to Reagan, ‘our best posture is a vigorous defense of 
the agreement – and an image of Israel as difficult to budge.’ 118  Indeed, the 
negotiations leading up to the May 17th Agreement were fraught with formalities and 
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‘éclaircissement’ on both sides, that reached an apogee in the lead up to the US 
Embassy bombing in April 1983.119  
 Harbouring resentment toward both Sharon and Begin for tarnishing the 
MNFII’s ‘peacekeeping mission,’ Reagan pushed for sanctions to be taken against 
Israel until Begin agreed to negotiations with Lebanon.120 Tensions grew in December 
1982 between the Reagan Administration and Israel. As a result, Reagan increased 
Shultz’ responsibility as spokesman in the conflict as he had historically been pro-
Israeli and could manage the Begin/Reagan tensions.121 The president implemented 
his proposed foreign policy reshuffle in order to ‘make structural changes in the 
foreign policy-making machinery so that the Secretary of State will be the President’s 
principal spokesman and adviser.’122 Shultz, Habib and Draper worked to secure a 
date for the commencement of the ceasefire negotiations, recognizing Israel’s 
strategic importance (particularly if Syria continued to dominate Lebanon) and 
understanding Israel’s stubbornness in withdrawing from Lebanon.123 Habib stated 
that ‘the United States just doesn’t have the authority to decide within deadlines; you 
have to convince people, and that’s what we’re in the process of doing.’124  
 As a result, Shultz announced on 30 January 1983, that no tangible action 
would be taken against Israel to pressure them to withdraw from Lebanon. It was 
hoped that this would lead Israel into a less aggressive position and more positive 
relations with the US. Conversely, it signified to the internal Lebanese factions, the 
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Gemayel government and Syria that the Reagan Administration evidently intended to 
defend Israeli objectives.125 Shultz saw the peace talks as a possible easy victory for 
the MNFII and a way of lessening the growing debate over US marines’ withdrawal 
domestically.126  
Reagan issued a directive in April 1983 under increasing pressure to normalise 
the Lebanese/Israeli conflict, announcing US forces’ extensive militarization in 
Lebanon and stressing the importance of this in renewing US-Israeli relations, as 
Begin questioned the MNFII’s resolve in Lebanon.127 The first British contingent’s 
arrival to the MNFII of only 100 troops on 10 February did little to signify to the 
warring parties that the MNFII was intent on finding a diplomatic solution. The initial 
deployment was ‘a symbolic British presence to demonstrate support for the 
Government and to attach other contributors to the MNF.’ 128 The British plan 
mandated a limited three-month operation for the troops’ withdrawal back to the UN 
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).129 None of this suggested to Begin that the MNFII was 
Israel’s ally in Lebanon. As a result Shultz tried to improve US-Israeli relations 
ultimately at a cost of the US’ relationships with other Arab neighbours.130 Yasir 
Arafat strongly rejected Reagan’s proposals for Arab-Israeli peace, referring only 
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thereafter to the Fez Summit proposal which he believed recognized Palestinian 
demands.131  
 
The May 17th Agreement 
 
The May 17th Israeli-Lebanese Agreement was designed to bring about three tangible 
outcomes; namely, an Israel/Lebanon armistice, IDF withdrawal and therefore the 
subsequent handover to the LAF of Israeli-occupied territories and a joint LAF and 
IDF mission to prevent a PLO return. However, the chance of both sides reaching an 
agreement was fundamentally obstructed by a number of broader issues.  
 First, the US failed to acknowledge that the Israelis were concerned with the 
Gemayel government and the LAF’s inability to curb the build-up of the anti-Israeli 
Shi’a militias in southern Lebanon and the rapid Syrian militarization along Israel’s 
northern border. However, a ceasefire with the LAF and departure of SAF and PLO 
forces were exclusively conditional on an initial IDF withdrawal.132 The US needed to 
break this deadlock and prove to Israel that an IDF withdrawal back to the Awali 
River would allow the LAF and the MNFII to secure Beirut. Without the May 17th 
Agreement, the US believed there was no other way to pressure Gemayel or Begin to 
agree to a sustainable ceasefire and thereby guarantee an IDF withdrawal. The 
negotiations and subsequent agreement illustrated that the US was desperate to find a 
solution to the current conflict.133 Even with the IDF firing at USMNF positions on 14 
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May 1983, the US would not aggressively or directly pressure Israel to withdraw from 
Lebanon.134  
 Second, while the negotiations seemingly strengthened US resolve as the 
‘leader for world peace,’ the talks invariably made the agreement’s successful 
implementation dependent upon continued US intervention.135 Whilst Shultz’s role in 
mediating the negotiations consolidated US influence in the region, the May 17th 
Agreement also tied the US to the agreement’s successful implementation. The 
Reagan Administration’s support for the May 17th Agreement led to numerous 
political crises throughout 1983, as the US refused to let Israel or Lebanon abrogate 
the agreement even when it proved an obstacle to peace. As Reagan sent Gemayel 
personal congratulations for the confirmation of the May 17th Agreement, its details 
were still being aggressively debated on both the Israeli and Lebanese side.136 
 Third, the agreement was informally recognized as the US-Israeli-Lebanese 
Agreement due to US interference and Shultz’s pressure on Begin and Gemayel to 
sign.137 Shultz described the agreement’s importance to Reagan, stating that:  
The agreement represents not only a major commitment of US prestige; it 
represents the second moderate Arab country to negotiate with Israel under 
our auspices, and it is the only extant arrangement for ensuring both Israeli 
withdrawal and Israeli security.138 
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While the US led the way in pushing Israel and Lebanon to sign the agreement, the 
perceived failures of a diplomatic solution in Lebanon became evident.139 It is 
questionable that Shultz, as the key architect of the talks, was attempting to facilitate a 
successful consensus regarding the May 17th Agreement.140 Shultz pressured both 
Israel and Lebanon to sign the agreement even though vital aspects regarding patrols 
and security remained unresolved.141 The April Embassy Bombing forced Shultz to 
recognize Lebanon’s volatile security environment and the central role the US had 
now inadvertently taken. The Secretary of State saw the signing of the agreement as 
imperative to quell US losses if the conflict were to escalate further. If the MNFII was 
forced to withdraw quickly, at least the Reagan Administration could publicly state 
that they had mediated the negotiations and signing of the agreement.142 
 Eventually, Begin agreed to an 8-12-week withdrawal back to the existing, 
internationally-recognized Israeli border (under the 1967 Lebanese Israeli 
Armistice),143 only if full SAF withdrawal had also occurred within this timeframe.144 
The Israelis raised concerns over:  
Syria’s flagrant and ongoing intervention in Lebanon’s internal affairs - 
including its present effort to replace the elected government of President 
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Amin Jemayel with a group of pro-Syrian figureheads who can be expected to 
do Damascus’s bidding.145 
 
Sharon believed that Asad’s focus in Lebanon was to escalate the conflict by ‘keeping 
the Lebanese pot boiling, Damascus is also serving Moscow.’146 Without making 
Syria party to the talks, the signing of the May 17th Agreement merely served to 
increase Syria’s aggressive position. The Syrian Defence Minister stated: 
The Americans hate Arabs, their ultimate goal is to make all Arabs slaves 
under the Israelis…Syria wants to defend its freedom and that is why they will 
resist the Americans and what they stand for.147  
 
Deputy National Security Advisor Vice Admiral John Poindexter wrote to Reagan, 
outlining the May 17th Agreement’s conceptual faults, which he said represented an 
unrealistic attempt to mediate peace between the two parties whose agendas differed.  
The talks leading up to the agreement’s signing had been emblematic of the final 
agreement; they were contrived, disingenuous on both sides and undertook to broker a 
rushed sense of peace between Israel and Lebanon, with each party discussing 
different issues and priorities. The agreement, in theory, promised greater 
coordination and cooperation between the historical enemies in order to establish 
security for both governments.148 However, it completely disregarded the fact that the 
LAF was unable to manage the situation in greater Beirut, let alone control the 
south.149 Israel would only agree to a withdrawal were Syria also to start withdrawing.  
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However, given that Syria was not at the negotiation table nor allowed to participate 
in any of the agreement’s details, their withdrawal was implausible.150  
The May 17th Agreement also failed because it was predicated on Israeli 
demands of ‘normalisation’ of Israeli-Lebanese relations and so failed to recognize 
Syria as party to the negotiations.151 This placed the US directly in the Syrian, Iranian 
and Palestinian leaders’ line of fire, who saw the normalization of relations with Israel 
as ruinous.152 The agreement also failed to garner any support from the other factional 
Lebanese leaders, resulting in even greater animosity toward the Gemayel 
government. Fundamentally, these challenges would block the possibility of Gemayel 
implementing any part of the agreement and hence Israel refused to leave. 153 
Furthermore, the US blindly followed Gemayel’s analysis of the Lebanese context 
that was ultimately unrepresentative of the internal Lebanese factions, which included 
the Christian and non-Christian marginal groups as well as the remaining Palestinian 
militia.154 Syria used the major obstacles to the agreement’s implementation to garner 
further support for having the agreement abrogated, while Asad bolstered the internal 
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Lebanese protests. The internal Islamic factions saw the negotiations as brazen US 
support for Israel and the Gemayel government. The growing anti-Gemayel militias, 
such as Harakat Amal, had become the nucleus for anti-American and anti-Israeli 
sentiment within Lebanon by July 1983.155    
As UNIFIL’s exit deadline neared its expiration on 19 July 1983, Israel 
insisted that UNIFIL was not an implementation partner to the agreement.156 Israel’s 
Permanent Representative to the UN, Yehuda Blum, outlined that Israel would not 
accept UNIFIL as a guarantor in ensuring the mitigation of ‘the threat posed against 
Israeli’s citizens by the continued presence of Syrian Forces and PLO Terrorists on 
Lebanese soil.’157  
 On 23 July, the National Salvation Front (NSF) was formed to unify all of the 
opponents to the May 17th Agreement. The agreement’s failure to include all 
stakeholders in Lebanon led to a wave of anti-Americanism. The MNFII was now 
seen as supporting the Israeli and Kata’eb agendas without recognizing the 
Palestinian, Druze or Shi’a communities.158 Iranian support for the Shi’a community 
in southern Lebanon increased to counter the growing Western presence,159 based on 
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the belief that the agreement was being formulated around Israeli objectives in 
Lebanon.160   
 
Conclusion 
The May 17th Agreement was a ‘dead letter’ before it was even signed.161 Specifically, 
the Agreement was a failure for the US in terms of creating a ‘face-saving formula’ 
for its exit from the Lebanese crisis.162 The US-led negotiations’ failure to bring about 
any tenable ceasefire was evident both before and after it was signed, indicating to the 
US administration that mediated diplomacy alone would not lead to the conflict’s 
cessation, unless it involved Syria. 163 As recognizing Syria in any negotiations was 
not an option for Begin or Gemayel, the possibility of reaching an agreed peaceful 
withdrawal of the foreign troops seemed remote.  
 Phase One of the MNFII on 29 September 1982 represented a reconstituted, 
significantly different force than that of its predecessor, the MNFI. Reagan had 
previously been hailed as a peacekeeping hero for his leadership of the PLO’s 
removal from Beirut. However, if anything, the tragic events from 14-18 September 
1982 should have indicated to the Reagan Administration that it had failed under the 
MNFI to create a sustainable ceasefire. Yasir Arafat and the PLO only made up a 
small part of the Lebanese conflict by the end of 1982. It is also important to note that 
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the MNFI was only deployed after a political consensus had been reached between 
the PLO and the Israelis for a safe Palestinian withdrawal. Conversely, the MNFII 
was operating in a volatile context in which no negotiations for ceasefires, 
withdrawals or even talks had taken place. 
 The MNFII was completely unprepared for the constantly-changing 
environment in which it had to operate. The force was unable to engage the Lebanese 
factional militias, instead finding itself in the middle of a regional conflict between 
the SAF and IDF. Rather, the MNFII found itself helplessly interposed between Israel 
and Syria and with a profoundly ambiguous mandate that allowed it neither to engage 
in the conflict nor reprimand either side. The US’ failure to create a limited mission 
with tangible and achievable goals meant that the Reagan Administration was forced 
to continually amend and restructure the force.  
 By December 1982, Reagan’s vision of a victorious military peacekeeping 
force had proven obsolete, leading to Shultz’s diplomatic intervention in spearheading 
the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations. The May 17th Agreement allowed the Reagan 
Administration to appear committed to the Lebanese crisis’ peaceful resolution but at 
the same time ensured the MNFII’s extended deployment. However, the Agreement 
was fundamentally deficient in encouraging the key parties to reach a ceasefire or 
providing guarantees from Begin or Gemayel of long-term security. The Reagan 
Administration’s diplomatic attempts to resolve the situation were more focused on 
saving face than the altruistic pursuit of a sustainable ceasefire. If the US could not 
fulfil these promises to the Gemayel government, then there would be a perceptible 
loss of credibility regionally and the sense that the US was bowing to pressure from 
Syria.  
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 Ultimately, it was the May 17th Agreement that created the greatest hurdle for 
peace in Lebanon.164 Without engaging with Syria or the internal Lebanese factions, 
the negotiations and subsequent agreement were inherently useless. The 18 April US 
Embassy bombing and May 5 attack should have warned Washington that the 
administration’s involvement in the agreement’s creation was now directing the 
conflict toward the US, portraying the US no longer as merely a defensive 
peacekeeper but an active participant in the conflict.165  
 The MNFII was initially redeployed on the basis that it would provide the 
Reagan Administration with a clear public victory, demonstrating the US’ prestige as 
the leading international peacemaker. However, the US intervention in Lebanon had 
already been condemned and eventually resulted in the force being caught up in 
offensive military escalation that will be examined in the subsequent chapters.  
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Chapter Five 
The Soviet-Syrian alliance and the Battle of Souk el Gharb 
Multinational Force II, Phase Two (18 May to 22 October 1983) 
 
 
The failed May 17th Lebanese/Israeli Agreement, as well as the US Embassy 
bombing, represented two successive setbacks for the US’ position in Lebanon. They 
left the Reagan Administration increasingly concerned about a ‘perceptible erosion of 
U.S. credibility in the Middle East.’1 The US deployed the Multinational Force II 
(MNFII) in order to solidify their role as the international peacemaker in the region. 
However, by May 1983, international approval of the US intervention in Lebanon was 
at an all-time low. In light of the US Embassy bombing and Israel’s continuing 
pressure, Shultz turned his focus toward the forcible withdrawal of foreign forces to 
illustrate US commitment to removing ‘terrorism’ and instability from Lebanon.  
 The focus of this new policy direction was the growing Syrian influence in 
Lebanon, which was highlighted as the key factor that led to the May 17th 
Agreement’s failure. The Administration was concerned with the reach of the Syrian 
Armed Forces (SAF) and whether or not the Syrian President Hafez Asad’s growing 
interest also indicated growing Soviet Union influence. If so, the US needed to decide 
if the Soviet sponsorship of Syria was of such direct concern for the Administration 
that it would risk a confrontation with the USSR. Moreover, this posturing occurred at 
a time when US President Ronald Reagan’s aggressive rhetoric toward the Soviets 
internationally was creating fear about the possibility of a superpower confrontation 
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or nuclear war.2 As Westad and Hiro argue, the first quarter of 1983 was characterized 
by a distinctive renewing of tensions between the US and Soviets, as exhibited by 
Reagan’s 8 March ‘Evil Empire’ speech, the announcement of the Strategic Defense 
Initiative on 23 March and the CIA’s sponsorship of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan 
under Operation Cyclone.3  
 There are two disparate positions regarding US views on Soviet interests in 
the Middle East and, more specifically, Soviet influence in Lebanon. Kriesberg claims 
that, while the US had not considered Soviet interference in Lebanon as a primary 
concern up until May 1983, the international tensions between the two superpowers 
and the US’ weakened position in Lebanon created the possibility of an aggressive 
confrontation between the US and USSR in Lebanon.4 Taylor and Kolko also see the 
1983 Soviet-US tensions as critical in shaping US policy in Lebanon.5 Taylor defines 
Soviet involvement in the Middle East as ‘a special endeavor to promote a Soviet-
sponsored ‘anti-imperialist’ front against the United States and Israel.’6  
 Conversely, Westad discounts the possibility of a US/USSR confrontation in 
Lebanon, given that the war in Afghanistan had become a bloody stalemate and was 
draining significant military resources from Moscow.7 Cox and Freedman also state 
that Soviet influence in Lebanon is often overplayed and loosely projects the broader 
international Cold War tensions onto the Lebanese conflict for the purpose of 
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extending the superpower narrative in all corners of the world. Cox supports Westad’s 
thesis, maintaining that, although Reagan’s conservative stance toward the USSR had 
exacerbated the tensions between the two superpowers, the overall relationship had 
transformed such that, by mid-1983, the possibility of a direct conflict in the Middle 
East had disappeared.8  Freedman also supports the view that the Soviets were 
disinclined to enter the Lebanese conflict directly, as they were preoccupied with the 
Iran/Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan. Dawisha argues that Moscow’s failure to 
establish a resolute policy in Lebanon was actually a calculated move by the Soviet 
leadership, as Moscow believed this to be the best way to restore relations with the 
neighbouring Arab countries.9 Finally, Khalidi argues that the US was less concerned 
with ‘increasingly enfeebled Soviets, but rather by the savage realities of Lebanon’ 
itself.10  
 Both schools of thought need to be tempered somewhat. While it is true that 
the idea of direct Soviet influence in Lebanon has been overplayed by certain 
researchers, the degree to which the Reagan Administration focussed its attention on 
Syria as a Soviet client illustrates that the US did regard Soviet indirect influence in 
the region as a potential threat. Therefore, the Cold War dynamic throughout the 
second half of 1983 cannot be completely discounted, although Khalidi correctly 
cautions about being ‘blinded by preconceptions and ideology.’11 
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 This chapter examines the development of the anti-Syrian military and 
political program and the careful redefining of US policy. It also analyzes the 
evolution of US policy in Lebanon after the May 17th Agreement and how the 
Administration’s blind pursuit of Syria resulted in the US’ further entanglement in the 
complexities of the Lebanon conflict. Through outlining the MNFII’s role and its 
relationship with the separately-established US military mission, the chapter will 
illustrate how the military escalation led to the continual policies vacillations and thus 
created operational ambiguity. Reagan and Shultz’s miscalculations and the 
subsequent escalation of US military involvement up to and including the Battle of 
Souk el Gharb in September 1983 made the US a direct physical target for Syrian-
sponsored Druze and Shi’a militias.  
 This chapter advances two arguments: First, it argues that, while the Reagan 
Administration continued to reference the Soviets in the Middle East as part of its 
broader international Cold War policy, the exponential increase in military capital, 
which was deployed by the US, was exclusively directed at Syria. The fact that Syria 
was a Soviet client and militarily supported by the USSR was an important but 
secondary factor. Second, it argues that, by mid-1983, the US diplomatic strategies in 
Lebanon had become untenable. The attempts to reach a sustained ceasefire had failed 
and the Reagan Administration had repositioned its policy toward Syria’s occupation 
of Lebanon and the need for a forcible, US-led military intervention. This advances 
Seib’s argument that the Reagan Administration hoped that militarization against 
Syria would establish the US as the key ‘mover and shaker in the region,’12 while the 
focus on Israel and the PLO conflict in Lebanon had reduced.13  
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A Cold War in Lebanon? 
When the MNFII was established there were few concerns in Washington about a 
Soviet intervention in Lebanon. However, the USSR’s aggressive rhetoric stated that, 
should the Lebanese conflict spill over into Syria, the Soviets would be persuaded to 
intervene militarily. 14  This intervention never materialized and, as the war in 
Afghanistan drained Soviet resources, the likelihood that the USSR would send in a 
military unit diminished. This section will examine the background to US-Soviet 
tensions in Lebanon and thus the degree to which the Reagan Administration’s policy 
in Lebanon was in fact aimed at the Soviets in the Middle East. The Soviet Union’s 
influence in the 1983 Lebanese context is often overplayed but should not be ignored. 
 This thesis argues that, while the Reagan Administration remained conscious of 
possible Soviet intention in the Levant region, US intervention was primarily 
focussed on weakening Syria’s presence in Lebanon. This policy was driven by US 
fear that the pro-Western Arab leaders could become sympathetic to the Soviet’s 
outreach in the Middle East.15 
 The death of Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, on 10 November 
1982, led to his replacement by Yuri Andropov.16 Andropov stated that the Soviets 
would not be drawn into a superpower military conflict in Lebanon, which he 
regarded as an uncertain playground, as evidenced by US action in Lebanon and the 
MNFII’s lack of authority over both the SAF and IDF.17 Even British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher did not see the Soviets as a threat in Lebanon because she believed 
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that Moscow was enjoying watching the US fail to control the conflict which was ‘a 
gaping wound to the United States.’18  
 From the US perspective, it was clear that the Reagan Administration had no 
intention of drawing the Soviet Union into the conflict any further than had already 
occurred through Moscow’s support of Syria with Soviet Surface to Air Missiles 
(SAMs). The Reagan Administration realized that, while it continued to pressure the 
Syrians to withdraw, the US needed to keep the Soviets in the background.19 Shultz 
stated that the American policy had a ‘broader objective of maintaining American 
dominance of Middle East diplomacy and reducing the Soviet role in the area.’20 The 
Secretary of State thought that an increase in Soviet access by Arab leaders could lead 
to a greater anti-Western or rejectionist movement. ‘To this end the Soviets will 
intensify efforts to forge a new consensus of Arab States, including Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan and Egypt.’21 The Administration perceived Soviet efforts as focused on 
obstructing US oil interests in the Gulf regions but believed that Moscow was not 
particularly concerned with the MNFII or US intervention in Lebanon. National 
intelligence reporting by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) centred on Soviet 
sponsorship of Syria’s military capabilities in the region. The reports identified the 
Syrian regime as a proxy for the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration believed 
that Moscow was pushing for a more influential role in the Middle East. The CIA 
believed that even the limited Soviet interest in the PLO was in order to undermine 
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US peace proposals and expand its influence with neighbouring Arab countries.22 
However, the little tangible support that the Soviets demonstrated toward the 
Palestinian fighters in 1982, during the MNFI’s deployment, moderated US fears of a 
strong Soviet-Palestinian alliance.23  
 The Soviet Union’s presence in the Levant in 1983 was outlined by the 
National Security Council through a three-point threat analysis which saw the Soviets 
as being able to ‘a) intimidate moderate Arab countries friendly to the U.S., b) 
threaten or complicate Western access to oil, and c) compromise Israel’s security.’24 
Shultz viewed US-Soviet relations as a zero sum game in the Middle East, regarding 
any Soviet interests regionally as being aimed at weakening the Western positions.25 
As the two superpowers continued to identify the Palestinian/Israeli conflict as 
fundamental to the Lebanese conflict, particularly since the June 1982 Israeli 
invasion, the Soviet Union used this platform to draw in Arab allies.26 Hanf argues 
that, without the Israeli/PLO conflict, the Cold War in Lebanon would have been of 
less relevance.27 Furthermore, the growing Islamic radical movement in Lebanon saw 
US interference as proxy support for Israel.28 Since the signing of the May 17th 
Agreement, relations between the US and Israel had been normalized, albeit with the 
direct cost of exacerbating US tensions with the USSR, Syria and the Lebanese Druze 
and Shi’a factions.  
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 The Reagan Administration saw a direct relationship between US oil supplies 
and the ongoing conflict in Lebanon. Shultz feared that increased Soviet influence in 
the Iran-Iraq war would lead to ‘terrorist’ attacks against US positions in Lebanon 
which in turn could directly affect US oil interests in Iraq.29 Shultz saw any US 
disengagement, both militarily or politically, in the Middle East as a direct threat to 
both US oil supplies and US guarantees of Israeli security.30  
CIA National Intelligence Council Director, Henry Rowen, advised the Senate 
Committee that a US-dominated Middle East was at the forefront of US foreign 
policy to ensure the safe access and transport of oil resources.31 The CIA interagency 
report continued the anti-Soviet line that Lebanon was ‘the most volatile area of US-
Soviet regional interaction with the greatest potential for a direct confrontation 
between Moscow and Washington.’32 The CIA argued that Lebanon could become the 
frontline for an international credibility battle between the two superpowers. It was 
assumed that having seen the overt US supply of arms to Israel, the surrounding Arab 
nations would turn to the USSR for assistance and closer relations.33 Friedman argues 
that the oil producing states in the Gulf were keenly watching the US attempts to 
resolve the Lebanese crisis, and the Reagan Administration knew that the failure to 
protect US commitments in Lebanon could negatively affect the integrity of US 
relations with other Arab neighbours.34  
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Yet, the lack of White House policy documents on the Soviets in Lebanon 
suggests that a direct confrontation of the Soviets was not the Reagan 
Administration’s key priority in Lebanon. Although the US was aware of the Soviet 
attempts to coax regional Arab nations into a Soviet alliance, Moscow had attempted 
this previously with little success aside from Syria. However, the failure of the May 
17th Agreement left a vacuum of credibility for US policy in Lebanon and the Middle 
East. The US was concerned that this would leave space for possible further Soviet 
involvement in or sponsorship of Syria. Lebanon was a strategically-positioned 
regional US ally, threatened by growing Syrian military and political inference. To 
Shultz, the US intervention in Lebanon was critical in illustrating to the Arab 
neighbours that the US was a dominant, committed military force. 35 Soviet 
encroachment through military sponsorship was seen as a possible threat of polarizing 
the region but not a direct threat to US or Lebanese security.36 US policy toward Syria 
was aimed at setting an example of US military strength regionally, with a secondary 
goal of minimizing Soviet advancement.  
 
Hafiz Al-Asad: the Soviet Client 
The May 17th Agreement achieved little apart from strengthening Syrian influence in 
Lebanon. The agreement’s failure to satisfy the Lebanese Druze and Shi’a meant that 
they were easily drawn toward Syria through the promise of arms and support.37 
Despite the losses caused by the Israeli invasion in June 1982, the SAF underwent 
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‘the largest re-equipment effort in their history’ sponsored by the Soviet Union.38 The 
Syrian army had acquired T-72 tanks, MiG-23 and Sukhoi-22 aircraft as well as SS21 
ground missiles by 1983 and the MNFII and IDF quickly became concerned that the 
SAF’s military capabilities could overwhelm both forces.39 Washington used this 
militarization to justify distancing itself from defensive peacemaking, preferring 
instead to develop a pre-emptive, aggressive defence policy. This section will argue 
that the Reagan Administration’s concerns over Syria’s military position in Lebanon 
led to a policy shift from peacekeeping to a pre-emptive defence strategy against 
Syria, which was driven by a need to hide the inescapable truth that US attempts to 
mediate the Lebanese situation diplomatically had failed.  
 Reagan’s open criticism of détente raised the USSR’s consciousness of the US 
efforts to counteract Soviet expansion in the Middle East.40 While the Soviet-Syrian 
arms program was considered ineffective until September 1982, the period of relative 
quiet between September 1982 and May 1983 enabled Syria to catch up with the new 
military technology. By June 1983, the modernized SAF stirred US concerns over 
Syria’s military and political domination in Lebanon. The Reagan Administration 
regarded Syrian influence in Lebanon as destabilizing US interests in the region. The 
fear of Soviet communism spreading throughout the Middle East was less a concern 
than the image that the US would have if a Soviet military client, Syria, were able to 
dominate a US ally, Lebanon. Removing the SAF was not merely about monitoring 
peace within Beirut’s perimeters; the Administration needed to make significant 
changes to how the US military and USMNF would engage with Syria. These 
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changes in the Administration’s rules of engagement would ultimately lead to the US 
entering into direct military confrontation with Syria.   
 Israel’s insistence that the SAF must make the first move in withdrawing its 
SAMs from southern Lebanon and the requirement that the LAF should control the 
Shi’a militias and remaining Palestinians in the Bekaa Valley meant that no side had 
yet made any movement toward the resolution outlined in the May 17th Agreement. 
The Reagan Administration was plagued with the issue of ‘how to remove the figleaf 
which Syria uses to justify its continued occupation…simply put continued Israeli 
occupation of southern Lebanon.’41 They conceded, however, that political incentives 
for Syria to agree to a withdrawal, given they were excluded from the Israeli-
Lebanese talks, did not exist. The recent militarization (through the Soviet sponsored 
SAM-5s), in fact, illustrated that Syria was strengthening its position in Lebanon, a 
direct movement away from a peace initiative.42  
In an attempt to curb SAF occupation, the Department of Defense advised that 
a clear message be delivered that the US would not withdraw under any 
circumstances while the Syrian occupation continued in Lebanon, and that Asad must 
be made aware that the US would continue to arm and finance Lebanese President 
Amin Gemayel’s government until a level of political integrity was guaranteed.43 The 
Reagan Administration believed that this stand would pressure the Syrian 
Government into a partial withdrawal on the basis that the US would defend Israel 
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and Lebanon militarily.44 The proposed plan argued that the MNFII should extend its 
operational capabilities to become a major military force and disengage the Syrians 
pre-emptively through a fast strike attack. However, the policy also relied on the 
expansion of the MNFII’s troops, which was deemed unlikely due to Congress’s 
continued reluctance to commit further resources to Lebanon.  
 The mounting domestic public and congressional discontent within the US 
over the MNFII’s deployment led to a dialogue as to why the US should continue its 
involvement in Lebanon. The White House’s Director of Near East and South Asia 
Affairs and Deputy Director of the Pentagon’s Office of National Assessment, Dennis 
Ross, responded that, should the US withdraw from Lebanon, this would lead to an 
abrogation of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, increasing Syrian, and 
indirectly Soviet stature and leverage in the region, moderate Arab reluctance 
to embrace us and to do anything the Syrians oppose.45 
 
The fundamental problem now for Shultz and Reagan was how to balance the 
domestic pressures without losing US credibility, as premature withdrawal would 
entail. Ross proposed an unlikely scenario which included the possibility of 
Gemayel’s pro-Western government adopting a more hostile anti-Western stance so 
that the US would be asked to leave the conflict. This was quickly discounted as it 
risked leaving Syria to control Lebanon and creating a culture whereby the Arab 
states would think ‘don’t identify with U.S. initiatives; don’t expose yourself to risks 
on the peace process; and don’t count on the U.S. guarantees, even if there is a formal 
agreement.’46  
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 In order to convince Congress and create the necessary justification for the 
military escalation against Syria, Reagan ordered the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Department of Defense to revise the definition of ‘self defense.’47 There were two 
possible options. ‘Option A’ was the deployment of a separate, independently-
commanded US military mission which, on the surface, would be classified as a 
‘support and protect’ mission for the USMNF but which was ultimately a US-led 
force that would be unanswerable to the other MNFII participants.48 By the time the 
US proposed this, the other MNFII partners, Britain and France, already felt that the 
US was leading the MNFII autonomously anyway.49 ‘Option B’ outlined an extension 
of the USMNF in order to increase the military attacks against Syria but continuing 
under the pretext of protecting the LAF and Lebanese government.50 Both options 
illustrated US willingness to become an active participant in the Lebanese conflict 
(aside from its contingent in the MNFII), listing the US’ primary motivations as 
‘more active cover and support for MNFII contingents.’51 However, the military 
strategy for both options included armed reconnaissance into Syrian-controlled 
regions, pre-emptive action against Syria and escalated ground artillery and naval 
bombardment, ‘e.g. shoot back until silenced’, against Syrian-sponsored groups, none 
of which was wholly aimed at the MNFII’s protection.52   
 Further to the military escalation, both Vice Admiral John Poindexter, who 
was Deputy National Security Advisor and also National Security Council Chair, and 
Shultz recommended to Reagan that a build-up of the IDF would provide a deterrent 
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to Syria. ‘It has been our hope that Syria will respond to this collective political and 
military pressure and accede to the ceasefire.’53 This involved a major increase in 
military programs, such as financing the Lavi aircraft fighter program, an increase in 
defence cooperation and procurement agreement and the supply of US military 
technology to Israel to prevent Syrian SAMs being used against Israel’s northern 
border positions.54 This policy saw a complete reversal of the pressures placed on 
Israel at the end of 1982. Shultz, an adamant supporter of the American Jewish 
Lobby, publicly announced that closer military cooperation with Israel would lead to 
greater stability in Lebanon, pressing for increased Israeli presence in southern 
Lebanon. The US’ support for the IDF in southern Lebanon by July was in direct 
contradiction of the May 17th Agreement’s principles that Shultz had mediated.55 It 
was hoped that this gamble would appease Congressional protests and at the same 
time complement the US’ escalated military strategy. 
 On 7 August both the French and Italian MNFII contingents increased their 
troops to 2200 personnel compared to the USMNF deployment of 1000. In contrast to 
the US’ pro-Israeli policy, the FRMNF and ITMNF argued that the IDF’s monitored 
withdrawal to the Awali River was the first step in motivating the SAF to withdraw in 
response.56 The increase in the size of the FRMNF and ITMNF troops, however, was 
not an attempt to support the US’ emerging militarization toward Syria. In fact, 
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France was leading the negotiations with Asad in Paris, still hoping that a diplomatic 
solution could be reached. The Reagan Administration argued against this. Reagan 
and Shultz believed that the only proposal for creating incentives for IDF withdrawal 
was a policy of greater military strength in southern Lebanon.57 The French, British 
and Italian leaders were concerned that US strategy in Lebanon was now far-removed 
from the initial mandate they had all signed and that Reagan’s rhetoric toward Syria 
would only lead to a further heating up of the Syria/MNFII tensions.58  
 Despite the MNFII partners’ concerns, the US continued to develop its 
strategy against Syria. US policy in Lebanon now demonstrated none of the neutrality 
that the MNFII’s mandate had suggested. The decision to establish military ‘red-lines’ 
was carried out by a USMNF-LAF collaboration of air and naval firepower, targeting 
key Syrian channels and transit points in order to distance Syria from its Lebanese 
clients, namely the Druze militia Jayish al-Tahrir al-Sha’aby (People’s Liberation 
Army) led by Walid Jumblatt as well as the Shi’a militia Harakat Amal led by Nabih 
Berri.59 Harakat Amal had become disgruntled with the US and LAF efforts to split 
the faction and its allies.60 Berri called for the traditionally Christian positions of 
Commander of the LAF and intelligence agency to be transferred to a Shi’a leadership 
while threatening to continue receiving military and political support from Syria.61  
The Reagan Administration, therefore, demanded that Gemayel should make political 
                                                
57 Intelligence Estimate, [Andropov’s Approach to Key US-Soviet Issues], 9 August 1983, SC 
0307883, CIA FOIA, p.23 & [Draft Paper on Next Steps in Lebanon], p.1. 
58 ‘Arrive hier a Washington, le Chef de L’Etat a eu un premier contact avec Shultz’, 20 July 
1983, L’OLJ, p.1 & Hallenbeck, ‘Military Force as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy’, 
pp.76-77. 
59 Cable from UNIFIL Beirut to UN New York, [Lebanese Unity Government], Lebanon- 
Country File, Box UNRWA, S-0354-001-15, 1 May 1984, UNARMS, p.1. 
60 Jean Gueyras, ‘L'opposition libanaise dénonce le rôle prédominant des États-Unis, dans la 
force multinationale’, Le Monde, 26 October 1983. 
61 Special Analysis, [Lebanon: Shia Discontent], 21 October 1983, TCS 2947/83, CIA FOIA, 
p.2. 
 201 
concessions to the Shi’a and Druze leaders. Dennis Ross believed ‘a deal with the 
Shias is likely to look as if a new National Pact has been negotiated.’62 The attempted 
fracturing by Gemayel, however, had in fact strengthened the Shi’a leadership within 
the Lebanese system which directly became a threat to the US’ pro-Israeli, anti-Syrian 
stance.  
  
Escalation through an ‘aggressive self-defense’ 
Throughout August and early September 1983, the Reagan Administration had hailed 
a period of relative quiet between the IDF and SAF as a major achievement of the 
MNFII.63 US response to this, therefore, should have discouraged the use of military 
force in lieu of continued political negotiation. Yet, by mid-September, the USS New 
Jersey’s deployment to Lebanese waters marked a turning point in the US 
Administration’s strategy.64 The decision to expand the USMNF’s military capability, 
therefore, was deemed necessary in order to protect the US’ now threatened integrity 
in Lebanon and the region more broadly. Shultz argued that ‘success in one 
dimension strengthens our position generally. A set back in one area makes the 
achievement of our objectives elsewhere that much harder.’65  
 The deployment of the BB62 Naval Gunship just off the shores of Lebanon 
was claimed to have been to protect the USMNF units and other US military 
personnel operating in the country.66 Ultimately, however, the New Jersey was 
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positioned to provide naval fire against Syrian-backed militias in the strategic village 
of Souk el Gharb located to the southwest of Beirut in the Chouf Mountains.67  
 The mission, which began on 12 September 1983 with the Battle of Souk el 
Gharb, changed the rules of engagement for US military involvement. The new rules 
of engagement allowed the US military to undertake vaguely defined ‘security’ 
missions.68 The new strategy effectively detached the US from the MNFII mandate’s 
limitations, which prohibited an escalation of the MNFII’s military policy. The 
Reagan Administration believed that an escalation in the short-term would allow 
concentrated military targeting of SAF-sponsored factions, which would ultimately 
lead to a more expeditious withdrawal of US troops from Lebanon.69 The US began 
distancing itself from the MNFII because, in part, Shultz believed that the other 
MNFII contributors were less strongly opposed to a Syrian-dominated Lebanon.70 
Indeed, Thatcher and the French President, Francois Mitterrand, did not trust the US 
over Lebanon, arguing that this was mainly because the European MNFII partners had 
insufficient contact with Reagan himself.71 All parties felt that Shultz was now 
running the show.72 Similarly, the emergence of US movement toward an escalated 
policy ‘frustrated’ UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, as UNIFIL ‘found 
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itself unable to contribute anything towards a solution of the Lebanese problem…’73 
Perez de Cuellar saw the military offensive as counterproductive to peace in Lebanon 
and further limiting UNIFIL’s humanitarian role.  
 On 9 September the Lebanese Ambassador to the UN, Rachid Fakhoury, 
warned the Security Council that the Gemayel government was facing potential 
collapse.74 If Gemayel were assassinated or his government collapsed directly after 
the US had illustrated its resolute support of the president, this would suggest US 
inability to guarantee stability and peace in the Middle East. As a consequence, the 
Reagan Administration proposed an alternative strategy for handling the worsening 
situation in Lebanon.75 This was laid out in the National Security Decision Directive 
(NSDD) 103 issued by Reagan. NSDD103 continued to promulgate many of the same 
justifications for US intervention in Lebanon as NSDD64 and NSDD92. 76  US 
motivations for the continued deployment of the MNFII remained, publicly, the 
Lebanese sovereignty’s restoration and foreign forces’ withdrawal. However, an 
additional stated justification was US commitment to Israel’s northern border’s 
protection and security.77 The other most significant difference in NSDD103 was the 
amendment regarding the US’ operational rules of engagement in Lebanon. Reagan 
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declared that ‘the concept of operations for these [MNF] forces would be one of 
aggressive self defense against hostile or provocative acts from any quarter.’78  
The White House had determined that pre-emptive offensives against potential 
future aggressors constituted ‘active peacekeeping’ and so constituted a legally-
justified use of military force.79 This strategy permitted active US targeting and 
combat against Syrian forces. The reasons behind this policy change were listed as the 
increased hostility between the internal confessional factions, Syrian determination to 
force the MNFII out and a concern that a domestic crisis in Israel would prevent the 
nation from adequately protecting itself.80 Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
argued that Gemayel’s possible resignation or assassination, direct military conflict 
with Syria and the need for the MNFII mandate’s further expansion were all possible 
scenarios to be recognized and avoided.81  
 Shultz stipulated that the decisions to amend US objectives in regards to the 
use of military force in Lebanon was supported by three key arguments. First, that the 
appropriate use of hostile action, deemed proportionate, was covered by any 
international peacekeeping legal framework. Second, that the line between ‘response’ 
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and ‘offensive’ was often unclear and that the use of military force could be seen as 
reactive, given Lebanon’s military context. Third, that pre-emptive targeting would 
have to be an essential component of the MNFII strategy where there was a broader 
escalation of the Lebanese conflict.82 However, US Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger continued to protest against Shultz’s foreign policy doctrine, regarding 
the military escalation in Lebanon as being against US national interests and 
potentially setting the US up for failure, as the intervention was neither a guaranteed 
success nor conclusively expedient. Weinberger’s reluctance regarding US military 
involvement in Lebanon was not due to pacifism but rather because he could not see 
the advantage of becoming further entwined in the military quagmire that the 
Lebanese conflict already represented.83 Ultimately, Shultz continued to exercise most 
influence over Reagan and was able to overcome these internal protests, albeit the 
debate between Shultz and Weinberger continued until the end of the MNFII’s 
mission.  
 
The opportunity cost: military force and the Battle of Souk el Gharb 
From 11 to 19 September fighting between the LAF and the Druze, Palestinian and 
Iranian-linked Shi’a forces peaked in intensity, so much so that Gemayel informed 
Ambassador McFarlane that the failure to overcome these forces at Souk el Gharb 
would prove the Gemayel government and LAF’s death knell. Reagan and Shultz 
faced several issues over the US action at Souk el Gharb; namely, the Gemayel 
government’s total dependence on US protection, Syria’s removal and the security of 
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US personnel at Beirut International Airport. Souk el Gharb was deemed a strategic 
position for US troops based at Beirut International Airport, as the village overlooked 
the USMNF positions and the US and French Marine Barracks as well as the 
Lebanese presidential palace.  
 Reagan had shown unwavering public support for Gemayel and the LAF but 
by signing NSDD103, he also committed the US to remove any force that threatened 
Lebanese security, thereby directly tying the US to the Gemayel government’s 
survival. NSDD103 also transformed the US intervention in Lebanon from a 
peacekeeping, international collaboration to a US-led navy gunship and marine-
focussed war against the Syrian-backed militias. Reagan’s decision to stand by the 
Lebanese government militarily meant that, as Souk el Gharb came under attack by 
Druze and Syrian-sponsored militias, the US split from the MNFII, instructing the 
USMAU commander to begin shelling the ‘enemy.’84  
 By 12 September it was clear that the US had decided to begin its military 
escalation with the landing of the US Special Forces teams.85 Similarly, US heavy 
artillery had been sent to Lebanon for use by the USMNF troops, including 34 tanks, 
18 howitzers, 124 Armoured Personnel Carriers, 29 million rounds of small arms 
ammunition and 105mm/155mm artillery rounds.86 This was matched by a similar 
weapons and ammunition supply to the LAF.  Reagan’s redefinition of the US rules of 
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engagement allowed US marines and naval gunships to begin shelling Syrian 
strongholds and militias in Souk el Gharb.87 
 As the USS John Rogers and USS Virginia fired hundreds of artillery rounds 
at the Druze positions at Souk el Gharb, the US military policy’s duality became 
evident. The USMNF commander led the US marines from Beirut International 
Airport while the US gunship offensive was controlled by the United States Marine 
Amphibious Unit (USMAU). Reagan clarified the distinction between the USMNF’s 
two major military objectives: 1) the support for LAF and the Lebanese government; 
and 2) the wider escalation of US-led missions and ‘aggressive self defense’ in MNF-
controlled regions.88 The US’ military response to the Battle of Souk el Gharb led to 
an exponential increase in the provision of direct US military and offensive combat.89  
 The militias fighting the LAF in Souk el Gharb were backed by extensive 
Syrian military artillery and the battle was seen as a Syria-sponsored attack on pro-
Christian, pro-Western forces.90 This made the decision to intervene easily justifiable. 
Shultz and McFarlane considered it essential if the US wished to uphold its credibility 
in the Lebanese conflict’s wider diplomacy. However, the realities of the conflict 
were less straightforward than this. The intelligence provided by the LAF was vague 
and the US military command complained that little US sourced intelligence had been 
gathered to quantify which positions the US was engaging. As such, the Joint Chiefs 
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of Staff made the mistake of pre-emptively engaging unconfirmed targets. The fact 
was that the US did not know whom they were fighting.91 
 Hallenbeck argues that the US would not have entered if the opposition simply 
comprised Druze and Palestinian forces that would have been deemed internal 
factional groups. The US did not wish to be seen to be taking sides along internal 
factional lines but rather to be linking Syria to the offensive.92 Weinberger believed 
that there would be no sense of US victory if it were impossible to quantify whether 
or not this was a decisive battle that would lead to Syria’s removal from Lebanon 
(which he further argued was not a US national interest). However, yet again, Shultz 
overcame these protests, showing that the battle was in line with Reagan’s NSDD103 
and that Syria’s domination of the region was a significant concern for the US.93  
 The key memorandum from the Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State, 
Charles Hill, to the National Security Advisor was aptly entitled ‘Strategies for 
Lebanon if the current concept proves inadequate.’ 94  It proposed that the US 
contingent in the MNFII should not escalate beyond the force’s current policy of self-
defence in order to pacify the other MNFII partners’ complaints. Instead, Hill stated 
that the US would deploy a separate ‘US Military’ force.95 While this separate 
intervention mission was beyond the MNFII’s existing deployment guidelines, it also 
aimed to generate a quick, apparent military victory for the MNFII. The escalation of 
US military involvement was a provocative gamble without any guarantee that it 
could achieve lasting success for the MNFII or US. 
                                                
91 Hallenbeck, ‘Military Force as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy’, pp.80-106. 
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 Regardless of the internal opposition, the USS Rogers, USS Jersey and USS 
Virginia unloaded over 380 rounds of heavy fire at the opposition positions along 
with very limited British, French and Italian air and ground support. The British, 
French and Italian MNFII contingent reluctantly followed the US into Souk el Gharb 
in an attempt to regain a sense of unity among the partners. It was clear that the 
British saw the US action and the launching of the US Naval Gunship mission as 
adequate justification now to consider transferring British troops back to UNIFIL. 
Thatcher’s office argued that the security of the BRMNF troops was threatened ‘every 
time the guns of the USS New Jersey open fire.’96  
 On 20 September the French MNFII had lost more than ten troops, issuing 
stern warnings to the Syrian-sponsored militias of FRMNF retaliation. These threats 
were merely rhetorical, and the French, Italian or British combat participation 
remained minimal.97 However, the political fallout had begun between the US and the 
other MNFII contributors over Souk el Gharb, as Paris and Rome questioned 
Washington’s objectives in the offensive.98	  French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson 
informed Shultz that any further incidents like Souk el-Gharb would precipitate the 
French and Italian forces’ full, unconditional withdrawal. Indeed, Cheysson believed 
that Italian Foreign Minister Giulo Andreotti was looking for an incident as a pretext 
to leave. 99  This publicly drew the US mission in Lebanon into question both 
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internationally and domestically.100 Facing the MNFII partners’ resentment and the 
US Congress’ growing opposition to the evolving US military presence in Lebanon, 
the Administration was forced to ‘maintain the multi-national character of our 
presence.’101 Reagan could not afford to lose his non-Arab partners’ further support in 
Lebanon, having already notably distanced himself from Paris and Rome.102  
 Fortunately for Reagan and Shultz, on 21 September, the US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee granted the USMNF an 18-month extension to its mandate, in 
order to pressure both the Druze and Syria into an informal ceasefire. In doing so, the 
Senate had made a significant compromise in allowing Reagan ultimate control of the 
troops in Lebanon. Even with a partial ceasefire on 26 September 1983, the Reagan 
Administration believed that the possibility of the ceasefire breaking down was 
imminent and that a retreat at that time would constitute a failure of US policy in 
Lebanon.103 Although the Senate Committee’s extension provided some security, 
Shultz and Reagan faced the possibility of an extraordinary congressional order to 
withdraw US troops from Lebanon without the MNFII having fulfilled its mandate. 
Reagan and Shultz therefore planned that the USMNF presence should be sustained 
for a 12-month period in order to create an environment for withdrawal and ensure 
that the LAF had taken control of Beirut’s security situation.104  
  The ‘Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution,’ pushed through by Reagan, 
gave the Administration a generous extension, allowing time for the Lebanese 
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government or the UN to assume the security and leadership role.105 The resolution 
was passed on 12 October 1983, by a slim eight Senate vote majority, illustrating that 
Congressional approval over the US deployment was tightening. The resolution made 
four key changes to Reagan and Shultz’s autonomy over decision-making. It outlined: 
that a UN force must be prepared and supported to take over from the MNFII at the 
end of this final extension; that Reagan had to report to Congress every three months; 
that the president’s actions had to comply with the War Powers Act; and that the 
USMNF presence was conditional on US mediation of Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian 
withdrawal discussions. The difficulty was that any negotiations or talks with Syria 
would not only mean a full abrogation to the May 17th Agreement but also require the 
escalation policies to be revised, that had only been introduced in September.  The 
resolution continued unrealistically to tie the US to foreign forces’ successful removal 
from Lebanon.  
 While the resolution demanded constant reporting to Congress on the 
USMNF’s participation in Lebanon, it proved a breakthrough for the Reagan 
Administration. The resolution’s broad time extension and ambiguous deployment 
conditions meant that the US had plenty of political and military space in which to 
create what it saw as a victory for the Administration in the Middle East.106 However, 
most damning for the Administration were that Weinberger’s concerns regarding 
Souk el Gharb ultimately proved correct. This US involvement in the Battle of Souk 
el Gharb was unrecognizable in terms of the USMNF’s initial peacemaking mandate 
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and ultimately led to the US becoming a direct target in the conflict.107 Without clear 
military guidelines and objectives, the US had unwittingly walked into a political trap. 
While there appeared to be a battlefield victory for the US and LAF at Souk el Gharb, 
the ramifications of the US actions were soon felt, with the Marine Barracks Bombing 
on 23 October 1983.   
 
Conclusion  
The MNFII was considered an opportunity for the Reagan Administration to assert 
US strength in handling peacekeeping missions in the Middle East. However, Phase 
Two of the MNFII’s deployment in Lebanon (from 18 May to 22 October 1983) was 
characterized by ambiguous military escalations and policy manoeuvring that 
contradicted the force’s initial peacekeeping mandate. If the Reagan Administration 
had been waiting for an opportunity to enter the Lebanese conflict offensively, the US 
strategy from the beginning would have been clearer.   
 Reagan and Shultz, as the MNFII’s architects, were incrementally reacting to a 
situation that was constantly changing. As such US policy in Lebanon should be 
described as one of reactive assertiveness. The strategy they employed to do this 
vacillated throughout the MNFII’s deployment in 1983 without significant 
forethought. Lebanon’s volatile situation merely hindered the US because the 
MNFII’s ambiguous mandate failed accurately to outline its approach to finding a 
peaceful solution to the conflict. As Chapter Four illustrated, by January 1983, 
Reagan and Shultz saw US withdrawal from Lebanon as detrimental to US credibility 
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internationally. Identifying the US as the key mediator and ‘peacemaker’ regionally 
was contingent on the successful completion of the MNFII’s objectives.108   
 While the Soviet sponsorship of military aid and arms to Syria concerned the 
US, it was not direct superpower conflict that heightened US anxiety. The US was 
more concerned that Syrian domination of Lebanon would provoke further Israeli 
engagement in the conflict, thereby creating an anti-American backlash among the 
Arab neighbours.   
 By September 1983, the US was involved with the Lebanese conflict and the 
Gemayel government to such a degree that a failure to protect it from Syrian 
domination would directly reflect on US power and prestige. As the US embarked on 
an aggressive ‘self defense’ policy, characterized by pre-emptive naval and air force 
strikes on Souk el Gharb, it became entangled further in the Lebanese conflict’s 
military complexities. This marked the beginning of the US combat identity in 
Lebanon in which it spilt from the MNFII in order to pursue its own strategy and 
interests. The Battle of Souk el Gharb also illustrated that the US commitment to 
finding a peaceful solution in Lebanon had diminished. The conflict also highlighted 
the US focus on the use of military force. Whether this movement toward an 
aggressive military policy in September was unique to Lebanon must be questioned. 
On 25 October, two days after the Marine Barracks attack, Reagan launched the 
invasion of Grenada. US military actions in Souk el Gharb should also be seen as part 
of the broader US escalation of its foreign policy.109  
 Lebanon was not insufficiently strategically important for the US to become as 
heavily involved as it did, even though it was a key Middle Eastern ally. For reasons 
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of prestige, regional backing and international credibility, the Reagan Administration 
continued to support the Gemayel government throughout 1983.110 The result of 
having escalated its own military policy in Lebanon was that the US was now a 
central target for militias and factions sponsored and supported by Syria, Iran and 
Libya. While the US had become aware of a growing Western rejectionist movement 
in Lebanon since the April Embassy bombing, it had not considered the degree to 
which US involvement in Lebanon could lead to a movement of anti-Americanism 
and the devastating attacks that occurred on 23 October 1983.111 
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Chapter 6 
The Marine Barracks Bombing and a ‘vigorous self defense’ 
Multinational Force II, Phase Three (23 October to 28 December 1983) 
 
At 6:22am on 23 October 1983, two trucks laden with explosives drove through US 
security at Beirut International Airport, which had housed the US and French 
Multinational Force troops (USMNF, FRMNF) stationed in Beirut since 29 
September 1982. The first truck penetrated the Lebanese Armed Force’s (LAF) outer 
perimeter and drove through the gates toward the US Barracks. As the suicide bomber 
approached the central Battalion Landing Team building, the driver detonated the 
12,000-pound explosive, killing the 241 US military personnel sleeping inside. 
Moments later, another truck drove through to the French military barracks, killing 58 
French personnel in a smaller explosion.1  
 The Marine Barracks bombing demonstrated the strength and intent of the 
emerging anti-American Islamist movement and its commitment to ensuring US 
withdrawal from Lebanon.2 While no group officially claimed responsibility, the US 
believed that this event had been masterminded by Imad Mughniyeh, founder of 
Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami,3 and Hizbullah’s operational and Iranian strategist.4  
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 The shockwaves of the bombing highlighted two key issues. First, it revealed 
the US’ direct involvement in the factional landscape that characterized the Lebanese 
conflict. Second, it proved that Reagan and Shultz had failed to recognize the growing 
anti-Western (or, more specifically, anti-American) Islamist movement that was 
developing in the region. With hindsight, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
stated that ‘there was something like 27 or 28 separate armed groups, all of which had 
only one thing in common: they opposed us and they opposed a multinational force 
coming in.’5  Even with the considerable evidence provided by Israeli, US and 
Lebanese intelligence to suggest that an attack was imminent, the Reagan 
Administration failed to recognise this possibility, thereby demonstrating the lack of 
connection between Washington’s decision-makers and the realities of the Lebanese 
conflict. It was clear throughout the USMNF deployment that the US had failed to 
prioritize the factional or Islamic extremist groups, such as Harakat Amal, Hizbullah 
or al-Hizb al-Taqadummi al-Ishtiraki.6  
 While the US was preoccupied with direct state-based diplomacy between 
Israel, Syria and the Lebanese Gemayel government, the Reagan Administration 
ignored the many religious militias. Moreover, the intrinsic nature of such an attack 
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was based on surprize, and the degree to which the US failed to acknowledge that it 
was now a primary target highlights the administration’s naivety.  
 The 23 October bombing created a distinct turning-point in US engagement in 
Lebanon. It sounded the death knell for the Multinational Force II (MNFII) and was 
acknowledged as the leading reason for the USMNF’s withdrawal in February 1984.7 
A nexus between the Vietnam War and the MNFII in Lebanon was born out of 
another failed US-led military intervention.8 The Department of Defense’s public and 
‘independent’ inquiry into the bombings allowed the administration to distance itself 
from blame and, instead, develop an aggressive line on state-sponsored Islamic 
terrorism. However, Reagan’s policy decisions immediately after the attacks 
illustrated that the bombings had created significant concern within his 
administration, specifically with regards to the MNFII’s validity. Shultz and Reagan 
remained the MNFII’s backbone of support in Washington and feared that this tone of 
critical inquiry might lead to the MNFII’s perceived failure and thereby strike at the 
heart of the administration’s credibility.9  
 This chapter will examine the impact of the Marine Barracks bombing on US 
policy in Lebanon and the US responses to the attack from 23 October to 28 
December 1983. It will highlight the degree to which the US acknowledged that its 
strategy in Lebanon was responsible for creating the threat and subsequent attack. 
This chapter also focuses on whether the original MNFII mandate regarding the 
Lebanese government’s protection and sovereignty and the Lebanese Armed Forces 
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(LAF) was factored into US policy from 23 October 1983 or whether these new 
policies were aimed exclusively at enabling the US to find a way to withdraw the 
USMNF without losing face.   
 Thakur, Korbani and Nelson were quick to label the contradictory US policies 
in Lebanon after the bombings as a product of poor decision-making. 10  Their 
arguments centre on the belief that the Reagan Administration made inadequate 
foreign policy decisions because they had insufficient understanding of the Lebanese 
landscape to be able to engage accurately with the right actors or parties. In contrast, 
Hallenbeck proposes that US policy in Lebanon was aimed exclusively at the pursuit 
of US self-interest, above all else.11 The truth lies somewhere between these two 
views. As Chapters Four and Five illustrated, the administration had miscalculated the 
importance of the Lebanese conflict due to failing to understand its internal dynamics, 
hence leading the US to engage merely on a state-to-state basis. However, in the wake 
of the 23 October bombing, the US was forced to recognize that the Lebanese conflict 
was as much a product of the factional, community actors as of their foreign 
neighbours.  
 As a result, it is argued in this chapter that US responsibility for the 23 
October bombing did not lie in the USMNF’s inability to predict the threat of 
terrorism but, rather, that it was the Reagan Administration’s failure to mitigate the 
origins of the threat arising out of US involvement in the Battle of Souk el Gharb and 
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the USMNF’s altered rules of engagement. 12 These two key actions, more than any 
other, shifted the US position from mediator and questionable peacemaker to the 
frontline of the conflict.  Second, this chapter contends that the policy decisions taken 
in the three months after the attack were focused on protecting the Reagan 
Administration, specifically Shultz and Reagan, from the fallout of the bombing 
rather than US credibility more broadly. Public statements by Reagan in the wake of 
the attack indicated the administration’s reticence to consider any possibility of US 
withdrawal, although the president’s major policy addenda illustrated the opposite.  It 
was through this duality between the public proclamations and the realities of 
Reagan’s policy machine in Washington that the Administration illustrated its main 
objective of protecting its own integrity, over and above Lebanon and the ailing 
Gemayel government. 
 
‘The Worst of all Worlds’: The Aftermath of the Marine Barracks 
Bombing  
Reagan described the 23 October bombing as ‘the saddest day of my presidency, 
perhaps the saddest day of my life’ and the marine barracks bombing must be 
recognized as a turning point not only for the US in Lebanon but also for Reagan as 
US President more broadly.13 This section will examine the immediate aftermath of 
the 23 October Marine Barracks bombing, first by outlining Reagan’s public response 
on the one hand and his unwavering commitment to the MNFII’s continued presence 
on the other and, second, by highlighting the Reagan administration’s private 
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machinations as it scrambled to formulate an acceptable policy response. This two-
part analysis will illustrate how Washington’s public response to the crisis invariably 
created numerous conflicting policies and, behind closed doors, led to internal rifts 
and divisions. For example, while Reagan and Shultz vehemently believed in 
extending the MNFII’s military strategy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of 
Defence, Caspar Weinberger, petitioned Reagan to consider an immediate or near-
term withdrawal, regardless of the cost to US credibility.14  
 Two days after the bombing, Reagan announced the US invasion of Grenada. 
Hence it is important to also recognize the impact that the US attack in Beirut had on 
the administration’s legitimacy and credibility outside of Lebanon.  
    
Terrorism and Reagan’s response 
 
USMNF Commander General Paul Kelley admitted that, from August-October 1983, 
the USMNF was ‘virtually flooded with terrorist attack warnings.’15 The bombing, 
which led to 241 US military personnel fatalities, was the largest, non-conventional 
military attack against the MNFII in Lebanon and, more broadly, against the US 
internationally at that time. 16  It was quickly branded a terrorist attack against 
international peacemakers. The smaller, less effective bomb, which exploded 
moments later on the French side of Beirut International Airport, was also unpredicted 
but, unlike US intelligence, General Cann, Commander of the French MNFII 
contingent, stated that French intelligence prior to the event had failed to detect any 
threat of an attack.17  
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 The day after the attack, 300 US Marines were sent from Washington to 
replace the lost troops and assist with the substantially weakened US force. The 
French and Italians disappeared into their bunkers at the threat of further attacks and 
the British noted that the USMNF troops were ‘invisible outside of their airport 
fortress.’18  
 On 24 October Reagan issued a number of responses to the bombings both 
within the White House and to the American people. These statements laid the 
foundation for a significant policy shift and a change in the rules of engagement of the 
USMNF in Lebanon.19 Weinberger announced a full inquiry into the bombings on 29 
October, firstly to assess the link between the attack and the MNFII’s operational 
activities and, secondly, to examine the degree to which US decisions in Lebanon 
prior to October 1983 had created the environment that led to the attack. While 
Reagan continued publicly to insist that a US withdrawal from Lebanon was 
impossible, requests for an immediate exit, from within the administration, were 
spearheaded by Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the JCS Chairman, 
General John William Vessey. 20  Furthermore, the US European Command 
(USEUCOM) argued that the current rules of engagement did not allow for military 
reprisals or retaliation and therefore the USMNF should withdraw from Lebanon’s 
shores, as stipulated in the MNFII’s original mandate.21 
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 The possibility of the attack being connected to US involvement in the Battle 
of Souk el Gharb was initially hushed up by the administration. By the end of October 
Reagan ordered the USMNF to ‘harden’ militarily, which meant significant US troop 
reinforcements.22 While the new troop deployment was justified exclusively as a 
means of ensuring MNFII personnel’s safety in Lebanon, it also illustrated that the 
Reagan Administration finally recognised that it had placed the US at the centre of a 
dangerous conflict. 
 At a White House Press conference on 24 October 1983, Reagan declared that 
his administration would remain steadfast in its belief that the USMNF’s near-term 
withdrawal was not an option, as this would negatively affect US credibility and lead 
to the MNFII mission’s unnecessary failure. However, by October 1983, the 
possibility of the MNFII’s mission objectives being completed had diminished. 
Reagan continued to argue that US ‘actions in Lebanon are in the cause of world 
peace,’ reminding the US Congress and public of the administration’s commitment to 
Lebanon under the MNFII.23 
To get Syria, get Israel, get the PLO organization out of Lebanon and then to 
have a stabilizing force while a government be established in Lebanon and 
their military could then acquire the capability necessary to reinstitute their 
control over their borders. And this was why the multinational force went in- 
to provide that stability so that when the Lebanese forces move out, as the 
other forces, the Israelis and the Syrians left, there could be a maintenance of 
order behind them.24  
 
Reagan’s public refusal to remove the USMNF from Lebanon continued until the 
MNFII’s final days, but this refusal must also be examined in the context of the 
administration’s wider foreign policy goals at that time.  
                                                
22 [NSDD 109 Responding to the Lebanon Crisis], pp.1-2. 
23 Presidential Remarks, [Regional Broadcasters Luncheon], 7:45pm 24 October 1983, 
Lebanon Bombings-October 1983 File, Box 5, Phillip Dur Series, RRPL, p.2. 
24 Press Minutes, [Remarks from the President in Q&A session with regional editors and 
broadcasters], 1:11pm 24 October 1983, Lebanon Bombings-October 1983 File, Box 5, 
Phillip Dur Series, RRPL, p.2. 
 223 
 Two days after the 23 October Barracks Bombing, US troops landed in 
Grenada under Operation Urgent Fury and Reagan needed to convince the American 
public that the intervention in Grenada was solely intended to protect US civilians and 
personnel.25  The link between Lebanon and the US intervention in Grenada is 
important for understanding how the Reagan Administration perceived the threats 
emanating from the Lebanon crisis to other policy areas.  Reagan grouped both 
intervention forces, the MNFII in Lebanon and Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, 
together, as both demonstrated Reagan and Shultz’s military force as foreign policy 
strategy.26 Reagan wanted to reassure ‘the public on the steadiness of the President’s 
foreign policy in the Mideast and Caribbean,’27 so cleverly referenced the threat to US 
positions internationally and the necessity of protecting US security abroad 
(evidenced by the US Barracks bombing) as an explanation of the Grenada 
intervention. Reagan barely cited the Beirut crisis on 23 October in his journal but 
rather focused on the plans for Grenada. 28 The Barracks bombing distracted the public 
and Congress from Operation Urgent Fury. However, it also meant that Reagan could 
not afford to back down from the Lebanese crisis and risk delegitimizing the 
Grenadian mission.29   
                                                
25 Operation Urgent Fury was officially justified as the means to rescue and protect US 
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27 ibid. p.2. 
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29 ibid. p.352.  
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 Operation Urgent Fury did not garner the same support from international 
leaders, however, specifically the MNFII’s European partners, Britain and France.30 
Thatcher emotionally petitioned Reagan to reconsider the possibility of the US 
invasion of Grenada. Reagan stated simply: ‘She’s upset and doesn’t think we should 
do it. I couldn’t tell her it had started.’31 While British and US relations were close, 
fused by Reagan and Thatcher’s shared Cold War policies, the British MNFII 
contingent was the first to show signs of hesitation and a lack of commitment to what 
Thatcher saw as Reagan’s international gun show. Similarly, the day after the 
bombing, as Mitterrand toured the bombed French and US Barracks in Beirut, the 
French questioned US priorities that saw the launching of the Grenadian operation 
over mourning the tragic loss of troops in Lebanon.32 As a result Britain and France 
became further disconnected from US military strategy in Lebanon.33   
 Nevertheless, the administration’s attempts to create a political opportunity out 
of the bombings continued. Reagan’s address to the nation on 23 October 1983 
illustrated his intention to lay blame on international terrorists and distract attention 
from the growing numbers of critics who directly tied the US losses to Reagan’s 
policies in Lebanon:  
Those who sponsor these outrages believe that they can intimidate the 
Government of Lebanon, its people and their friends in the international 
community. They are wrong. We will not yield to international terrorism 
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because we know that if we do, the civilised world will suffer and our values 
will be fair game for those who seek to destroy all we stand for.34 
 
Although the President did not go as far as publicly naming Hizbullah or any other 
Sh’ia radicals for the 23 October attack, this was generally accepted by the 
Administration.35 The Department of Defense Commission Report obliquely stated 
that an Iranian surrogate force in Lebanon had carried out the attack. Shultz also 
claimed that: ‘The President will reiterate his commitment to keeping the marines in 
Beirut, announce new security precautions to prevent future incidents and link both 
Iran and Syria to the bombing of the Marine headquarters.’36 This link was supported 
by French army intelligence that had been watching the Iranian Embassy in Beirut on 
the preceding day and also believed that the attack was an Iranian-Syrian 
collaboration.37 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 109, ‘Responding to 
the Lebanon Crisis’, issued on 23 October 1983, stressed the US Administration’s 
position in pushing Gemayel to sever all diplomatic ties with Iran.38  
 Reagan also attempted to use the bombings as a public way to unite the other 
MNFII, particularly France, with the US’ policy in Lebanon and its ‘measures to 
strengthen the capabilities of our forces.’39 In many ways, the US was fortunate that 
the second bomb targeted the French Barracks; otherwise, a definite case could have 
been made that the attacks were focused exclusively on the US presence in Lebanon. 
While there was little unity among the MNFII partners, the attack on both the French 
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and US positions allowed Reagan to blame the bombings on anti-Western ideology 
rather than simply constituting an anti-American attack. However, US Commander in 
Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR) General Kelley did recognize the 
growing anti-American sentiments in Lebanon, stating that ‘Iranian operatives in 
Lebanon are in the business of killing Americans. They are in that business whether 
or not the USMNF trains the LAF or provides indirect fire support to the defenders of 
Souq-Al-Gharb.’40 It was important for the US to illustrate that, no matter what policy 
the administration had adopted throughout 1983, the attacks were part of a wider part 
of ‘la guerre mondiale’ against international terrorism and therefore unavoidable.41  
 The US made clear that the 23 October bombing was to be labelled, officially 
and publicly, an ‘Act of Terrorism’ rather than considered more broadly as part of the 
conventional conflict.42 General Paul Kelley believed that there was: 
sufficient evidence to conclude that both incidents were not suicidal acts by 
some individual fanatic. They were instead, well planned and professionally 
executed acts of terrorism which appeared designed to drive out the US 
presence from Lebanon. 43 
 
This definitional distinction is important on two levels. If the bombing had been 
associated with a conventional combat environment, the USMNF deployment, 
mandate and operations would be open to direct criticism on the basis that the force 
had become too intertwined in the Lebanese conflict. However, labelling the 
bombings an ‘Act of Terrorism’ meant that the LAF’s security protection of the 
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MNFII could be blamed for the tragedy, rather than the MNFII’s presence itself.44 
Second, if the attacks were considered random or fanatical, then the context within 
which the USMNF was deployed would be deemed too volatile and therefore an 
immediate withdrawal would follow, in line with the initial MNFII mandate.45 
However, as the attack was labelled a terrorist attack that was exclusively directed at 
driving out the MNFII, withdrawing from Lebanon would look like the US was 
giving in to terrorism. As a result, the tragedy was painted as an unfortunate 
consequence of global peace-making.46 
 Behind Reagan’s public admonishment of the terrorists lay his need ‘to 
reassert American leadership in the wide range of challenges we face in the Middle 
East.’47 It was the challenge to his administration’s credibility that Reagan most 
feared. While Reagan continued to propagate a response to the attacks that was 
characterized by nationalism and retaliation, it was clear that a bloc of decision 
makers within Washington were moving in an entirely different direction.  
 
US opportunism: the makings of an impasse 
 
Reagan privately reaffirmed the MNFII’s objectives and goals in order to remind the 
administration that the force was ‘bold, innovative and challenged long held 
assumptions about obstacles to resolving the Palestinian problem.’48 This tied US 
policy in Lebanon throughout October 1983 to the original MNFI mandate that 
focused on PLO removal from Beirut. While the two force mandates differed vastly, it 
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was important for Reagan to return to his image as ‘peacemaker’ as had been the case 
when the mission was first established. Much of this was due to the US Presidential 
election the following year. While Reagan publicly denied that this had any bearing 
on the decisions related to Lebanon,49 he also privately reminded the decision-makers 
that, given the impending election, the administration had to move to achieve success 
rather than failure if it were to curb growing domestic criticism.50 
 NSDD 109 had, through its ambiguity, enabled the administration to buy time, 
as it scrambled to outline a comprehensive response to the attack and fend off 
growing pressure from within Washington for MNFII withdrawal.51 Reagan sent 
General Kelley to Beirut to review the US Marines’ security arrangements and 
guarantee US personnel’s protection over and above the objectives outlined in the 
MNFII’s September 1982 mandate. After his visit to Beirut on 25 October 1983, 
Kelley stated, ‘we must make every effort to have the multinational force both 
multinational and a force.’52 Kelley believed that, while the US continued to publicize 
the MNFII’s multinational structure, the Lebanese factions singled out US 
involvement as a separate entity.  
 As a result, Kelley recommended that the US should integrate its marines with 
the other MNFII partners, including multinational patrols and ‘a truly combined 
command.’ 53  National Security Affairs Special Assistant, Geoffrey Kemp, also 
supported this, seeing a US focus on renewed relations with Britain, France and Italy 
as imperative to assisting the US to find an agreeable, internationally-sanctioned 
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diplomatic, rather than military, solution.54 The other MNFII partners, however, were 
reluctant to participate in further US operations. The French specifically believed that 
significant changes to US strategy would affect their own force’s security situation.55 
Similarly, Kelley argued that should the USMNF continue to be deployed at Beirut 
Airport, advanced security enhancement would be required by both the US and the 
LAF to counter another terrorist attack.56 The Commander concluded, therefore, that 
US troops should be redeployed aboard US Navy ships and only brought ashore for 
short, targeted missions that could be limited and controlled.  
 Critics of the MNFII, both in the US and the Middle East, believed that it was 
the US’ inability to engage unilaterally with the other Lebanese factions that led to the 
MNFII being seen as a non-neutral military force aiding President Gemayel’s Kata’eb 
agenda. Reagan therefore used the attacks diplomatically to pressure the Lebanese 
leaders to agree to a framework for the national reconciliation conference. Reagan’s 
support for the 30 October 1983 Geneva reconciliation talks, while demonstrating US 
willingness to support a diplomatic consensus, garnered superficial support from the 
factions within Lebanon. Many felt that US pressure for the talks was merely to create 
an excuse for MNFII withdrawal, and few Lebanese leaders held hopes that talks 
would change the Lebanese context.57 Specifically, Harakat Amal leader Nabih Berri 
and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt believed that the talks were redundant, since the US 
refused to abrogate the May 17th Agreement and Syria was, yet again, not a party to 
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the negotiations.58 President Gemayel, in a three hour meeting with Special Envoy 
Donald Rumsfeld and US Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, stressed the 
difficulties that the US had created in Lebanon by binding the Lebanese President to 
promises he was unable to keep.59 Gemayel believed that the Geneva Conference 
would do little to curb the growing Syrian presence in Lebanon. Gemayel stated that 
he only went along with Geneva as he realized it was politically necessary for the US 
to illustrate its commitment to the conflict’s diplomatic rather than military 
resolution.60  
 While Rumsfeld continued to pressure Gemayel to remain steadfast on the 
May 17th Agreement, he also recognized that this was the sticking point in creating an 
acceptable security agreement. Consequently, the US continued to stand by the May 
17th Agreement and simultaneously pressure Gemayel to act likewise at the Geneva 
reconciliation talks.61 However, Gemayel knew that he could not begin a national 
reconciliation process with community leaders who were sponsored and aligned to 
Iran and Syria without abrogating the May17th Agreement or, in the words of former 
President Suleiman Frangieh, ‘putting the Agreement on ice.’62 Similarly, French 
President François Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson argued against 
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the US, supporting a full revocation of the Israeli-Lebanese accords and pushing to 
include Syria in any future negotiations.63 The May 17th Agreement was not only an 
obstacle for Gemayel in constructing a united government, but also drove a wedge 
between the MNFII partners.  
 Even though quietly the Administration recognized that no sustainable 
resolution could be found while the US continued its blind support for the May 17th 
Agreement, it allowed the US to buy time as it prepared to announce the NSDD111. 
The NSDD, outlined by Reagan on 28 October, focused specifically on the future of 
US policy in Lebanon.64 The directive was based on recommendations drawn up on 
17 October 1983, which had been considered premature and therefore were not 
implemented. The bombings created the urgency for the Reagan Administration to 
find a solution to the crisis and therefore the recommendations were rehashed for 
immediate execution. The earlier operational directive highlighted the need to 
consider the MNFII’s withdrawal, the strengthening of Israeli-US relations, support 
for friendly Arab neighbours and a push for national reconciliation.65 Importantly, this 
implies that the Administration was already considering a withdrawal and closer 
Israeli relations prior to the bombings.  On 17 October, as if seeing into the near 
future, the paper stated that ‘an American humiliation in Lebanon will weaken our 
position generally in the Middle East.’66  
 The key differences between the 17 October directive and Reagan’s 28 
October policy were that the US was no longer committed to a functioning Lebanese 
unity government, responsibility for non-MNFII personnel or, most importantly, 
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foreign forces’ removal. The Marine Barracks bombing had fundamentally changed 
the USMNF mission in Lebanon with regards to its objectives, mandate and security 
obligations. The NSDD demonstrated US perceptions that a short-term political and 
military stalemate in Lebanon was more realistic than a long-term sustainable 
ceasefire. This impasse would therefore provide the required environment and time 
for a possible US withdrawal. The best-case scenario for the US would be a 
perceptible ceasefire that would last while the factions entered into negotiations and 
the US could consider withdrawing.67  
 In NSDD111, Reagan stated that the military rules of engagement, created 
during the Battle of Souk el Gharb, would be reinstated indefinitely. Specifically, this 
engagement would allow US missions inside Syrian-controlled territories.68 Shultz 
adamantly supported targeted attacks on Syrian and Lebanese Shi’a positions in the 
Bekaa Valley as retaliation for the Barracks bombing. In support of Shultz’s 
argument, the National Security Council (NSC) Director, Howard Teicher, issued a 
note to the president specifically stating that he felt that NSDD111 did not expand the 
rules of engagement sufficiently to engage appropriately with the issue of the 
‘terrorist infrastructure.’69 Similarly, the NSC was conscious that the recent attacks on 
the US would lead to a forced MNFII withdrawal and wanted to expand the NSDD to 
include further measures and powers to continue the US’ military presence.  Such 
extensions would also mean that the NSC could use the 23 October attacks to operate 
a wider policy of counter-terrorism throughout the region, using Lebanon as the 
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pretext. Teicher singled out the CIA report on ‘Syrian use of Terrorism as an 
Instrument of State Policy.’ The CIA demonstrated that the 23 October attacks were 
both a clear warning to the US and an opportunity. By leveraging a strong anti-
terrorism strategy, the US could further legitimize its extended military presence in 
Lebanon as ‘self-defense.’ Conversely, Weinberger again petitioned that, while US 
Marines remained in Lebanon, inciting further attacks by militant Shi’a factions in 
Lebanon was counterproductive to the proposed tightening of USMNF security 
arrangements.70  
 Weinberger was ultimately proved correct and the administration finally 
realized that it must acknowledge the risk associated with possible future attacks on 
US bases or personnel. However, Reagan’s steadfast backing of Gemayel still did 
little more than defend the Kata’eb Christian agenda.71 Therefore, the non-state actors 
within Lebanon used this to continue gaining momentum and support outside 
Lebanon. The previous US policies were patently unsustainable in the long-term but 
had allowed the US to demonstrate military resolve in Lebanon in such a way that it 
did not appear to be retreating. However, US decision-making was now exclusively 
focused on saving Reagan and Shultz’s credibility and actively creating a moment 
which would allow the administration to claim a victory.72  
 
What went wrong? The Department of Defense Commission Report 
Following the Marine Barracks bombing, the Department of Defense established a 
commission to conduct an inquiry into the bombing and the wider Lebanese 
landscape with the aim of assessing US intervention’s validity and future. A major 
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failing of the Report, however, was that it conflated many of the smaller factors that 
led to the bombing while understating the broader, more important policy decisions 
that exacerbated Lebanon’s security environment in the lead-up to the attacks. As 
such, much of the blame was wrongly attributed to micro factors, such as security 
policing and minor breaks in the chain of command. This section will examine how 
the Department of Defense Commission Report’s (DOD Report) findings 
underestimated the Reagan Administration’s contribution to Lebanon’s instability, 
specifically the US military and MNFII’s actions, and show how this arose from a 
culture of denial that would eventually backfire on the US and create the pretext for 
the 1984 MNFII and US withdrawal. 
 The Commission was composed exclusively of serving executive military 
personnel appointed by the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger. In their report, 
they outlined four key conditions under which the decision-makers had inserted the 
USMNF. First, the force would operate in a relatively benign environment. Second, 
the Lebanese Armed Forces would provide security in the areas where the force was 
to operate. Third, the mission would be of limited duration. And, fourth, the force 
would be evacuated in the event of an attack.73 None of these conditions were met 
throughout the MNFII deployment and, even following direct attacks on US 
personnel in the April Embassy bombing and the 23 October Marine Barracks 
bombing, the US had not pushed for an evacuation or withdrawal. 
 Lebanon could also not be considered a benign situation and the LAF was 
patently incapable of protecting its own positions let alone those of the MNFII.74 The 
MNFII mission’s mandated short duration, initially outlined as a flexible, 90-day 
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deployment, was continually extended, such that, by the time of the Report, 18 
months had lapsed since its initial deployment. Much of Shultz and Reagan’s 
resistance to a US evacuation was pinned on their belief that such a withdrawal would 
damage US credibility in the region. However, due to the significant losses suffered 
by the US and both the LAF and USMNF’s humiliation, the 23 October bombing 
ultimately represented a far greater setback for US credibility than a withdrawal.75   
 The Report outlined the failings of the decision-makers, without making 
specific reference to any member of the Reagan Administration: 
The commission concludes that US decision as regards Lebanon taken over 
the past fifteen months have been, to a large degree characterized by an 
emphasis on military options and the expansion of the US military role...The 
commission further concludes that these decisions may have been taken 
without clear recognition that these initial conditions had dramatically changed 
and that the expansion of our military involvement in Lebanon greatly 
increased the risk to the MNF.76 
 
The Commission noted that, while the MNFII was initially and widely regarded as a 
peacekeeping mission, it was never explicitly mandated as such (a minor but relevant 
technicality). This ambiguity allowed the US both an opportunity to expand the 
force’s military role if the administration wished and subsequently led to US 
involvement in the conflict.77 General Kelley described how, from June to September 
1983, increased shelling of US positions occurred and relations with Muslim factions 
deteriorated to the point where the US felt that the main perception of the US-LAF 
relationship was based on a pro-Christian alliance with an offensive rather than 
defensive operational strategy. 78  The issues regarding the MNFII’s mandate 
(discussed in Chapter Four) were highlighted by the Commission, in the wake of the 
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bombings, demonstrating that the MNFII was neither a peacekeeping body nor a 
military intervention unit, albeit limited by both structures.  
 The DOD Report quoted Senate assessment findings from 23 July 1982 during 
the MNFI & MNFII’s conceptual development, outlining these concerns, which were 
not taken into account. As such, the objectives of the force overwhelmed its strategy.  
It stated: 
If a peacekeeping force is to avoid the problems of dividing the intentions of 
armed elements and avoiding entrapment in Lebanese internal conflicts, it will 
be essential for the question of extra-legal armed presence in the area to be 
settled before its deployment. If a multinational force is to be used, basic 
issues affecting its ability to accomplish its mission must be settled in 
advance. If these issues are not clarified and resolved during a pre-deployment 
phase no one should be surprised if the peacekeeping force encounters 
intractable political and military problems on the ground (as was the case with 
UNIFIL).79 
 
As this states the US’ focus should have been whether or not the US armed presence 
in Lebanon was a defensive peacekeeping mission or an offensive military 
intervention.80 Rather, the DOD Report suggested that the confusion over the chain of 
command between US Central Command (CENTCOM), US European Command 
(USEUCOM/USCINCEUR) and the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) made the US 
positions vulnerable.81 It was ultimately because the operational definitions of the 
term ‘presence’ were so equivocal (hence allowing Washington greater flexibility for 
future escalation) that the military strategy chain of command at every level was 
similarly confused. As USCINCEUR Commander Kelley explained, in his statement 
to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 31 October 1983, ‘first let me tell you 
that presence as a mission is not in any military dictionary. It is not a classic military 
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mission.’ 82  This was interpreted by Kelley as meaning a visible, neutral, non-
combative operational strategy.83 While this non-combative strategy was adhered to 
under the MNFI, it was inaccurate for Kelley to link this to the realities of the MNFII 
operations from August to October 1983. The MNFII rules of engagement, announced 
in September 1983, had altered the US mission from ‘presence’ to an offensive 
military position, as illustrated by the Battle of Souk el-Gharb. 84  Kelley also 
incorrectly stated that the MNFII ‘was basically a diplomatic/political mission, not a 
military one in the classic sense.’85 While the MNFII was certainly not traditional or 
clearly mandated, it was, without doubt, a military force. This confusion led most 
people on the ground to believe that the Americans were no longer performing a 
‘presence role’ but an ‘assistance role’86 and that they were ‘less peacekeepers than 
supporters of the Maronite Christian faction of the Lebanese ethnic fabric.’ 87 
Similarly, FRMNF Brigadier General Albert Coullon argued that the MNFII had 
become a biased force for the US’ political machinations: 
Elle ne comprend pas de contingent militairement dominant; les contingents 
[of the MNFII] ne sont pas intégrés sous un commandement unique (à 
l’inverse de la FINUL); chaque contingent est utilisé non comme un 
instrument de combat mais comme un instrument de politique international 
sous la tutelle de son Ambassadeur.88 
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Naively, while the political context in which the MNFII was deployed was considered 
‘for the most part, not hostile,’89 a September 1982 car bomb, the US embassy 
bombing in April 1983 and the 23 October 1983 Barracks bombing clearly illustrated 
that the US in fact ‘was emerging as a prime target for those who either opposed or 
misinterpreted the role of the MNF in Lebanon.’90 General Kelley had contacted the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 October 1983 to recommend a full, immediate withdrawal 
of US Military from Lebanon, citing imminent threats.91 The next day, a car bomb 
exploded, directed at a US convoy, but this was dismissed as part of ‘conventional 
military action’, as well as ‘clumsy, amateurish and a failure.’92 Regardless of 
Kelley’s warnings, the Department of Defense focused blindly on blaming Kelley’s 
European Command, USCINCEUR, for the bombing, attributing it to a ‘failure of the 
USCINEUR operational chain of command to inspect and supervise the defensive 
posture of the USMNF.’93 
 Although the Commission would not specify the exact cause and effect 
relationship nor identify any of the administration’s key decision-makers as 
responsible, the report loosely linked the altered US rules of engagement at the Battle 
Souk el Gharb and the bombings. However, the consensus of the USMNF Officers in 
Beirut was that there was a strong and undeniable link between the increased US 
military aggression and the subsequent attack on the US Barracks. While US 
intelligence estimated that over 100 such car bombing warnings had been received 
from June to October 1983, the fact that none of these leads had been investigated 
illustrated the US’ naivety in failing to perceive any real threat to US troops, even 
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after Souk el Gharb.94 Kelley claimed that he took no heed of the potential threats, 
believing that they did not represent conventional combat.95 It was a major failing of 
both Kelley in Beirut and the Administration in Washington not to recognize that the 
threats toward the US were fast becoming direct and targeted.96  
 The report also highlighted that the rules of engagement for the semi-
independent US military force’s offensive strategy and those applied to the USMNF 
differed. The USMNF’s security rules of engagement only proposed to consider two 
key scenarios; namely, a ‘hostile force’ and a ‘hostile act.’ Without clear guidelines 
regarding what would determine a hostile force, the USMNF was left to operate under 
USEUCOM peacetime rules of engagement, which meant that any unauthorised unit 
or force that entered US-controlled territory was asked to leave and action was only 
taken if a hostile act resulted from this communication. Yet, the Administration had 
argued that those rules of engagement were, in fact, insufficient to protect US Marines 
in Lebanon given the April Barracks bombing and the SAF troops’ growing presence 
near Beirut. By 26 October 1983, in the aftermath of the bombing, two further 
changes in the rules were made, allowing US forces to open fire on any civilian 
vehicle travelling toward them at high speed and stipulating that forceful action must 
be taken against unauthorised forces in USMNF-controlled territories.97  
 The DOD Report, as well as NSDD 109 and 111, demonstrated that the 
administration was searching for an immediate solution to US intervention in 
Lebanon.  This needed to be found, without conditions being placed on the US, for a 
successful, sustainable resolution to the conflict. By evaluating the USMNF’s security 
arrangements and military strategy, the Department of Defense Commission was 
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ordered to examine the Reagan Administration’s decision regarding the MNFII’s 
initial deployment. It also scrutinised the US military mission’s expansion and the 
escalation of the force’s rules of engagement. The report advised a reconsideration of 
the standing policies in favour of alternative strategies in Lebanon. Rather than 
employing the MNFII or Reagan’s aggressive self-defence policy, 98  the report 
suggested phasing-out the US military and a more ‘vigorous’ pursuit of diplomacy.99 
It was abundantly clear that the US now needed to move away from Reagan and 
Shultz’s proposed increases in military deployment. The Department of Defense 
findings demonstrate how the US had used the MNFII policy vehicle for its own 
interests in Lebanon. The autonomy in command that the US had leveraged 
throughout 1983, coupled with the lack of incentives for the other MNFII partner 
countries to join the US, meant that returning to, or rather initiating, a collaborative 
command would be impossible.   
 Kelley concluded by advising the Senate Committee that such attacks were 
imminent, arguing that they could not be countered by any imaginable security 
measures, reinforced or otherwise. Aside from minor security reinforcements, Kelley 
could not guarantee the Marines’ safety if another such attack occurred. With the 
weight of this and the DOD findings bearing down on them, Reagan and Shultz began 
devising the final policy changes for the MNFII in 1983.100 
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Looking outside: US Cooperation with Israel and Arab neighbours 
Of the directives and reports that the administration issued immediately following the 
23 October attacks, few identified direct, aggressive retaliation as best serving US 
interests.101 The US realized that reshaping the MNFII’s long-term objectives and 
military strategy required time, resources and a change in Lebanon’s political 
landscape. While Reagan obstinately believed that the US could not withdraw from 
Lebanon without affecting US credibility significantly, the Administration urgently 
needed to shift its attention to the wider Middle East.  Reagan believed that the US 
had to continue to be seen as the ‘fair arbiter of justice’ in the region. Shultz and 
Weinberger, however, realized that the stalemate between Israel, Lebanon and Syria 
would lead to the perception that the US-backed May 17th Agreement had failed and 
that the US would need to look outside Lebanon for its victories. Shultz stated: ‘the 
window now exists in which perceived success in a broader peace process context 
may be more likely than in Lebanon itself.’102  
 Further, Shultz believed that ‘Arabs increasingly perceive the MNF as a USG 
instrument to prop up an unrepresentative regime and help kill Muslim opponents.’103 
Zimbler argues that the USMNF had, in fact, alienated the regional allies, who were 
well-placed to undermine US efforts in Lebanon. Zimbler states that this was due to 
the MNFII becoming a ‘pawn in the struggle for control of the Middle East.’104 To 
ensure that it would not lose Israel and the friendly Arab nations’ support, the US 
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embarked on a substantial campaign to minimize the damage caused to US military 
prestige by the 23 October bombings. This section will examine the US outreach to 
their Middle Eastern allies as a result of the 23 October attacks.  
 The moderate decision-makers within the administration, such as Weinberger 
and Vessey, pushed for an outreach policy for aid and military sales to the Arab 
neighbours, for two key reasons. First, the Reagan Administration realized that the 
substantial investment and ties forged with the Gemayel government (and therefore 
the LAF) had failed to achieve the US goal of securing its position within Lebanon. 
Gemayel criticised the May 17th Agreement as the only factor leading to his 
government’s decline that ‘had begun steadily and rapidly to deteriorate, starting with 
his signing of the May 17th Agreement. The Lebanese President stated that it took 
‘rock-hard’ resolve in this situation to ‘maintain faith in the US.’105 Through this 
statement, Gemayel showed that, while he was dependent upon the US, he also 
resented their interference. Gemayel blamed Shultz and Reagan for the political 
quagmire in which he found himself. Placing total responsibility on the US for 
Gemayel’s decline was unfair. Former Lebanese President-elect Bachir Gemayel’s 
brief courtship with the Israelis did not transfer to his brother, Amin Gemayel and 
thus his relations with Israel had always been strained. Indeed, Gemayel believed the 
Israeli’s would ‘eat me like a mouthful of bread.’106 Thus Gemayel argued that future 
negotiations between Lebanon and Israel would have to be mediated by the US 
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Administration because it was the US that forced the dialogue between the two states 
in the first place.107  
 Reagan had hoped that, through his close support for the Gemayel 
government, the US would demonstrate tacit backing for moderate pro-Western states 
in the Middle East. However, support for Gemayel’s Kata’eb agenda and the 
perception of an unbreakable US-Israeli alliance portrayed the US as uninterested in 
the surrounding Muslim majority nations, especially the Gulf States. US Ambassador 
Bartholomew claimed that:  
conversations here in Beirut indicate a high level of dependency and 
expectations vis-à-vis the US which, whatever its consistency with Lebanese 
history and its possible advantages for the US, also has some very troubling 
dimensions we will want to talk about.108  
 
Weinberger also recognized Lebanon as a failed US policy frontline and regarded a 
strong, non-US military intervention as key to attaining a long-term, sustainable 
security arrangement in the region. 109 Due to the established links between the LAF 
and the MNFII, the US turned to promoting the rapid modernisation of the LAF and 
approved considerable increases in military aid. 110  However, the US remained 
cautious about becoming dependent on Lieutenant General Ibrahim Tannous, 
Commander of the LAF, whose assassination or removal they believed was 
imminent.111 Similarly, the concern was that the LAF had proven too weak and 
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disorganized to protect US troops in Lebanon.112 The Barracks bombing illustrated 
that the LAF was unable to protect the USMNF positions in Lebanon and also that 
Gemayel now represented a fruitless investment.113  
 The aftermath of the barracks attack was characterised by the Administration’s 
push to secure military aid agreements with regional neighbours and thereby reduce 
the perception that the US was being chased out of the region. The US began to focus 
on military aid missions supporting Israel and friendly Arab States, such as Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, plus quietly ‘leaning’ towards Iraq. This policy was 
focused on further isolating Syria regionally. By linking Syria to Iran in the Iran/Iraq 
conflict, the US wished to reduce any financial cooperation between Saudi Arabia and 
Syria.114 However, King Hussein continued to ‘despair’ over the US’ support of Israel 
and the IDF’s occupation of Lebanon, and ‘was contemplating telling President 
Reagan that he should forget his Middle East Peace Initiative’ if it relied on 
collaborating with Arab neighbors.115 Similarly, US attempts to direct Saudi Arabia to 
apply financial pressure on Syria to withdraw from Lebanon had strained US/Saudi 
relations, eventually leading Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz 
publicly to denounce US control, stating that ‘Saudi Arabia is not a tool.’116  
 Because the Reagan Administration continued to regard Syria as an obstacle to 
stability in Lebanon it, in turn, saw Asad as a threat to US interests in the region. 
Even though the US was resigned to accepting Syrian influence, Reagan stated: ‘in 
the case of Syria, while accepting its legitimate interests [in Lebanon], we must try to 
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lessen its control through surrogates, over the reconciliation process and generate 
international pressure against its continued occupation of Lebanon.’117 While the US 
quietly acquiesced in accepting Syrian influence, the Reagan Administration also 
realized that Syrian sponsorship of militias in Lebanon would have a long-term, 
negative impact on US interests while the MNFII remained on Lebanese soil.  
 The Administration’s failure to engage with the factional groups, specifically 
the Druze and Sh’ia communities, meant that political manoeuvring by October 1983 
was face-saving rather than a genuine attempt at reconciliation. 118  The Reagan 
Administration did not show any intention of bridging the gap between the USMNF 
mission and the Lebanese Sh’ia community, whom the US broadly saw as responsible 
for the Barracks attack. While the US had rejected the possibility of retaliation, the 
administration did not wish to seem weak in extending a hand to the religious groups 
it had labelled ‘terrorists.’119  
 As such, US Intelligence proposed that Iraq offered the best opportunity for 
the US to engage with both Sunni and Sh’ia groups in order to strike a balance that 
would disenfranchise fundamentalists and terrorists. The US believed that the Iraqi 
President, Saddam Hussein, ‘ruthlessly suppresses those individuals or groups that are 
a threat to his regime.’120 As Hussein continued to confront Khomeini’s radical Sh’ia 
Islamism, it was in US interests to support Iraq in providing a buffer against the 
spread of the Iranian revolution.121 Gemayel could neither afford to confront the 
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Islamic radical groups nor had the political clout to co-opt them within his 
government. The US saw Hussein as a charismatic, non-prophetic leader, who, unlike 
Gemayel, was able both to appease and repress the religious revivalist movement.122 
The US recognized that Moscow and Washington shared their support for the Iraqi 
leader and, as Soviet-Iranian relations deteriorated, the USSR supported Hussein 
through significant arms sales. Similarly, the US directed aid toward Baghdad in an 
attempt to isolate Iran.123 US Intelligence highlighted that Iraq was now the policy 
frontline for the US in the region, rather than Lebanon, and that Iran would not attack 
the US directly unless Tehran came under direct provocation. The CIA also saw the 
Iran/Iraq war as the administration’s leading concern by November 1983. The Agency 
linked the war to a disruption in the Gulf Oil exports to the US, which was far more 
important to US national interests than the ailing Gemayel Government’s sovereignty. 
If tacit, discreet US support occurred, the US would soon be pressured to intervene 
militarily in Iraq in order to defend Hussein’s regime against Khomeini. While US 
Marines remained deployed in Lebanon, the CIA believed that Tehran would continue 
to expand Iranian sponsorship of US-directed terrorist attacks.124  
 By December 1983, Israeli domestic opposition to the IDF’s continued 
presence and involvement in the conflict had reached a climax. Yair Evron supports 
the view that, while the Israeli government did not want to consider the invasion a 
failure, the diplomatic context created by the US meant there was little room for an 
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Israeli victory. 125 Reagan believed that widening and enhancing Israeli military 
support was in US interests.126 This occurred partly through the realization that a US 
withdrawal would place greater pressure on Israel to protect itself and partly because 
the attempts to make US actions in Lebanon seem even-handed had already failed. 
Further support of Israel was, if countered by the support of other Arab states, not 
going to further harm perceptions of the US/Israeli alliance.127  
 The most notable shift in US policy throughout the MNFII’s deployment was 
that NSDD111 mandated support for Israel in order for the US to use the IDF as a 
proxy military unit against anti-American groups in Lebanon.128  The US wanted to 
use Israel to pressure the Syrian-sponsored Palestinian and pro-Iranian Muslim groups 
in Lebanon. The administration believed that Israeli rather than US pressure on the 
radical groups in Lebanon would not lead to further direct targeting of US positions. 
This also meant that the Reagan Administration was giving tacit support for Israel to 
stay in Lebanon, even though the IDF occupation had been one of the primary focuses 
of and justifications for the MNFII’s initial deployment. The Reagan Administration 
also publicly, but cursorily, requested Israel to agree to withdraw if national 
reconciliation occurred and a unity government was formed.129  
 Reagan went further, defending the US mission in Lebanon as exclusively 
focused on Israel’s protection in light of the Syrian and Palestinian aggression 
directed at its northern border. Given the strained US/Israeli relations over the May 
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17th Agreement, Reagan’s manoeuvring back towards a pro-Israeli stance was an 
active strategy, because he and Shultz now believed that Israel represented the only 
and most reliable ally in the region.130 US Senator Howard Baker, however, protested 
that Shultz’s ‘newfound interest in cooperation with Israel is a way in which we are 
going to end up committing troops to the defence of Israel.’131 The political gamble 
was whether or not the US could afford to be publicly seen to be supporting Israel and 
whether that support in Lebanon would include a broader defence of Israel in other 
areas; specifically, the Arab-Israeli conflict. While Saudi Arabian King Faisal 
requested that Reagan should diplomatically embrace Syria in order to begin 
negotiations for a SAF withdrawal, the president retorted that ‘I’m afraid his [King 
Faisal] plan involves us separating ourselves from Israel. No can do.’132 However, the 
National Security Planning Group stated that ‘close cooperation with Israel damages 
our interest in the Arab world and we seldom get anything in return for our help from 
Israel,’ but further concluded that ‘Strategic cooperation with Israel is clearly in our 
interest; after all if the balloon ever went up in the Middle East, who else can really 
fight!’133 
 National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane recognized the urgency with 
which decisions needed to be executed, viewing US policy in the Middle East as 
governed by the Lebanese conflict, US-Israeli relations, the Arab/Israeli peace 
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process and US engagement in the Iran/Iraq War.134 The Marine Barracks bombing 
clearly startled the Reagan Administration, leading Shultz, Weinberger and Reagan to 
reflect over whether they believed that the US could garner any further credibility or 
influence from the Lebanese conflict. Reluctantly, the US was forced to admit that the 
May 17th Agreement was actually hindering a reconciliation between Israel and Syria 
and the administration had to look to the region to ensure that the MNFII and US 
military failures in Lebanon would not taint US influence elsewhere.135   
 
 ‘Somewhat leaning forward’ with a ‘vigorous self-defense’ 
While the US’ manoeuvring regarding other regional neighbours meant that it 
reaffirmed its relationship with Israel and the Gulf states, it also indicated to Gemayel 
that the US’ resolve in Lebanon was weakening. In a meeting with Gemayel, 
Rumsfeld and Bartholomew sensed that the US was now being blamed for the 
Lebanese President’s failed political security. 136  Furthermore, the Reagan 
Administration was concerned that it would be made to feel obliged to remain in 
Lebanon until the conflict’s resolution. The danger was being publicly tied to the 
Gemayel government’s seemingly improbable success. Kemp concluded that US goal 
in creating a secure, stable Lebanon, free of foreign forces, was now evidently 
unachievable. The initial MNFII objectives were conditional on a unilateral ceasefire 
arrangement and the possibility of national reconciliation talks, neither of which 
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appeared feasible by the end of 1983.137 Reagan, led by Shultz, continued to pursue an 
ideological campaign to renew perceptions of the Administration’s strength and 
credibility. However, key military decision-makers, such as the JCS and the 
Department of Defense, continued to lobby for a near-term withdrawal. This section 
will examine the period from mid-November to the end of December 1983, which 
was characterized by significant divisions between the various political blocs within 
the Reagan Administration.  
 Shultz believed that the US must take what it could from Lebanon and that 
meant creating the perception that the Reagan Administration was unwavering in 
terms of its military strength and power. Throughout the protracted Israeli/Lebanese 
talks, Shultz had been the key US decision-maker, mediating between both sides to 
reach the impulsive May 17th Agreement. All too late, he now believed that this 
diplomatic solution was unrealistic and could not represent all of the external and 
internal parties involved in the Lebanese crisis. Shultz preferred decisive military 
action as the key policy vehicle for US foreign policy even in the face of considerable 
criticism.138 In November, the JCS and Secretary of Defense Weinberger once again 
petitioned against Reagan’s policy for renewed aggressive defence, proposed under 
NSDD111. They believed that it was not in US interests to increase the MNFII’s 
military capabilities, as this meant increased US obligation to participate in Lebanon’s 
security situation.139 These protests were matched on 10 and 15 November 1983 by 
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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that sat with the sole purpose of reviewing 
US policy in Lebanon.140 The hearings resulted in Senate Joint Resolutions 187, 190 
and 253, which sought to repeal the Multinational Force Resolution, enforce a 
Congressional review of the MNFII’s strategy and seek a replacement for the MNFII 
immediately. By 15 November the MNF Resolution was repealed and congressional 
support withdrawn. The 18-month deployment extension, granted in October 1983, 
was reduced to a mere 90 days.141 Any further extensions of the MNFII would 
therefore have to be submitted by Reagan with 30 days’ notice to be approved by 
Congress and would amount to no more than a 90-day extension at any one time. 
Resolutions 248 and 253 were directed toward enhancing security measures for the 
MNFII, conditional on a near-term withdrawal. The Foreign Relations Committee’s 
resolutions were created to force Reagan into an immediate withdrawal.142  
 On November 16-17, Israeli and French forces launched two retaliatory 
attacks: one against the Palestinians in southern Lebanon and the other against 
Iranian-sponsored Islamic groups at Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley. The FRMNF were 
targeting the Jihad al-Islami suspects of the 23 October Bombing, while the IDF was 
targeting PLO positions, that it believed was responsible for Israeli Embassy bombing 
in Sidon on 4 November 1983. 143 While these two attacks represented entirely 
different agendas, they were undertaken to hold ‘terrorist’ forces accountable for 
attacks on Israeli and French positions. However, the shelling of Iranian and Shi’a 
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positions did not result in a meaningful victory for the FRMNF.144 While the losses 
were heavy, the Shi’a militia’s high-powered retaliation signalled to the French that 
Hizbullah and the other factions’ military power was greater than expected. The two-
day operation to weaken and destroy the Islamic militants failed, showing the US that 
the increasing Iranian support for Lebanese internal factions could quickly overwhelm 
the MNFII with its current size, mandate and structure. Facing further humiliation, 
French President François Mitterrand claimed that the French had initiated the attack 
between 16-19 November solely due to US insistence. By the time they contacted the 
US to ask when the joint mission would proceed, the US stated that the French should 
go ahead alone. National Security Advisor McFarlane communicated to Weinberger 
and Shultz that all plans that had been prepared for further strikes in support of the 
French MNFII contingent should be abandoned for fear of further provoking attacks 
against the US in Beirut.145 The French President felt betrayed.146  
 Owing to Weinberger’s clear distrust of Shultz and the Department of 
Defense’s refusal to sanction NSDD111, the USMNF did not perceptibly alter its 
rules of engagement or increase its visibility in Lebanon. Reagan, Shultz and the NSC 
were spearheading a stronger, more forceful military resolve while the Department of 
Defense was attempting to minimise further US military participation and thereby 
limit the possibility of future attacks against the US.147 Weinberger adamantly argued 
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that an aggressive military policy would increase the MNFII personnel’s 
vulnerability. The Department of Defense ordered the USMNF to retreat to the Beirut 
Airport perimeters on the basis that it did not want to be seen to be supporting the 
LAF. By December 1983, Gemayel controlled only a miniscule ten per cent of 
Lebanese territory. 148  Weinberger also did not regard the LAF as nationally 
representative and felt a closer alliance with General Tannous and the LAF would 
further challenge the alleged US neutrality. Weinberger was unwilling to draw further 
fire or increase the targeting of US troops, for which he felt he and his Department 
would be blamed.149  
 However, on 25 November 1983, the NSC argued against Weinberger’s 
refusal to escalate the MNFII, believing that the force should be militarily aligned 
with the LAF to strengthen the US position. The NSC thought that only by deploying 
the USMNF troops in ‘fixed positions adjacent to the southern suburbs which are 
increasingly infiltrated by radical elements (supported by Syria and Iran)’ could the 
US guarantee its security in Lebanon.150 Weinberger and the Department of Defense’s 
refusal to execute Reagan’s policy demonstrated fundamental cracks in the 
administration.151 Yet, it was not the use of military force per se that Weinberger or 
Vessey questioned, but the further extension of the MNFII’s mandate to include 
offensive military missions which they believed would increase the threat to the US.  
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 Indeed, Yoshitani challenges the widely-held belief that the Weinberger 
Doctrine aimed at limiting the use of force to a last resort.  Instead she argues that it 
aimed at legitimising the use of force as a method of statecraft.152 Weinberger was not 
a pacifist; he supported the use of force and  ‘that when you use it, you have to use it 
at overwhelming strength, and win your objective and get out.’ 153  Reagan 
unsuccessfully attempted to coax the Secretary of Defense and JCS away from this 
position on the basis that ‘we must respond to future attacks which endanger our 
forces, with more than illumination rounds.’154  
 Fears within the Reagan Administration were fuelled by the possibility of an 
official inquiry to establish whether or not the JCS had advised Reagan against 
MNFII deployment in Lebanon. The JCS claimed that they had advised Reagan and 
Shultz that the MNFII’s political objectives in Lebanon were not within reasonable 
range of the US.155 In response, the NSC argued that neither the Battle of Souk el 
Gharb nor the October 23 Marine Barracks bombing had ‘substantively changed the 
conditions bearing on our mission in Beirut.’156 The fact was that, while neither 
incident had drastically changed the Lebanese conflict’s topography, the events had 
dramatically affected the US position within it.  
 After the US Marine Barracks bombing, the threat to USMNF troops increased 
exponentially. On 30 November 1983, CIA Director William Casey received 
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intelligence regarding increased terrorist threats to US troops stationed in Lebanon, 
due to the growing numbers of Palestinian and Sh’a factions in Beirut.157  The US 
believed that the rise of an anti-American ideology within the Palestinian groups in 
Lebanon was also intended to punish the US for its alliance with Israel. The CIA 
stated that ‘the Shia in particular are prepared- even anxious- to sacrifice themselves 
as martyrs in terrorist operations.’158 The intelligence report named five key groups as 
responsible for the continuing anti-American threat; namely, Harakat Amal, 
Hizbullah, Hizb al Da’wa al-Islamiyya, the Huseini Suicide Squads and the Islamic 
Students Union. The report stated that British and Italian troops were less likely to be 
targeted because London and Rome had been more even-handed in their relations 
with the peripheral Lebanese factions. Further, Italy ‘sought to ingratiate themselves 
with local Muslims by establishing personal links.’159 While the French positions were 
also seen as targets, as they had been in October, the threat was characterized by an 
overwhelmingly anti-American ideology.  
 Therefore, the Reagan Administration believed that any attempt to normalize 
the security situation in Beirut would prove futile. The US positions in Lebanon 
would continue to face on-going, increased violent threats as long as the US remained 
in Lebanon. Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani continued publicly to support the 
anti-American jihad in order ‘to expel the aggressive forces of the United States and 
the other so-called multinational forces including the Zionists.’160 Similarly, Syrian 
Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam stated that ‘Andropov and Reagan were his 
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two best friends: Reagan supplied the circumstances and Andropov the 
ammunition.’161 
 In response to the worsening security situation, on 1 December 1983, the 
NSPG extended US policy to include a ‘vigorous self-defense.’162 The NSDD117 on 5 
December 1983 crucially outlined the guidance measures that defined the US’ new 
‘vigorous self-defense’ policy.163 The rules of engagement under this policy ordered 
US troops to destroy any position that was deemed to present a hostile threat or could 
lead to an attack, proposing the pre-emptive ‘total destruction’ of targets or threats 
including a militia’s support network.164 Should the potential civilian or collateral 
damage be deemed too high to allow shelling (either by tactical air force or naval 
surface fire), then destructive fire by ground troops was recommended. The strategy 
merely added further confusion to the numerous self-defense policies that the Reagan 
Administration had announced regarding Lebanon.  
 By December 1983, US policy in Lebanon no longer resembled the proposed 
MNFII’s security arrangements on October 25. The new, vigorous self-defence policy 
allowed the US to seek out targets more actively, specifically Syrian positions. The 
first example of the implementation of this came as the US flew F14 Fighter jets over 
Syrian-controlled territories on 3 December 1983. The fighter flight missions were 
presented as essential reconnaissance on the positioning of SAM and SAF positions in 
Lebanon which electronic intelligence had previously spotted. The F14s came under 
fire from Syrian anti-aircraft defences which, in turn, resulted in an immediate US 
counterattack on SAF positions in East Beirut on 4 December. Drew Middleton 
argues that these reconnaissance flights were purposefully directed at drawing Syrian 
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fire on US aircraft to create a legitimate self-defence pretext for the planned US strike 
on 4 December.165 The Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance Pod (TARP) missions 
continued throughout December 1983, resulting in the USMNF troops remaining on 
high alert, ‘anticipating a possible bombardment from Syrian backed militiamen 
because of the over flights.’166  
 The US attempts to provoke Syria into an offensive had negative 
consequences for the other MNFII partners. British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe 
believed that there was no longer a relationship or link between the MNFII partners.167 
Khaddam told Ivor Lucas, British Ambassador to Syria, that, due to the US 
provocation, the MNFII’s full withdrawal was now a primary condition if Syria were 
to consider the SAF’s withdrawal.168  
 Rumsfeld’s meeting with the three other MNFII participants on 9 December 
produced a number of clear outcomes. The European partners believed that 
the gap between the US posture in Lebanon and that of the three European 
MNFII contributors has widened. The US have shown that they are prepared 
to interpret their right to self-defense more widely and more vigorously than 
we believe to be justified.169  
 
The French and Italians wanted to leave Lebanon and the British believed that this 
would be more likely if the French ‘decoupled’ their contingent from the Americans 
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and made the Italians and British choose between the two sides.170 As a result, 
Cheysson proposed that individual contracts for each MNF contingent should be 
agreed with Gemayel instead of considering the MNFII as united.171  
 Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad wrote to British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher noting the seriousness of the US military escalation where Asad called the 
TARP provocations US ‘air raids.’ Asad claimed that, while the US had entered 
Lebanon under the pretext of peace, ‘what we fear is that the region has come to be on 
the brink of another Vietnam.’172 On 12 December the bombing of the US Embassy in 
Kuwait was linked directly to US involvement in the Iran/Iraq war. The Iraqi Shi’a 
Ḥizb al-Dawa al-Islamiyya was suspected of the attacks and, while this event was not 
directly related to the Lebanon conflict, it was directly relevant to the administration’s 
broader regional foreign policy. Similarly, as Farber argues, the Reagan 
Administration inherited a US-Iranian context characterised by Carter’s soft handed 
and ineffective ‘dickering.’173 Carter had not been strong in his handling of the Iranian 
hostage crisis which signalled a growing Iranian-sponsored anti-American Islamic 
opposition. However by December 1983 the Reagan Administration maintained that 
they did not want to be caught out as Carter had been and began to realize the 
emergent threat of non-State Islamic militants, particularly those supported by Iran. 
While too late to avoid the Marine Barracks Bombing, the Administration finally 
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understood that future attacks on the US could only be avoided with an expeditious 
ending to the Lebanon intervention.174 
 In order to appear resolute in the face of these threats, Rumsfeld proposed ‘a 
strategy of ‘leaning somewhat forward.’175 Thus, by 14 December, the administration 
resumed its military campaign against Syria, which allowed the US to appear to be 
moving forward rather than retreating.  This strategy was more about developing the 
image of the US’ continued backing of a sustainable ceasefire than was the reality 
under the Reagan Administration. Carefully-orchestrated public visits by US 
Generals, CENTCOM Commanders and increased public training cooperation 
between the LAF and US Military was all geared at forcing Syria to enter into 
negotiations out of fear of a near-term offensive or direct conflict with the US.176  
 Yet again, this policy failed to win support from Weinberger and Vessey, who 
loudly voiced their objections to the provocative move. They believed that the 
continual changes in military rules of engagement now obliged the US to pursue 
military missions even though the ambiguity of the self-defence polices and broken 
chain of command ultimately led to US personnel losses. Weinberger believed that 
further addenda to the rules of engagement would lead to the US being ambiguously 
placed again on the frontline of the Syrian/Lebanese factional militias. He stated:  
Beirut was an absolutely inevitable outcome of doing what we did, of putting 
troops in with no mission that could be carried out. There was no agreement 
on either side of the pullback. You didn't need a buffer force. There's nothing 
more dangerous than in the middle of a furious prize-fight, inserting a referee 
in range of both the fighters, both the contestants. That's what we did.177 
                                                
174 James Harper, ‘The Middle East, Oil and the Third World’, in John Carroll & George 
Herring, eds., Modern American Diplomacy, (Oxford: SR Books, 2004), p.259. 
175 Cable from Rumsfeld to McFarlane, [Illustrative initiatives which could get the attention 
of Syria, as an aid in the negotiation process], 10:25am 14 December 1983, Cable #270331, 
Rumsfeld Middle East Mission Vol. 1 File, Box 45, Executive Secretariat Records: NSC 
Country Series, RRPL, p.2. 
176 ibid. pp.2-4. 
177 ‘Interview with Caspar Weinberger’, Frontline, PBS News, September 2001. 
 260 
While recognizing the opposition within the Administration, Shultz, Casey and US 
Ambassador to the UN Jeanne Kirkpatrick sponsored the NSDD117, which was duly 
signed and issued by Reagan. It is less clear what direct role Reagan played in this 
policy directive, although it is apparent that Shultz’s influence over the president in 
the lead-up to NSDD117 and Reagan’s reference to ‘contentious staff’ (Weinberger 
and Vessey) led to a victory for the Shultz bloc.178 Weinberger believed that the 
MNFII was too weak to overpower the Syrians or Shi’a militias and that, through the 
continual US provocation, they had been turned into the MNFII’s key enemies. He 
argued that taking sides was not part of the US mission and that the vigorous self-
defence would not have been required if the US presence in Lebanon had been 
defined, limited and withdrawn.179 
 A letter from Robert Byrd, President pro tempore of the US Senate, ordered 
Reagan to prepare an accountability report on the MNFII, as stipulated by Joint 
Senate Resolution 190. Byrd stressed concerns that the US contingent was still 
costing more than the other MNFII partners. While France and Italy had secured long-
term loans and credit arrangements with Lebanon, the US was continuing to send over 
$150 million in economic aid to Gemayel, which was not expected to be repaid. 
Reagan’s first accountability report was submitted on 14 December 1983 and failed to 
convince the US Congress that the MNFII could achieve any of its original objectives. 
Shultz argued that, as Israel and Lebanon requested the continued MNFII presence, it 
was vital to prove to the US Congress that significant milestones and 
accomplishments could be reached within a month (and then request a further 90-day 
extension). It was important to avoid an order for immediate withdrawal until both 
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Reagan and Shultz had maximized the remaining opportunities of the situation in 
Lebanon.180 Shultz saw these opportunities as:  
i. Security of Israel and moderate Arab States, ii. Balance of regional power in 
factor of those advocating resolution of core issues and continued perception 
that Washington is only address for the objective, iii. Economic access of US 
and allies especially to oil and gas, iv. containment of Soviet influence and 
prevention of further penetration.181  
 
Shultz therefore stressed that the ‘factors to exploit’182 in relation to US success 
included:  
A Lebanese army of growing strength, US-Israeli-Lebanese cooperation, Syria 
now in direct dialogue with GOL and wants to maintain dialogue with US, 
Gradual coalescence of a moderate Arab bloc with US backing.183  
 
Reagan presented the case to congress that the MNFII and US training had 
strengthened the LAF and that the US had ultimately protected the Gemayel 
government. However, Reagan’s Congressional report did little to underline how the 
US could extricate itself from the Lebanese crisis other than to state that the decision 
to evacuate US troops should only be made once all foreign forces had been 
withdrawn and a consensus had been reached between all of the Lebanese leaders. 
 
The seeds of dissent: the European partners question Washington 
Allegedly, USCINCEUR General Paul Kelley leaked that a US withdrawal was 
imminent and full MNFII withdrawal would occur within the first few months of 
1984. General Kelley denied that he made these claims or that any member of his 
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team had leaked the details to the New York Times. Rumsfeld believed that any 
public leaks would lead to the regional leaders and MNFII partners thinking that the 
US was ‘“leaning backward” rather than “forward.”’184 Rumsfeld stressed to the 
National Security Council that ‘regional and MNF leaders remain convinced of US 
steadfastness in Beirut.’185  
 However, Italian Defense Minister Giovanni Spadolini announced, on 21 
December 1983, that Italy’s intention was to reduce and ultimately withdraw its 
troops from Lebanon.186 On the same day, Jihad al-Islami struck again with a 700kg 
explosive car bomb at the Kata’eb Offices in Beirut, next to the French MNFII 
Headquarters.  While the explosion did not incur great French losses and was not seen 
as a direct attack on the FRMNF, the guerrilla attack did little to comfort the French 
or Italian MNFII contingents.187 Recognizing the divergence in the MNFII partners’ 
positions, Rumsfeld advised that a unified statement be communicated, stressing that 
the security agreement was being obstructed exclusively by Syrian aggression and 
Iranian/Syrian terrorism. The demarche would reiterate a public statement of 
commitment and unity between the MNFII partners while allowing all parties to ‘talk 
seriously about the future of the MNF in private.’188  
 On 21 December 1983, Rumsfeld advised NSC Secretary McFarlane that 
pressure should be placed on the French to adopt a more ‘aggressive defense.’ 
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Rumsfeld, predicting British disinterest and ‘skittishness’ in regards to the MNFII, 
saw an immediate handover to the UN as the only facing-saving strategy available.189 
British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe warned the US that their attempts to mask 
the US military operations as “robust self-defense” had not fooled anyone.190 The 
whole of the British Parliament opposed the US policy and this unified dissent was 
openly communicated to Shultz.191  
 Mitterrand, meanwhile, believed that an MNFII handover to UNIFIL and 
thereby a strengthening of UNIFIL’s military capabilities was the only way to shape 
the MNFII’s withdrawal as a ‘departure’ rather than a ‘defeat.’192 UNIFIL, however, 
was seeking to reduce the size of its force significantly in the aftermath of the 
Barracks bombings. If the MNFII were to hand over to the UN peacekeeping force, 
then it would require Israel’s agreement.  Considering the historic strain between the 
IDF and UNIFIL, it was ‘inconceivable’ that Israel would accept UNIFIL 
monitoring.193  
 UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) Officer Rune Wrangdahl 
appealed to Under-Secretary General Urquhart on 12 December 1983, indicating that 
Lebanon’s political situation was regarded as impossible while the US continued to 
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block a UN transition.194 Shultz was reluctant to support an immediate MNFII to UN 
handover and therefore advised that the MNFII partners should ‘hang in there for a 
while longer’ providing time for the US Administration to work out the details of its 
exit strategy.195 The British and French were prepared to go against the Americans, 
arguing that their ‘divergence from the Americans’ was a result of not wanting to be 
‘involved in some anti-Syrian action or hopeless efforts to extend the authority of a 
government that is rapidly becoming a purely Christian faction.’196  
 During a meeting with Mitterrand, Thatcher stated that she felt that the MNFII 
mission had transformed from one of establishing reconciliation into a US/Israeli war 
against Syria. Mitterrand agreed, and believed that the humanitarian mission under the 
MNFI was now a distant memory; it now looked like an anti-Arab, pro-Christian 
mission. The French President’s main concern was how to leave with ‘dignity.’ 
Thatcher believed that the MNFII mission was an outright failure. While neither 
European leader wanted Syria to remain, they felt it was the lesser of two evils than 
having the current war raging between the US and Syria.197 Both leaders were 
concerned that their relations with the Arabs were being diminished by the US.198 In 
an angry letter from Asad to Thatcher, the Syrian President attacked the US mission 
in Lebanon for being exclusively anti-Syrian. To minimize the UK’s ties to US 
activities in Lebanon, Thatcher stated that she was pleased that the disagreements 
between Syria and the US could now have a channel for discussions through the 
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upcoming Rumsfeld talks in early 1984. However, she added that it was not the UK’s 
intention or policy to become involved in Lebanon’s internal affairs, including Syria’s 
occupation or claims.199 In a meeting between the British Ambassador to the European 
Community, Sir Michael Butler, and French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, the 
French stated that they were going to return over a quarter of their MNFII troops to 
UNIFIL as they felt it was now time to ‘start reshuffling.’ Cheysson was also adamant 
that he did not ‘wish to be seen to be too close to the US’ especially if further attacks 
against MNFII positions were being planned.200	  	  	   On 17 December 1983, the Italian Chief of Defence Staff, Lamberto 
Bartolucci, wrote to Sir Edwin Bramall, stating that the Italian MNF contingent would 
be reduced significantly by January 1984 and that, while this was not to be announced 
to the US yet, the Italians felt that the US’ lack of cooperation amounted to a 
breakdown in the MNFII’s efficacy, and so they viewed ‘the refusal of the US 
Ambassador in Syria to say anything to his MNF colleagues increased the argument 
for maintaining direct contact with the American protagonists.’201  Similarly, in a 
meeting on 14 December 1983 at No. 10 Downing St, Gemayel informed Thatcher 
that the May 17th Agreement was unworkable and that he would require Syrian input 
for any solution if Walid Jumblatt, Rashid Karame and former President Suleiman 
Franjieh were to participate in any Gemayel-led talks.202 
                                                
199  Letter from Thatcher to Asad, [Lebanon], 19 December 1983, Relations/Internal Situation 
File, Lebanon Folder, PREM19/1077, UKNA, pp.1-2.  
200 Telegram from Butler to FCO, [Discussions with Cheysson on the Lebanon/MNF], 
2:40pm 19 December 1983, #4543, Relations/Internal Situation File, Lebanon Folder, 
PREM19/1077, UKNA, pp.1-2.  
201 Telegram from Bridges to FCO, [Italy/Lebanon], 11:10am 17 December 1983, #688, 
Relations/Internal Situation 4 Dec 1983- 30 Dec 1983 File, Lebanon Folder, PREM 19/1077, 
UKNA, p.1.  
202 Memorandum [Thatcher and Gemayel at No. 10 Downing Street], 12:15pm 14 December 
1983, Relations/Internal Situation 4 Dec 1983- 30 Dec 1983 File, Lebanon Folder, PREM 
19/1077, UKNA, pp.1-4.  
 266 
Creating an environment to leave 
 
Shultz’s policy proposals, namely the ‘National Program’ and ‘National 
Reconciliation’ were, arguably, the first tangible evidence that Reagan’s inner circle 
had accepted that the MNFII’s near-term withdrawal was inevitable. 203   The 
documents’ terms were careless and unrealistic but, if implemented, provided a 
possible channel for withdrawal. Shultz’s proposed program was dependant on the 
LAF’s rapid modernization and also demanded that Israel should publicly state their 
support for a full withdrawal. Most radically, Shultz advised that Gemayel should 
appoint a Syrian-backed Prime Minister, while urging Israel to take the lead in 
Lebanon ‘in exploring new formulas.’ The policies also stated that a full cancellation 
of the May 17th Agreement would be supported if targeted bombing of Syrian 
positions in Lebanon was undertaken immediately, as ‘this would confirm to Syrians 
that the US will not be pushed around.’204  
 While further aggression against Syria was considered a face-saving strategy, 
it would almost certainly harm any remaining congressional support for the USMNF. 
Shultz stated that the US would put the MNFII occupied territories into the hands of 
the LAF rather than UNIFIL, whether or not the LAF was prepared to expand further 
outside Beirut. The political negotiations were to be handed over to Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia. As Prince Saud al-Faisal called on Gemayel to construct a unity government 
for national reconciliation, including anti-Gemayel factions, the Saudi Arabian 
delegation began to develop an eight-point security plan for Lebanon.205  
 Overall, Shultz’s plan was based on two major changes; namely, the 
abrogation of the May 17th Agreement in order to appease Syria and the MNFII’s 
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removal. Cancelling the May 17th Agreement provided key evidence that Shultz saw 
the US mission in Lebanon as futile. Furthermore, the Reagan Administration was 
aware, by 28 December 1983, that allowing Saudi Arabia to spearhead the 
negotiations between Israel, Syria, the Gemayel government and the Lebanese 
factions would mean a full reversal of US policy during the previous 18 months. 
Irrespective of this, the US had little option but to allow the handover to take place.206  
 By the end of December 1983, the Reagan Administration was pursuing 
numerous conflicting policies that appeared to solidify US military commitment in 
Lebanon but, at the same time, prepare the diplomatic platform for a near-term 
withdrawal.207 It is also clear that, by 28 December 1983, the Administration had little 
medium- or long-term vision for US intervention in Lebanon.208 This loss of vision 
was as much due to the divisions that had developed within the US administration as 
to the pressure from the US Congress for Reagan to be held accountable for US 
losses. While no official statement was made by the administration to confirm 
USMNF withdrawal in 1983, the possibility that the US would remain in Lebanon 
had faded. Without unconditional funding for the USMNF and with the growing 
domestic pressure to withdraw, there was little room for the MNFII to continue its 
mission. 
 
Conclusion 
The US recognized that ‘by the end of September 1983, the situation in Lebanon had 
changed to the extent that not one of the initial conditions upon which the mission 
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statement was premised was still valid.’209 In contrast, it has been argued here that the 
true political landscape, on which these initial conditions were premised, was never 
accurately gauged. The US became involved in a volatile context, which it could not 
control and the MNFII as a result was pushed further into the depths of the conflict 
without regard for the internal sectarian or factional complexities that characterized 
Lebanon. However tragic, the Marine Barracks bombing was an inevitable product of 
this naivety. The Reagan Administration’s inability to assess the constantly-changing 
conditions impacted on the US presence, as well as the significant shifts in US 
engagement, ultimately led to the Marine Barracks bombing on 23 October 1983. 210  
 For Washington’s decision-makers, the Marine Barracks bombing had a far 
greater impact than the loss of the 241 US lives. The attack represented two key, 
closely-interconnected issues. First, it underlined US vulnerability to acts of terrorism 
whereby the bombings represented the largest assault on US military personnel since 
World War Two, and certainly the largest ever terrorist attack against the US at that 
time. This highlighted not only the US’ military susceptibility to unpredictable, 
extremist attacks but also its failure to acknowledge the potential threat of the rising 
anti-American Islamic movement in the Middle East’s strength and intent. As was the 
case with the Carter Administration, the US demonstrated that it still did not have a 
handle on how to deal with the radical Islamic opposition sponsored by Iran. By 
October 1983, Lebanon represented the frontline of this crusade against the US and 
the USMNF was the most accessible and exposed target. While the US believed that 
the attack was spiritually and financially sponsored by Iran and Syria, the guerrilla 
strategy employed by the militants meant that it could not retaliate with a 
conventional response. The implication of this for the Reagan Administration meant 
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that the US was unable to guarantee its own security in the region and there was a 
high probability of further attacks if the MNFII and US troops remained in Lebanon.  
 Second, the Beirut bombing demonstrated how the anti-US hostility was 
deepened by the administration’s aggressive military actions at the Battle of Souk el 
Gharb and misreading of the internal Lebanese militias. The US rules of engagement 
and the ‘aggressive self defense’ employed during September 1983 remained largely 
unrestricted in the hands of Shultz and Reagan. While quiet stirrings in Washington 
throughout 1983 challenged Shultz’s use of military force, US Congress showed tacit 
support for the MNFII through sanctioning the force’s extended deployment and rules 
of engagement. The Department of Defense Commission Report and the Senate 
Armed Services Committee inquiry both acknowledged the MNFII’s operations’ 
ambiguity in Lebanon. The US military policy’s escalation was criticized, and 
illustrated the disconnection between the White House and the MNFII’s initial 
mission. 
 The 23 October attack struck at the heart of US credibility, forcing the US to 
face up to the realities of the Lebanese conflict and the future MNFII deployment. 
However, Reagan and Shultz remained fervent supporters of the MNFII (as well as 
the US intervention more broadly) and were not likely to admit that the October 23 
bombing represented a failure for the US in Lebanon. As such, by the end of October 
1983, US policy decisions in Lebanon can best be seen as falling under a neoclassical 
realist interpretation rather than the neo-conservatism that is often attributed to 
Reagan’s Cold War foreign policy.211 That is, the policies drawn up by the Shultz bloc 
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in the White House focused on protecting the Regan Administration’s credibility 
internationally.  
 While Shultz’s belief in the ‘use of military force’ drew the US into the 
invasion of Grenada, a victorious MNFII was needed to support the argument that 
military force was the most appropriate vehicle for the Reagan Administration’s 
foreign policy.  
 However, as the administration extended support for Israel and the friendly 
Arab states, it represented cracks in the US’ commitment to the Gemayel government. 
While NSDD111 and NSDD117 implied a renewed US military resolve, the 
directives also demonstrated the Reagan Administration’s desire to appear resilient 
while concurrently searching for a face-saving exit. The question was not whether or 
not the MNFII would be leaving the shores of Lebanon but how the withdrawal would 
be structured in order to minimize the potential fall-out for the Reagan 
Administration. Summing up the sentiments of all MNFII partners, British Diplomat 
Sir Andrew Palmer stated, ‘there will be no “Feux de Joie” here to usher in 1984.’212 
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Chapter 7 
Leaving through the back door: The final days of the US 
intervention in Lebanon 
Multinational Force II, Phase Four (27 December 1983 to 21 March 1984) 
 
The enduring public memory of the Marine Barracks bombing and the Department of 
Defense’s subsequent damning report threatened the MNFII’s deployment and left the 
US mission in Lebanon in doubt. Unsurprisingly, the US public and congressional 
opponents expected that the MNFII’s withdrawal would be announced, by President 
Reagan, by the end of 1983. Instead, on 27 December, the president announced that 
he would take personal blame for all of the faults listed in the report and any failures 
of the US intervention in Lebanon.  
I do not believe, therefore, that the local commanders on the ground, men who 
have already suffered quite enough, should be punished for not fully 
comprehending the nature of today's terrorist threat. If there is to be blame, it 
properly rests here in this Office and with this President. And I accept 
responsibility for the bad as well as the good. 1 
 
Reagan himself had not given up hope of US success in Lebanon and further 
instructed the USMNF contingent actively to defend their position in Beirut militarily, 
giving no sign that the Reagan Administration’s resolve to remain in Lebanon was 
weakening.2 There was a dichotomy between the administration’s public façade and 
the ongoing internal machinations that were quietly working to salvage some 
remaining credibility from the Lebanese situation. Phase Four of the MNFII, from 27 
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December 1983 to 21 March 1984, was characterized by backroom dealings and 
negotiations between the Reagan Administration, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel 
and Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad with the purpose of reaching a diplomatic 
compromise that would allow the US to exit quietly from the Lebanese conflict. 
Although a withdrawal had been considered many times throughout the MNFII’s 
deployment, it was now recognised that Reagan and Secretary of State George 
Shultz’s goal of achieving political credibility through perseverance, by keeping US 
troops in Lebanon was no longer possible.3 Abou Diab argues that four factors led to 
the MNFII withdrawal: namely, the Lebanese system’s total collapse after 6 February 
1984; the ambiguity of US policy; the spilt between the Europeans and Americans; 
and the increased Syrian influence over the decision to abrogate the May 17th 
Agreement.4  
 The credibility that had been so preciously sought by Reagan to demonstrate 
his strength as a peacemaker was now instead being pursued through a negotiated 
withdrawal. The threat of fatal attacks against the US had increased since September 
1983 and Reagan could not afford another catastrophic loss of American lives, 
particularly as the presidential elections loomed in November 1984. The US position 
had fallen into an unsustainable defensive spiral, and imminent withdrawal was now 
firmly the administration’s goal.5 The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) ‘Strategy 
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for US Actions in Lebanon’ outlined the US situation in Lebanon, exemplifying the 
key factors influencing US decision-making in this final phase:  
i. No player willing to move away from military actions or options, ii. only 
player we want to influence is Syria, iii. Syria is a political fact of life - must 
be treated with respect and not disdain, iv. US must at least talk with the 
Syrians, v. Lebanon is impotent, vi. Israel is down South and does not want to 
be involved, vii. Soviet problem is the potential of a greater Syria, viii. US 
must respond to terrorist attacks by covert or overt means regardless of other 
arrangements with Syria.6 
 
Facing the possibility of further congressional petitions and the increased threat of 
attacks on US Marines in Lebanon, internal discussions in the Reagan Administration 
conceded that USMNF withdrawal was inevitable. However, Reagan and Shultz 
remained determined to lessen the withdrawal’s impact on the Administration’s 
credibility by once again focusing on Syria. This time, the US was not simply intent 
on curbing Syrian military aggression but also on finding a working solution to 
minimizing Syrian participation. Reagan subsequently sent Middle East Envoy 
Donald Rumsfeld to discuss Lebanon with the Syrian leadership in an attempt to 
reduce the perception that the US was being chased out by Asad.7 
 This chapter examines the dramatic reversal in US policy from January to 
March 1984, which was undertaken to establish the foundations for a military and 
political environment that would be conducive for a US withdrawal. While the US 
refused to show its weakening hand to Gemayel and Asad, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Shultz were working to create an 
opportunity for an expeditious withdrawal. The reluctant but pervading culture of 
acceptance within the Reagan Administration meant that the momentum toward 
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withdrawal was unstoppable. This chapter argues that, by January 1984, even though 
there was no public announcement, the Reagan Administration had already decided 
that it would withdraw the USMNF within three months. It further argues that the US 
was no longer concerned with Lebanese stability, which it saw as facing 
insurmountable political and military challenges. US policy’s initial peacekeeping 
vision of ensuring the Lebanese government’s sovereignty and foreign forces’ 
removal had been replaced with an acceptance of a Syrian-dominated Lebanon 
throughout the MNFII’s final days. 
 
The curtain call 
The 30 December 1983 Memorandum entitled ‘Next Steps on Lebanon’ from 
Weinberger to Reagan illustrates that the key decision-making factions within the 
Reagan Administration were resigned to the fact that the MNFII would be dissolved 
by February 1984.8 Taking into account the DOD Report’s recommendations and the 
conflict in Lebanon’s critical nature, Weinberger advised Reagan that an immediate, 
month-long withdrawal and redeployment of all US troops aboard the Marine 
Amphibious Unit (MAU) would mitigate any further risk to American lives and still 
allow the Naval gunships to be integrally involved in the specific targeting of enemy 
positions:  
Placing our forces offshore would allow us to fulfill our commitment and 
support our basic objectives, and at the same time maintain public and 
congressional support for the job we are doing in Lebanon.9 
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Weinberger also highlighted that Syria had restrained from attacking the US Tactical 
Air Reconnaissance Pod (TARPS) and MNFII positions because Asad and Syria’s 
Foreign Affairs Minister, Abdul Halim Khaddam, believed that the Reagan 
Administration was merely bluffing and would soon leave Lebanon.10 It was therefore 
argued that any attempt to illustrate US military resolve was a waste of time.  
 Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported to Shultz that the other 
MNFII partners were going to reduce their force size, which would leave the US with 
the largest contingent by February 1984. To counter this, Shultz requested that French 
and Italian Commanders should continue their military presence throughout February 
and March, arguing that it would demonstrate consensus between the partners if the 
three Western nations decided to withdraw simultaneously.11 However, the first step 
required for this withdrawal to occur was to convince Gemayel to agree that the 
MNFII was no longer needed in Lebanon. There were two aspects to this. First, by 
December 1983 Gemayel realized that the US was in fact actively provoking Syria 
through the TARP missions rather than monitoring the SAF, as claimed. Second, he 
believed that it was vital to detach himself from Washington if he were to convince 
the other factions to attend the National Reconciliation Talks in Lausanne in March.12  
 While it was inconceivable that Gemayel would have accepted the US 
withdrawal throughout 1983, the conditions by January 1984 were such that the 
president realized that he had to find a more viable way to keep his government 
together. Having been seen as Washington’s puppet throughout 1983, Gemayel 
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acknowledged that the full abrogation of the May 17th Agreement was the only way 
for his government to begin unity talks.13 The agreement could not be cancelled while 
the US was deployed in Lebanon, as such a move would humiliate the US who had 
sponsored and mediated the agreement.14 The JCS offered Gemayel a $1 billion 
modernization program by equipping 10 LAF brigades with US tanks and armored 
personnel carriers. As such, the JCS recommended to Shultz that a complete handover 
should take place by the end of February and that the USMNF should be removed 
from Lebanon now that the LAF had been strengthened.15 With both Weinberger and 
JCS Chairman John Vessey’s strong advice weighing down on Reagan and Shultz, the 
MNFII’s final days were imminent.  
 While it is clear that Reagan had accepted the USMNF’s eventual withdrawal 
from Lebanon, he was furious that this had been forced upon him. During a National 
Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting, he commented:  
I have to say I am pretty mad about the way we have backed into a situation so 
that we are reduced to considering the redeployment of our forces in Lebanon 
in response to the public debate stimulated by leaks from within our 
government.16  
 
The documents that Reagan referred to included the DOD Report and General John 
Kelley’s response to it, which were leaked to the media before being seen by the 
president. Regardless of the leak, Reagan could not have controlled the report’s 
eventual release and the subsequent effects that its findings had on the 
Administration’s approval ratings. It was clear that Reagan still supported the 
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MNFII’s continued commitment to Lebanon, hoping for the successful completion of 
the force’s mission.17 The Maritime Forces report believed that Reagan’s view on 
Lebanon was ‘tied to the specific regime of Gemayel and wants to see the regime, not 
necessarily the nation, survive.’18 The toughest obstacle to freeing up the US position 
in Lebanon was Reagan’s personal belief in the Gemayel Presidency and the hope that 
there was some way to continue US support.  
 However, Gemayel had also been leading the US on with his promises of an 
impending security agreement. This demonstrated that the US had learnt nothing from 
Israel’s handling of Gemayel during the May 17th Agreement. When Lebanese 
Ambassador to the US Abdullah Bouhabib met with the State Department on 6 
January, the conversation focused entirely on the upcoming security arrangement 
proposed by Gemayel and the necessity for MNFII participation to secure and 
stabilize the areas which were not under LAF control.19 The security plan, which was 
not announced until 16 February 1984, was intended to commit the Gemayel 
government to a national unity government and an internal security arrangement with 
the numerous militias. Regan did not see how, without considerable MNFII presence, 
this would be possible while the LAF was struggling to maintain the key strategic 
areas around Beirut. As a result, the president drafted a number of possible scenarios 
that would support a continued USMNF mission, including moving the US bases to 
the Christian stronghold of Damour (south of Beirut), ignoring the May 17th 
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Agreement, mobilizing the Turkish military to continue pressure on Syria and 
returning UNIFIL to lead and manage the Palestinian refugee camps.20 None of these 
options, apart from strengthening the UNIFIL, were considered by congress or the 
other MNFII partners.  
 When, on 3 January 1984, Gemayel requested that the MNFII should take up 
position where the LAF was weakest, namely Beirut and Mt Lebanon, it illustrated 
that both Gemayel and the LAF lacked the political or military strength to control the 
Lebanese-held territories. The Reagan Administration now conceded that Gemayel 
was using the MNFII as a buffer to tilt the internal security situation in his favor and 
hence controlling the opposing Lebanese factions. If Gemayel were unwilling to 
engage these communal groups, then there could be no long-term resolution to the 
conflict.21   
 On 4 January British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote to the UN 
Secretary General stating that the British government was resolute about resuming a 
more coordinated relationship with the UN. This action signaled the beginning of the 
two-month disagreement between the US and the other MNFII partners, who were 
now deciding when, rather than if, to withdraw from Lebanon.	  On 7 January, the 
French Deputy Director of the Quai D’Orsay and former French Ambassador to the 
US, Ernest Lucet, stated that he was pleased that Britain had ‘nailed its colours to this 
mast’ over finding a UN rather than US-led solution.22 While French, British and 
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Italian movement back toward the UN was not a sign of imminent withdrawal, it did 
place pressure on the US to further develop their own plans for a partial or 
comprehensive withdrawal.23 
 On 4 January 1984, the International Public Policy Research Corporation 
(IPPRC) advised the NSC that only two viable options now existed in relation to the 
US position in Lebanon. The first recommended a full withdrawal within 90 days 
without the establishment of a replacement UN or international peacekeeping force, 
on the basis that ‘prospects for national reconciliation and the formation of a 
government of national unity are nonexistent and that indefinite de facto partition of 
Lebanon is inevitable.’24 The second option, deemed a ‘non-starter’, included a partial 
withdrawal from Lebanon and the creation of another independent international 
peacekeeping force. The argument made for the first option stated that the positive 
effect that a withdrawal would have on public and congressional opinion far 
outweighed the loss of credibility due to an apparent admission of failure in 
Lebanon.25 ‘The short-term consequences in Lebanon, of course, are likely to be 
negative, but the longer-term outcome will hardly be catastrophic.’26  
 Moreover, an alert issued by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on ‘The 
Terrorist Threat to US Personnel in Beirut’ on 12 January outlined the extreme threat 
faced by US marines and MNFII positions in Lebanon. It listed 1,000 possible Shi’a 
Lebanese radicals and groups that were continuing to threaten US security in order to 
replace ‘the Christian-dominated Lebanese Government with an Iran-style Islamic 
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republic.’ 27  The CIA believed that the Marine Barracks bombing had further 
motivated certain groups to target the US and that only a full withdrawal could 
mitigate further critical security threats.   
 The conditions now surrounding the US troops in Lebanon were not 
conducive to Reagan’s attempts to remain resilient. The Reagan Administration knew 
that congressional approval of further funding even for a US-sponsored UN 
peacekeeping force would prove difficult, given that the MNFII had lost its neutrality. 
National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane advised the president that, as Congress 
would reassemble on 23 January 1984, decisions regarding MNFII redeployment 
needed immediate action because the US intervention was tabled as Congress’s first 
priority.28 McFarlane believed that the sponsor of the MNF in Lebanon Resolution, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives Tip O’Neil, was reconsidering his support 
for the 18-month extension granted to the USMNF. This would result in the 
Resolution collapsing and an immediate forced withdrawal of US troops.29  
   
The Rumsfeld Mission Part One: Conversations with Asad 
On 13 January 1984, in a meeting with Middle East Envoy Donald Rumsfeld, Syrian 
President Hafiz al-Asad stated that Syria had not become a proxy regime for its 
‘friends and brothers,’ the Soviet Union, in order to dispel any possible US concerns 
that Lebanon would be vulnerable to full Soviet interference without the MNFII’s 
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presence.30 However, by 1984, the US was unconcerned about Soviet involvement in 
Lebanon, accepting that Soviet sponsorship of the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) had 
dissipated due to the Soviet belief that Syria had been overactive in its involvement in 
the war. The NSC ‘Non-Paper: Next Steps on Lebanon’ stated that ‘the Soviets are 
urging caution on Syria.’31 
We sometimes underestimate the fears that the Soviet Union must have 
because of the very large U.S. military buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean 
and their own vulnerabilities in the context of a Syrian war.32  
 
Intelligence on 4 January from Lebanese Foreign Minister Salem’s meeting with 
Soviet Ambassador Soldatov about the growing instability showed that the Soviets 
favored a ‘substantially scaled-down Syrian presence in Lebanon’ and that Moscow 
now believed that an MNFII withdrawal would lead to further destabilization.33 The 
Soviets also made it clear that they would not oppose an enlarged UN force beyond 
the current UNIFIL-mandated territories, which constituted a complete policy reversal 
compared with Moscow’s initial protests.34 
 Salem added that, should the US-backed May 17th Agreement not be 
imminently successful in removing the foreign forces, then the Lebanese government 
would seek other arrangements in order to meet this goal. Salem requested the Soviet 
government’s assistance with the foreign forces’ removal and the implementation of 
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further security arrangements.35 However, Soldatov responded that ‘his country’s 
ability to influence the course of events in Lebanon was limited outside the 
framework of stressing his country’s support for peaceful solution and political means 
to solve all problems.’36 This clearly illustrated to the US that the Soviets had limited 
intentions of controlling or influencing Lebanon especially given Moscow’s 
awkwardness over Syria’s involvement and Andropov’s inability to influence his 
client’s decisions. Asad claimed that Syria’s main influence in Lebanon was now to 
prevent the dominance of the Kata’eb radicals, supported by Gemayel.37  
 The May 17th Agreement was the primary point of discussion between Asad 
and Rumsfeld, representing a key US policy concern.  Rumsfeld felt that ‘the 
argument that the May 17th Agreement is the main obstacle to a negotiated solution is 
illusory’, but Asad’s insistence on the agreement’s abrogation weighed on 
Washington. The Reagan Administration could not afford to have the agreement 
cancelled while still operating in Lebanon.38 Asad contested that, given the US 
pressure on Israel and Lebanon to sign the May 17th Agreement, Reagan and Shultz 
would have to accept responsibility for what the Syrian President saw as the key 
obstacle to peace between the three countries (Syria, Israel and Lebanon). Asad 
believed that only through a total abrogation of the principles on which the agreement 
was founded could sustainable peace in Lebanon be realistic, with specific reference 
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to Syria’s inclusion in any future negotiations.39 Rumsfeld retorted that the US was 
not a party to the agreement and that Gemayel could cancel it at any time. While 
obviously brushing over the considerable US role in the negotiations, Rumsfeld’s 
statement clearly indicated that the US had moved toward accepting the May 17th 
Agreement’s ultimate abrogation by Gemayel.  
 Asad continued to question Rumsfeld about US interests in Lebanon, as 
‘Lebanon had no economic, military or strategic importance for the United States.’40 
Asad saw the US intervention as merely an excuse to support Israeli objectives in the 
region and further ‘the influence of the Zionist lobby.’41 Determined to condemn 
Israel’s occupation of Lebanon, he noted that the Lebanese could not realistically 
choose a political solution while the IDF occupation continued.42 He saw the US role 
as either to align with Israel, which meant allowing Israel’s continued occupation, or 
to join Lebanon and Syria in revoking the May 17th Agreement, thereby forcing Israel 
to exit. Foreign Minister Khaddam was adamant that, regarding Israeli or Lebanese 
targets, Syria would not make any promises of a ceasefire.43 Rumsfeld conveyed 
strong requests from Washington for the Syrians to remove their forces beyond the 
MNFII’s range, as the US continued to monitor and control northern Lebanese 
airspace.44 Khaddam aggressively stated: ‘By virtue of the US-Israeli relationship, 
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particularly after the Shamir Visit to Washington, the US and Israel might attack 
Syria,’45 further adding:  
Lebanon was an Arab country and the Lebanese people were part of the Arab 
nation. There was a joint defence pact between Syria and Lebanon...Syrian 
forces were in Lebanon before the arrival of the US troops. How could Arab 
Troops be asked to withdraw from Arab territory without making the same 
request of foreign troops. The MNF troops would be safe if they returned to 
their ships.46 
 
Rumsfeld noted that these words were ‘adamant and somewhat ominous…awakening 
fears in the Administration that Syria was planning an attack on Israeli positions in 
southern Lebanon.’47  What was particularly ominous about the Asad meetings was 
that the Syrian President was wielding power knowing that the US would ultimately 
leave Lebanon. The US response to these meetings with Asad and Khaddam showed 
that it was not prepared to negotiate its military presence in Lebanon or its military 
pressure on Syria until the time came to withdraw. Khaddam protested that the US Air 
Force’s increased TARP Missions over northern Lebanon and in Syrian airspace 
illustrated US unwillingness to reach a diplomatic or military compromise.  Rumsfeld 
responded that these missions were intended to ensure the USMNF forces’ safety in 
Lebanon, police the infiltration and resupply of enemy forces with equipment and 
ammunition, both through Syria and in areas outside Syrian control.48 However, while 
Rumsfeld argued that the US was taking its military decision exclusively in order to 
protect USMNF positions, by 1984, he had failed to convey to Asad or Khaddam the 
MNFII’s purpose.49 Unsurprisingly, Khaddam told Rumsfeld on 16 January that all 
that Syria could promise was non-engagement with any US or MNFII troops, 
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provided that the TARP missions ceased and the US withdrew from Syrian-controlled 
territories.50   
 The Syrian meetings with the US in January reached a stalemate, with Asad 
and Khaddam remaining inflexible on the US TARP missions or a ceasefire with 
Israel. Rumsfeld insisted that the JCS should proceed with US reconnaissance of the 
Syrian positions as a measure to test Syrian reactions, advising that, once he had left 
Syria, the US should fly TARP missions over Syrian territories to push Syria’s 
resolve to defend itself ‘even though they [Syria] rejected this approach’51 and ‘if 
Syria fires at the aircraft or as a consequence against the MNF, US be fully prepared 
for vigorous response according to the rules of engagement.’52 Rumsfeld believed that 
baiting the Syrians would test their dogmatic, anti-US rhetoric, ultimately proving to 
Washington whether or not Syria posed the degree of threat predicted. Accordingly, 
British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe stated that he distrusted Rumsfeld’s 
statements in February, arguing that ‘Rumsfeld has not been as explicit with the 
Syrians as his remarks to us suggest.’53 Reagan stated that these anti-Syrian actions 
were taken because ‘I have a deep distrust of the Syrians in all this business.’54 
Meanwhile as the provocation continued, Khaddam was quoted as telling Lebanese 
Foreign Minister Salem that ‘the US was “packing and leaving” and therefore Syria 
would simply “freeze” the situation in Lebanon.’55 
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 Even though Israel recognized that the US was ‘short of breath’, Israeli 
Defense Minister Arens and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir were adamant that they 
would have the financial and military support of Washington to remain in Lebanon 
while Asad pushed for control in Beirut. Moreover, Israel recognized that the possible 
withdrawal of the US and MNFII and Gemayel’s abrogation of the ineffective May 
17th Agreement would, in fact, provide direct justification for the IDF’s continued and 
indefinitely defined presence in southern Lebanon.  
 Rumsfeld also stated that ‘any hint of a willingness to consider replacing MNF 
with UN forces would be seen as weakness and would increase Syrian intransigence 
on basic settlement.’56 Furthermore Arens stated: 
I think it's important to realize that the ambitions of the Syrian dictator Hafez 
El Assad are really unlimited - it's not a question of having certain grievances 
or plans which, once satisfied, will put him to rest.57 
And: 
In light of the fact that, in this situation, Lebanon is incapable of fulfilling her 
international obligations and of preventing south Lebanon once again being 
turned into a terrorist base, Israel itself will determine the best ways to ensure 
its security.58 
 
Rumsfeld Mission Part Two: The European partners 
On 15 January Rumsfeld met with Howe to discuss the British short-term position on 
the MNFII, as well as the rumors circulating about Britain’s possible return to a UN 
solution. 59  The British had never officially signed the initial MNFI or MNFII 
mandates and reluctantly joined with a limited force in 1983. The British had 
                                                
56 Cable from Rumsfeld to Shultz, [Rumsfeld Mission. British Options for expanded UN role 
in Lebanon], 2:55am 15 January 1984, Cable #150259, Rumsfeld Middle East Mission Vol.1 
File, Box 45, Executive Secretariat Records: NSC Country Series, RRPL, p.2. 
57 [Interview with Defense Minister Arens on ABC Television], Israel Ministry of Defense 
Archives, Vol. 8: 1982-1984, #155, 19 February 1984. 
58 [Statement by the Prime Minister’s bureau on the Israel-Lebanon Agreement], Israel 
Ministry of Defense Archives, Vol. 8: 1982-1984, #157, 5 March 1984. 
59 [Rumsfeld Mission. British Options for expanded UN role in Lebanon], p.2. 
 287 
experienced many of the MNFII obstacles and failures that had characterized the 1983 
operations, noting the aggressive military strategy’s limited success. The Reagan 
Administration believed that British withdrawal from the MNFII in favor of the UN 
solution would strike a blow at the remaining tripartite MNFII partners’ credibility. 
Rumsfeld warned Howe that ‘present behavior is the worst of all worlds.’60 As a last 
minute concession to Rumsfeld, Howe recommended that the UK would continue to 
state that the force could be recalled to the MNFII after being redeployed in the 
UNIFIL if deemed necessary and in order to extend the remaining MNFII 
participants’ credibility.61  
 The US also wished to avoid being caught off-guard by the European MNFII 
partner which could potentially undermine the US’s image as leader of the 
peacekeeping mission.62 Only with a prearranged timeline and MNFII consensus on 
the UN solution would the US be happy to allow the other partners to retreat. This 
openness to considering the European force’s eventual withdrawal was also countered 
by US wariness that the regional Arab neighbors regarded MNFII’s ‘wavering’ as a 
sign of political and military impotence.  In a handwritten letter from Walid Jumblatt 
and Sheikh Akl (Mohamed Abou Chacra), the Druze leaders pleaded that, while the 
internal Druze and Muslim factions continued to be ‘attacked by the Kata’eb militia, 
shelled by the Lebanese Army, bombarded by the American Forces’, they would 
continue to pursue an aggressive defence policy to fight for their survival. The two 
                                                
60 ibid. 
61 Letter from Howe to Thatcher, [Lebanon], 16 February 1984, PM/84/29, p.1. 
62 ‘M. Mitterrand : je n'exposerai pas au-delà de la nécessité la vie de nos soldats au Liban’, 
Le Monde, 14 February 1984 &‘Reagan: Donnons une change a la paix au Liban’, 27 January 
1984, L’OLJ, p.1. 
 288 
men pleaded for European intervention to remove the Gemayel-Reagan alliance that 
they saw overpowering the other parties and factions in Lebanon.63  
 The US, however, was reluctant to appear to have been forced to leave by its 
MNFII partners. By mid-January, MNFII participants France and Italy, as well as the 
regional Arab States, saw US withdrawal as imminent.64 In response, the US issued a 
statement to London, Paris and Rome, insisting that ‘it is especially important now, 
more than ever, that the MNF contributors stand together.’65 Washington adamantly 
argued for extended support for Gemayel, albeit recognizing the hesitant attitude from 
Paris and Rome. The US argued that Gemayel was the most pragmatic choice of 
leader in Lebanon, especially given his aim of establishing a unity government and 
guiding the LAF against internal and external military opponents. Rumsfeld added 
that Gemayel’s leadership ability would depend on ‘external considerations’ with 
specific reference to Syria and, further, that the MNFII partners must show their 
commitment to intervening in the future if Syria attempted to overthrow Gemayel.66  
 The tense negotiations and warnings arising from the talks signaled a 
fundamental breakdown between the US and the other MNFII participants. While US 
casualties and Lebanon’s untenable situation remained the ultimate motivator for 
considering USMNF withdrawal, the split between the European and US partners in 
the MNFII was also undoubtedly placing considerable pressure on the Reagan 
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Administration to such an extent that the US decided it now had to take all diplomatic 
or military decisions alone.67 
 
Washington’s final bluff: Syria and the eight-point security plan 
Rumsfeld’s attempts to warn the MNFII partners and Syria of the US resolve to 
protect the Gemayel government met with limited success. While Shultz’s long, 
discursive cables to regional US embassies underlined the US desperation to find an 
appropriate opportunity to withdraw, Reagan and Shultz continued to oppose US 
withdrawal from Lebanon. Shultz stated: ‘the problem in Lebanon is Syria. All of the 
evidence points to Damascus.’68 Khaddam’s aggressive rhetoric and insistence on 
standing up to US actions, specifically the TARP missions concerned Shultz, who 
believed that Syrian obstinacy would not allow a ‘MNF withdrawal without damage 
to the credibility of our commitment to moderation and negotiation in the Middle 
East.’69 The US continued to regard Syria as the key obstacle to a successful 
Israeli/Lebanese ceasefire and therefore as obstructing any possibility of Israeli 
withdrawal as well.70 Shultz now felt that an immediate withdrawal or the Gemayel 
government’s collapse could strike at the heart of the US’ failed peace mediations, 
thereby leading to the MNFII’s mandate’s public failure. Shultz’s determination that 
the US must not appear to be pushed out of Lebanon was bolstered by conversations 
with regional leaders ‘in strictest confidence’, declaring: 
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President Mubarak, King Hussein and King Fahd have all privately told us in 
the recent days that any precipitous or pressured withdrawal from Lebanon 
would be disastrous. Not only for Lebanon but for the Middle East as a whole. 
They have urged us to stand fast. Gulf leaders have privately told us that 
Lebanon is a test case of western resolve in the face of aggression. Gulf 
confidence in the west would be seriously undermined by any withdrawal 
perceived as an admission of failure or weakness.’71 
 
Shultz wanted to make Asad believe that the MNFII would stay indefinitely in an 
attempt to curb Syrian domination, or at least long enough for a staged withdrawal to 
occur that would allow the Reagan Administration to buy more time to ensure that the 
LAF and US allies in the region were prepared to handle Syrian aggression in 
Lebanon. As such, Reagan determined that the USMNF rules of engagement in 
January were based on a deterrence strategy to ‘silence the sources of hostile fire’ and 
‘destroy units in Syrian controlled territory firing into territory controlled by the 
Government of Lebanon.’72  
 To curb Syrian conviction about a US near-term exit, the JCS devised a plan 
which maintained the appearance of US military presence in Lebanon while secretly 
providing the blueprint for a quick withdrawal. The US increased its shelling of 
targets in Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon through both naval gunfire and air 
support and simultaneously increased the public training programs with the LAF. This 
included increasing the counter-battery firing capabilities and accelerating and 
increasing military ammunition and weapon supplies to the LAF.73 The US wanted to 
continue pressure on the Syrian forces while it arranged its timely withdrawal. The 
US shelling of Syrian targets and increased support for the LAF continued as the JCS 
                                                
71 ibid. p.5. 
72 ibid. p.6 & Hallenbeck, ‘Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy’, p.170. 
73 Joint Chiefs of Staff Report, [Next Steps in Lebanon], 26 January 1984, CPPG Meeting 
1/31/84 Lebanon File, Box 91834, William Burns Series, RRPL, pp.1-2. 
 291 
and Weinberger were developing a timetable and strategy for a ‘phase down of US 
military personnel ashore and a plan for continuing US military presence offshore.’74 
 Despite the aggressive veneer that Shultz put on US policy in Lebanon, the 
lack of US commitment to this strategy was illustrated by the Aley Ridge issue.75 
Gemayel, wishing to defeat the strengthening Druze and Syrian militias to the west of 
Beirut, began coordinating an LAF offensive in the region. Gemayel realized that the 
LAF was both too thinly spread and suffering from massive Shi’a troop defection, and 
therefore requested US offensive support. The US response differed significantly 
compared with Gemayel’s previous request for US military support for the LAF 
during the Battle of Souk el Gharb.76 This time, the Administration advised Gemayel 
to decide on a course of action without a commitment of MNFII or US support. It was 
a test of both the US’ commitment to its recently-announced surge against the Syrian 
positions and of Gemayel’s strength in controlling the LAF. If the US demonstrated 
its support through naval gunfire and air support, Gemayel would certainly proceed 
with the offensive, possibly drawing Syria further into Lebanon. The US believed that 
there was little chance of Gemayel surviving the SAF and pro-Syrian factions on his 
own in the long-term. This would lead to a war of attrition and the Reagan 
Administration was reluctant to become embroiled any further in the Lebanese 
conflict while it was considering a withdrawal:77  
If the US becomes actively involved there is a high probability that the MNF 
will suffer casualties and create further pressure in the US to withdraw. There 
is a high probability that direct US involvement will precipitate a pull-out of 
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the MNF by the UK, at least. Failure would have potential for disintegration of 
LAF and possibly collapse of Gemayel.78 
 
The Administration’s bluff was finally called when the US failed to provide military 
support for Gemayel in the Aley Ridge Battle. The Administration’s posturing 
illustrated vulnerability and sent clear signs to Damascus and the other MNFII 
partners that US troops would be withdrawn shortly.79 Reagan, Shultz, Rumsfeld and 
the Administration knew that the MNFII partners were no longer aligned with the US 
and to stay ahead of the Europeans, on 15 January 1984, Shultz instructed all of the 
US Ambassadors in the MNFII partner countries to report on leaders’ attitudes in an 
attempt to predict when Rome, Paris and London would announce their withdrawal.80 
 On 26 January 1984, the National Security Council met to decide the ‘Next 
Steps in Lebanon’ – that would turn out to be the penultimate NSDD mandate 
concerning US troops in the Lebanese Civil War. NSDD 123 directed, almost 
exclusively, that the US intervention’s final push was to be focused on three key 
points; namely, improved LAF counter-battery capability, Lebanese control and 
training for counter-terrorism operations and increasing US supplies of munitions and 
heavy artillery.81 These were then matched with US political maneuvers and a 
sanctioned strategy for the phasing out of the MNF in Lebanon. Shultz, Weinberger 
and the JCS were left with the task of determining when, if ever, it would be 
necessary to redeploy the USMNF back to Lebanon or if the US troops would be 
indefinitely redeployed in the MAU. While the program would require substantial 
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funding, it was noted that this would be easier to get through Congress on the basis 
that it represented a near-term phase out and eventual withdrawal of direct US 
involvement.82 While the Reagan Administration believed that such a plan would suit 
Washington’s objectives, it recognized that replacing actual US personnel with 
additional training for the LAF would not necessarily suit Gemayel. For the plan to 
succeed, Rumsfeld was advised to have Gemayel formally request the MNFII 
withdraw so that Shultz and Weinberger could develop the legislation for approval by 
Congress. Despite the optimism that the Congress would approve the personnel 
withdrawal, the increase in funding for the LAF and government of Lebanon was less 
certain. If the Administration could not manage this, Shultz feared that Gemayel 
would reject the MNFII’s withdrawal and the US would have to face certain 
embarrassment or the perception of having failed in Lebanon.  
 US desperation about ‘solving US problems in Lebanon and throughout the 
region’ was clearly illustrated by Wat Cluverius, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.83 Cluverius 
recommended that the US should exert active pressure on Saudi Arabia, given that 
Saudi Prince Saud al-Faisal and Lebanese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Rafik Hariri, 
had devised the new security plan. On 6 February, a day after Lebanese Prime 
Minister Shafik al-Wazzan’s resignation, Gemayel announced his unconfirmed 
support for the eight-point plan for national reconciliation and unity talks among 
factional leaders.84 As part of this Saudi Arabian-sponsored security agreement, 
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Gemayel acknowledged the MNFII’s withdrawal and replacement by a UN-sponsored 
peacekeeping force.85 If the eight-point security plan were to be adopted, it would 
mean abrogating the May 17th Agreement and pushing for all foreign forces, including 
the MNFII, to withdraw within a 3-month timeline. The US was hesitant about 
supporting the plan because it directly undermined US efforts in 1983 to broker the 
Israel/Lebanese Agreement and possibly threatened Israel until another security deal 
was secured.	  The French and British felt that the US had made considerable mistakes 
regarding the May 17th Agreement, not least because it gave Israel a strong position 
for rejecting any further proposals.86  
 If Asad signed up to the agreement, however, this could also mean a reduction 
in Syrian forces in Lebanon which was a key obstacle to US withdrawal, as outlined 
by Reagan and Shultz. Shultz’s hesitance about supporting the security plan was 
illustrated in his communication to US Ambassadors of the MNFII partner countries, 
divulging that the Reagan Administration had evidence of Iranian and Syrian 
collusion to ‘scuttle the security agreement’ that was being prepared to handle the 
Lebanese context’s factional divisiveness.87 The French and British were shocked by 
the Syrian attempts to destabilize the negotiations around the Saudi peace plan, 
having believed that Asad would embrace the opportunity to abrogate the May 17th 
Agreement. British Ambassador to Syria, Ivor Lucas, hoped that this new plan would 
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offer Britain a way out of Lebanon.88 Similarly, the French believed that all of the 
MNFII partners and other foreign forces should leave Lebanon and that another 
solution must be sought which included Walid Jumblatt and Asad.89 
 The realities of the Lebanese conflict and possibility of finding no other 
solution meant that ‘the US wants to withdraw from Lebanon and the agreement 
provides the means to do so.’90 Shultz argued that the security agreement could allow 
him to still be seen to have achieved success in ‘political reconciliation, strengthening 
of the LAF and other GOL institutions and withdrawal of all foreign forces.’91 US 
Ambassador to Lebanon, Reginald Bartholemew, on the other hand, illustrated the 
political deadlock between Jumblatt and Gemayel that neither the US nor the security 
agreement was able to break. While Jumblatt, speaking on behalf of the Druze and 
pro-Syrian Al-Harakat al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya or Lebanese National Movement, 
signified that they were ready to adopt the proposed security plan, he would not do so 
under Gemayel’s leadership.92 As US support for Gemayel was absolute (due to the 
administration’s desperate attempts to resolve the political stalemate and withdraw), 
the peripheral Lebanese factions, such as the Druze, supported by Syria, were even 
further alienated in the lead-up to reconciliation talks.93  
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The MNF’s final days 
On 2 February Admiral John Poindexter met with the Crisis Pre-Planning Group 
(CPPG) to develop a resolution to the US/MNF and the Lebanese conflict, which 
proposed to put pressure on all factions regarding the issue of national reconciliation 
and deemed that the US must: 
(2) following full consultation with other countries present and participating in 
the Multinational Force, re-orient the United States contingent of the MNF so 
as to better demonstrate United States commitment to a unified and 
independent Lebanon which aids in reducing their exposure to hostilities, and 
(3) seeking the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the 
Beirut area.94  
 
The Memorandum from McFarlane to Shultz, Weinberger, CIA Director William 
Casey and JCS Chair, John Vessey, on 9 February, mandated that the US Marines’ 
withdrawal and redeployment would occur within 30 days. McFarlane noted that the 
analysis identifying potential obstructions to a smooth US withdrawal included: a 
widespread, anti-US terrorist campaign, a Druze assault on the Marines at Beirut 
International Airport, a dramatic increase in Israeli or Syrian forces in Lebanon, a 
full-scale civil war breaking out prior to the Marines’ redeployment or Gemayel’s 
resignation. Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, Patrick Wright, believed that, while the US would continue to support 
Gemayel, ‘it seemed unlikely in practice that he could survive as President.’95  
 Situation Reports from throughout February 1984 illustrated Lebanon’s 
deteriorating military and political situation. US intelligence predicted a massive 
attack on the LAF 4th Brigade south of Beirut. West Beirut was reportedly controlled 
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by Muslim militias who, under Harakat Amal leader Nabih Berri, were attempting to 
force Gemayel to leave office within six months.96 The British Prime Minister wrote 
to Reagan, stating that she felt that his position was now ‘difficult’ and that it had 
been clear from the outset that ‘any force used by our countries in the Lebanon should 
be clearly limited to the needs of self-defence.’97 Thatcher did not feel this had been 
so. Jumblatt informed Washington that he could no longer guarantee that Western 
forces would remain safe in Lebanon, as it was unclear whether the MNFNII was a 
peacekeeping force or a pro-Gemayel force.98  
 The US troops’ swift withdrawal was necessary to avoid becoming further 
entangled in the brewing conflict and, on 10 February, all non-military US personnel 
were evacuated under the Phase III evacuation.99 The MNFII partners were furious 
that Reagan had not consulted them but was ‘rather informing us of his decision.’100 
Similarly, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, 
stated that it was now clear that ‘the reputation of the US as an ally had suffered 
seriously in the region, particularly in Jordan and the Gulf States.’101  
 Thatcher wrote to Reagan with sage advice, stating that ‘US involvement in 
the Lebanon is much greater than ours and I am the last person to indulge in back-seat 
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driving.’102 While congratulating Shultz on his work on the agreement, she stated that 
it was no longer relevant or useful for sustainable reconciliation and so should be 
removed from any discussions on Lebanon. Specifically, Thatcher stated that the time 
had come to include Syria in any future proposal, telling Reagan, ‘I hope you will see 
your way to doing this.’103 
 While Gemayel saw the May 17th Agreement as imperative to US support in 
Lebanon, by 10 February, with the US’ impending withdrawal, he began to maneuver 
closer to Syria in order to protect his government. On 11 February 1984, the US 
received intelligence of a Syrian order to a group of leftist Palestinian militias to 
attack a US ship stationed outside Beirut. US intelligence also showed that the Soviets 
had withdrawn their ships from the area that day.104 While concerns regarding the 
Soviet influence were limited, US intelligence noted that two Soviet Military 
Assistance Groups in Damascus were relocating to the Bekaa Valley.105 Khaddam 
continued to discuss Syria’s ‘categoric objection to the May 17th Agreement.’106 The 
Syrian Foreign Minister called for the LAF to be disbanded and a grassroots ‘Arab’ 
army to be established with the assistance of Syria, the remaining pro-Syrian 
Lebanese Arab nationalists, such as the Sunni Nasserist militia, al-Mourabitun, and 
                                                
102 Letter from Thatcher to Reagan, [Lebanon] 16 February 1984, Internal Situation 
Israeli/Lebanese Hostilities File, UK-Lebanese Relations July 1979- January 1984 Folder, 
PREM 19/1297, UKNA, p.1. 
103 ibid. p.2. 
104 Situation Report, [Lebanon: Situation Report as of 120500Z Feb 84.], 5:00am, 12 
February, Lebanon File, Box 8, Crisis Management Center: NSC Records Series, RRPL  p.2. 
105 ibid. p.1; [Lebanon: Situation Report as of 0400EST 10 Feb 84.], p.1 & [Lebanon: 
Situation Report as of 110500Z Feb 84.], pp.1-2. 
106 Working Group Situation Report No. 10, [Situation as of 1700 EST 13 February 1984.], 
5:00pm, 12 February 1984, Department of State Operations Centre, Lebanon File, Box 8, 
Crisis Management Center: NSC Records Series, RRPL, pp.1-2. 
 299 
the LNM. 107  A unified anti-Kata’eb/anti-Christian army would directly threaten 
Gemayel. 
 The Lebanese President knew that he could not withstand a military attack on 
the already-weakened LAF. Gemayel accepted the Saudi Arabian eight-point plan on 
16 February, hoping to avert an SAF attack, thereby signaling his awareness that he 
no longer had the US or MNFII military force’s unconditional backing. This 
acceptance of the security arrangement indicated Gemayel’s decision to abrogate the 
May 17th Agreement thereby, similarly convincing the Syrian, Druze and Shi’a 
leaders of his commitment to begin negotiations for national reconciliation. While the 
eight-point plan was insufficient to guarantee that the Lebanese militias in West 
Beirut would cease their aggression toward Gemayel, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-
Faisal, was now able to garner sufficient support from Syria for a temporary ceasefire. 
This also indicated to Washington, Paris, Rome and London that the MNFII’s 
mandate was no longer welcomed and was, in fact, extraneous to the Lebanese 
political conflict.108 Withdrawal was not only imminent but the start of the US 
withdrawal from Lebanon was planned for 19 February, with all USMNF troops fully 
redeployed on the MAU by 15 March 1984.109 
 France submitted draft resolution 16351 for the establishment of a UN Force 
in Lebanon on 17 February, recommending that another UN-led force be founded, 
separate from UNIFIL.110 The French tabled the resolution in the UN for foreign 
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forces’ withdrawal, including themselves, to be replaced by an internationally-
supported national reconciliation dialogue.  
 As UK Permanent Representative to the UN, John Thomson, claimed, it was 
clear that both French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson and President François 
Mitterrand wanted to remove France’s ‘military action’ from Lebanon by 27 February 
1984.111 Cheysson argued that neither UNIFIL nor the monitoring force should be 
seen to be ‘intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon.’112 The French consulted the 
Soviets over the proposed UN resolution. While the response was not wholly 
negative, the French were told that the Soviets ‘would have preferred the French not 
go ahead’ with the plan.113	  Rather, the USSR claimed that it would only consider the 
draft proposal in Lebanon if: first, the MNFII withdrew immediately and 
unconditionally; second, all MNFII Naval positions were removed out of Lebanon 
and Syria’s range; and, third, no MNFII participant country interfered in Lebanon 
from that moment onwards.114 While the British claimed adamantly to support a return 
to both UN monitoring and UNIFIL, the French grew suspicious.115 A France/Britain 
divide developed as Paris saw the other MNFII partners underestimating the 
situation’s gravity. The French wanted full British support for championing the UN 
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Security Council resolution.116 Conversely, the British perspective differed on this, 
and ‘the Prime Minister expressed concern about the impression which may have 
been created in public that France…was taking credit for the idea of a UN force to 
replace the MNF.’117 Nabih Berri met with Syrian-backed National Salvation Front 
leaders, Rashid Karami and Suleiman Franjiyeh, to discuss the situation and their 
attitudes toward the proposed new UN force. While these conversations were positive, 
all of the factional leaders demanded to know the details of the security agreement 
and the UN force’s working relationship.118 
 Meanwhile, the Italian MNFII was entirely concerned with its own position 
and its eagerness to withdraw, whether or not the UN force remained.119 The Italians 
began to withdraw their military equipment from Lebanon, while leaving their ground 
troops to protect personnel during their preparations for a comprehensive 20 February 
withdrawal.120  
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Abrogation and Withdrawal 
NSDD128 stated that ‘the situation in Lebanon is fluid’, directly referencing 
Gemayel’s decision to abrogate the May 17th Agreement.121 While the US felt unable 
to support this decision, the Reagan Administration’s permissiveness meant that the 
US wished to be party neither to the Lebanese government’s wider decisions nor the 
Syrian/Israeli conflict. The NSDD confirmed the US withdrawal’s completion on the 
same day. The US’ hands-off policy in effect meant that it would provide non-
interventionist support, as it had the period prior to the MNFI or MNFII interventions. 
That is, the US would continue to sell arms to the LAF and Gemayel’s government 
only if the government remained a strong US ally. The US would only consider 
support in the form of a possible humanitarian mission if a civilian massacre were to 
happen again. US military presence would only be provided to supply naval or air 
force support for an attack that endangered the US Embassy in Beirut or the US 
Ambassador’s residence. No commitment was made to any further military 
intervention.  
 While the red line of ‘large-scale killing of civilians’ was referenced, the 
guidance was that the US would need to consider any claim’s veracity and reserved 
the right to respond appropriately or not at all if it deemed it to be part of the internal 
factional conflict.122 NSDD128 stated that all US Military training teams (of which 
there were 77 by 1984) would remain in Lebanon even after MNFII redeployment. It 
also mandated that the US would allow a Syrian-controlled Lebanese government if 
Gemayel agreed to it on the basis of promoting internal reconciliation. However, the 
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caveat to this agreement was that the US would now hold Syria directly responsible 
for the Lebanese conflict’s outcome or future.  
 Clearly, the Reagan Administration conceded to a Syrian-dominated Lebanon, 
illustrating a major policy reversal compared with Shultz and Reagan’s aggressive 
anti-Syrian strategy that had characterized 1983.123 While it was unusual for this to be 
outlined in the same policy document that gave tacit support for Syria in Lebanon 
(given the US belief that Syria had colluded in the US Barracks Bombing in October 
1983) it importantly highlights the administration’s pragmatic approach in renewing 
its credibility worldwide and moving on from the failures of the US intervention in 
Lebanon.124 The NSDD concluded that the key US concern in the region was now re-
oriented toward the regional credibility of state-sponsored terrorism:  
In view of the serious developments in Lebanon and the perceived erosion of 
U.S. credibility… We have lost credibility in the wake of state sponsored 
terrorism and we need to review on an urgent basis steps we can take to 
effectively counter state sponsored terrorism and bolster confidence in US 
commitments to Israel and our Arab friends.125  
 
Israel’s response to the change in security was less supportive. Israeli Prime Minister, 
Yitzhak Shamir, stated that the signing of the eight-point plan and subsequent 
abrogation of the 17th Agreement was 'a blow to Lebanon's own sovereignty, to its 
people and to their chances of freeing themselves from the Syrian grip.'126 US support 
for the abrogation did not surprise Shamir who had been contacted in January and 
February by the US to gauge Israeli response. While Israel would not publicly support 
                                                
123 Memorandum from McFarlane to Shultz, [Draft NSDD on Lebanon], 24 February 1984, 
NSC Meeting February 24 1984 File, Box 91834, William Burns Series, RRPL, pp.2-3. 
124 ‘Adoptant un ton tres dur a l’egard du regime d’assad: Reagan- Damas veut que le Liban 
devienne la Syrie’, 4 February 1984, L’OLJ, p.1. 
125 ibid. p.3. 
126 David Shipler, ‘Israel asserts it won’t renounce security accord with Lebanese’, NYT , 17 
February, 1984, p.1. 
 304 
the abrogation, Shamir and Arens had predicted Gemayel would crumble to Syrian 
pressure as soon as he knew he had lost US support.127 
 As a result Shamir’s comments also implied that the Israelis would continue to 
occupy Lebanon, fearing that 'as long as there is no central Government capable of 
preserving South Lebanon and the security of northern Israel', the Israelis could not 
consider an unconditional withdrawal.128 The security plan offered no limited long-
term safety measures for the Israelis nor any proposition about the Palestinians and 
Shi’a factions’ demilitarization in southern Lebanon.  
 Intelligence, much of it garnered from Israel, continued to indicate that there 
was an overwhelming radical Palestinian build-up in Beirut by 20 February.129 While 
Gemayel’s gamble to support the security plan had led to more constructive 
discussions than the May 17th Agreement could ever have hoped for among the 
internal leaders and Syria, this excluded anti-Arafat Palestinian fighters, such as Al-
Jabhah al-Sha'biyyah li-Tahrir Filastin (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
- PFLP) and Al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiya Li-Tahrir Filastin (Democratic Front for the 
Freedom of Palestine - PDFLP), who returned from northern Lebanon. This renewed 
Palestinian presence unsettled the Israelis and Berri’s Harakat Amal, leading to 
‘orders to kill any Palestinians they [Amal] encountered.’130  
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 At a meeting with Cheysson, Shamir stated that, if Gemayel abrogated the 
May 17th Agreement following MNFII withdrawal, Israel would consider all of the 
conditions placed on them by the MNFII partners, specifically the US, obsolete and 
that Israel would ensure its security with military means.131 Curiously, Israel accepted 
Cheysson’s proposal for a UN force to replace the withdrawing MNFII and that 
UNIFIL (in which Israel had little trust) would be moved to supervise the green line 
which separated Christians and Muslims in Beirut. 132  However, Shamir was 
unyieldingly in considering UNIFIL’s control of any Beirut territory, instead wanting 
the IDF to continue controlling key military and strategic positions.133 
 The NSC meeting on 24 February 1984 outlined three final, critical issues that 
needed to be resolved. First, what position would the US take if Saudi Arabia adopted 
a more integrated approach with Asad in mediating the conflict? The NSC was 
concerned that security plan could lead to further Syrian political domination and 
ultimately control over Gemayel. Second, if Asad conditioned the plan’s success on 
the May 17th Agreement’s abrogation, would there be Christian support for Gemayel 
or the plan? It was clear throughout February that Gemayel was considering resigning 
in face of pressure from the Christian and Kata’eb leaders. The US needed to prepare 
a program in case the long-term pro-Western Lebanese President were removed from 
office and decide whether the US would continue the significant aid package to a 
new, pro-Syrian government. Finally, what would the US response be to the 
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possibility of a non-Christian, Muslim or Druze attack across the green line on 
Gemayel and the Christians in East Beirut?134  
 Ultimately, the US realized that the Lebanese situation was far too 
complicated to be able to predict the outcome in the coming months or years and the 
Reagan Administration decided that there needed to be significant distance to prevent 
the assumption of any further US obligations in Lebanon. Two days after the NSC 
meeting, on 26 February 1984, the US completed its withdrawal from Lebanon. 
Shultz summed up the US position on Lebanon, stating:  
I can't resist using that old image that the light you see at the end of the tunnel 
may be the train coming towards you. The situation in Lebanon is marked by 
violence, and is in no way satisfactory and is not at all what we have been 
trying to help bring about. It would be rash to say anything particularly 
optimistic at this point in time. The twists and turns in Lebanon are such that it 
is very difficult to predict. Just as you work on things and they seem about to 
jell, then your hopes are dashed… At this unpleasant juncture, something 
positive may develop, if people just get fed up enough with the conditions 
under which they exist.135 
 
It was hoped that the Lausanne conference on 18 March 1984 would bring about 
renewed optimism amongst the Lebanese factional leaders and lead to a long-term 
sustained ceasefire and the construction of a unity government based on the 16 
February security plan principles. However, as with previous talks between 
Lebanon’s ‘godfathers’, few tangible solutions were secured. Indeed, as with the May 
17th Agreement, the negotiations still failed to be truly representative of all of the 
factions involved in the Lebanese Civil War. Syria’s conspicuous presence was the 
key difference to the negotiations as many, if not most, of the leaders at Lausanne saw 
the Syrian solution as serving their most immediate needs. Khaddam stated at the 
talks: 
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I think the Syrians believe that if they can succeed in bringing order to 
Lebanon, the world will look to them to be kingmakers for the whole region. 
The Syrians have always wanted to have Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians 
under their wing. After this, they will be one-third there. 
 
While the Lausanne conference ultimately failed to bring about long-term peace, it 
somewhat put into perspective the Reagan Administration’s failed attempts to broker 
peace in Lebanon.136 The talks illustrated to the US that the factional Lebanese leaders 
were not ready for reconciliation, that many of the communities wished to make inter-
communal arrangements without foreign influence and that Syria was now firmly in 
control.137 
  
Conclusion 
By 23 March 1984, McFarlane and Rumsfeld’s public communications had met with 
moderate success in making US involvement in the Lebanese conflict appear a 
component of the Administration’s wider Middle Eastern tensions and the 
complicated Arab-Israeli conflict. However, within the White House, alongside 
growing concerns over the Iraq-Iran conflict and the war’s impact on US oil pipelines, 
the Lebanon intervention was seen as a failure of the Reagan Administration. As the 
US Administration had removed itself from direct military involvement in Lebanon, 
Gemayel had also illustrated his pragmatic approach to saving his presidency by 
moving closer to Asad.138 US attempts to curb Syrian influence in Lebanon had 
patently diminished and Gemayel was no longer under US pressure. The Reagan 
Administration moved its focus to supporting Jordanian King Hussein’s pursuit of a 
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wider Arab-Israeli peace settlement in order to provide a measure of credibility for 
US policy in the Middle East.139 It was no longer because the US believed that 
Lebanon was a mere extension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but rather that it was 
easier to remain ‘strong’ on the issue of a peace settlement that included Lebanon as 
only a small but volatile component.140  
 The MNFII’s final phase, which began on 27 December 1983 with the Reagan 
Administration’s internal discussions, was characterized by an inherent policy 
discontinuity and an unstoppable momentum toward complete withdrawal. While 
Shultz and Reagan belligerently resented being forced to withdraw US Marines from 
Lebanon, both the President and Secretary of State accepted this decision’s 
inevitability. Reagan, in particular, had borne the weight of the Long Commission 
Report’s condemnation of the operations and decisions made under the MNFII, which 
the US had almost autonomously led. Despite the reluctant acceptance that the MNFII 
would be disbanded, Reagan and Shultz wanted to prepare the political and military 
environment in order to minimize the damage done to the US’ image by withdrawing. 
It was an inescapable reality that the US would have to moderate its views on Syrian 
influence as Gemayel moved slowly toward Asad and the Saudi Arabian-proposed 
security initiative.  
 By February 1984, US decision-making lacked all of the assertiveness that it 
represented under the MNFI and the MNFII throughout 1983, due to the 
overwhelming war weariness and growing protests from the US public and 
congressional limitations, a combination that eventually led the Reagan 
Administration finally to recognize that the US’ military role in Lebanon and the 
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MNFII mission were both at an end. It was no longer seen as worth enduring future 
security threats against US Marines and personnel in Beirut once Shultz and Reagan 
realized that the situation was untenable. The Lebanese conflict had proven too 
complicated and dangerous for any future victories and the US now had to consider 
its credibility throughout the Middle East and internationally. The US Marines’ final 
withdrawal and the MNFII’s disbandment by the other MNFII partners drew to a 
close a questionable mission in international peacekeeping. 
 In Reagan’s candid, emotive hand-written note on 9 April 1984, he summed 
up the MNFII intervention in what he called ‘that troubled place’ where ‘centuries of 
hatred was too much for all of us.’141 
Put very simply we and our allies, the French, Italians and the British agreed 
to help maintain order and stability in Beirut while the new government 
established itself. We provided, in addition to the Marines, an army training 
unit to help Lebanon have a capable military force…It is almost impossible for 
us to imagine the savagery to which the people of Beirut had been subjected 
and what a change was made by our presence…The Lebanese government 
which would not exist had we not been there, cancelled the agreement with 
Israel under pressure from Syria. It is now meeting with and seeking a 
consensus with the dissident factions. We are willing to help diplomatically if 
we can but the purpose served by our military presence no longer exists…No, 
we didn’t reach our goal we sought in Lebanon but at least they are talking to 
each other for whatever reason it’s worth and even that would not be taking 
place if we hadn’t been there. Yes, our Marines are coming home—but only 
because they did all that could be done.142 
 
Finally, the Reagan Administration was forced to wonder whether the US had made 
any real difference in Lebanon’s political or military context through its intervention. 
The attempts to shape and structure Lebanon’s landscape throughout January and 
February 1984 merely proved that this was not so. Israel’s northern border’s security 
was still threatened, the factional violence between Lebanese religious groups 
                                                
141 Memorandum from White House Chief of Staff Jim Baker to Assistant to the President 
Dick Darman, [Ronald Reagan’s Handwritten Notes], 9 April 1984, Box 91834, Jim Baker 
Series, RRPL, p.1. 
142 ibid. pp.4-7. 
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continued and Syrian domination of Lebanon was inevitable. The MNFII arrived in 
Lebanon in September 1982, finding a volatile, complex context and left behind an 
equally divided one. 
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Conclusion 
 
On 1 September 1982, between two Multinational Force interventions in Lebanon 
(MNFI & MNFII), President Ronald Reagan declared to the US public his 
administration’s commitments to the Middle East peace process. In announcing the 
unwavering obligation he felt toward Lebanon, the US president quoted Romans 
14:19, stating that he would ‘follow after the things which make for peace’;1 yet 
seeking peace in Lebanon was a pledge that would thrust Reagan into the most 
difficult days of his presidency.2  
This thesis has advanced the existing, limited histories surrounding the US-led 
MNF and the policies surrounding the force’s operations in Lebanon by illustrating 
how the executive White House decision-makers failed to understand the complicated 
Lebanese context. As a result, the Reagan Administration never correctly engaged 
with the internal Lebanese conflict, rather seeing it as a by-product of the regional 
Arab-Israeli tensions. This thesis maintains that the MNF was ill-suited for Lebanon’s 
volatile civil war, where the internal sectarian violence was supported by regional 
interests and agendas. The Lebanese Civil War was, from the beginning, an 
unpredictable conflict and US intervention demonstrated equal measures of 
uncertainty. Had Reagan and Secretary of State, George Shultz, foreseen the 
mission’s humiliating demise, these two leading decision-makers would never have 
                                                
1 Reagan Speech, [Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle 
East], 1 September 1982, Public Papers, Online: 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/90182d.htm, Accessed 20 March 2014. 
2 Michael David Woodward, ‘Ronald Reagan: A Biography’, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 
2012), p.140. 
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established the MNF.  The self-styled libertarian socialist, Noam Chomsky, made a 
speech in Beirut in 2010 about US Foreign Policy in the Middle East. He stated: 
Now when the United States vetoes a resolution, it's a double veto. First of all, 
it doesn't happen, and secondly, it's vetoed from history… That's one of the 
prerogatives of an imperial power. You can control history as long as you 
have a submissive intellectual class, which the West does have.  
 
Extraordinarily, Chomsky’s critique of US decision making in the Middle East failed 
to even make a passing mention of the MNF or US intervention in Lebanon. 
Seemingly this statement holds true if even the greatest critics of US policy has fallen 
victim to forgetting the MNF’s impact in Lebanon. Could this mean that one of the 
Reagan Administration’s most significant foreign policy blunders has also been 
vetoed from Chomsky’s history? Chomsky continued:  
You see it every day in the newspapers. The United States is an honest broker 
and neutral arbiter trying to bring together two sides which are irrational and 
violent. They won't agree and the United States is trying to settle the conflict 
between them.  
 
Indeed, if the Lebanon intervention has taught the world anything, it is that this image 
must be created with caution. The US entered a highly volatile conflict and in its 
ambiguity and naivety the intervention exacerbated the instability. Therefore why did 
Reagan and Shultz risk US casualties for Lebanon? If Reagan or Shultz had foreseen 
the negative impact that the intervention would have on the Administration, it would 
not have risked US domestic and Congressional disapproval as it did.  
 To this, and given that Lebanon was not of vast strategic importance as a US 
ally, the first research question asked why Reagan risked a long-term, high casualty 
conflict. The Vietnam War legacy had impeded the US President’s sense of absolute 
power through the obligatory congressional approval process under the War Powers 
Act. Vietnam also warned any subsequent presidents that, if they did launch a military 
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intervention, there was a significant risk of becoming entangled in a protracted and 
possibly humiliating war. Lebanon in the 1980s was one of the most, if not the most, 
volatile and complicated contexts, which offered absolutely no guarantee of success 
to any international mission, peacekeeping or otherwise. Therefore, why did Reagan 
seek to prove himself and the US administration in Lebanon? The answer to this is 
twofold. First, Reagan wanted to leave his indelible mark on the Arab-Israeli peace 
process, just as his predecessor, President Jimmy Carter, had done with regard to the 
Israeli-Egyptian peace process in 1979. The Arab-Israeli conflict provides a rite of 
passage for every US President in making progress on the Middle East’s regional 
issues. While Carter had pursued a non-interventionist, diplomatic policy in bringing 
Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin and Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat to the 
negotiation table, this diplomacy was incongruous with Reagan and his 
administration’s policy style. Rather, direct confrontation and a neoconservative view 
of foreign policy, through the abundant use of military force, characterized the 
Reagan years. Second, Carter’s legacy and its influence on the Reagan Administration 
should not be overlooked. The Camp David Accords’ successful completion and the 
Multinational Force and Observers’ (MFO) subsequent establishment during 
Reagan’s first months as president set a high moral precedent in respect to US-Middle 
East policy, one which Reagan needed to work hard to achieve. Reagan thought that if 
Israel and Egypt could reach a peace negotiation under Carter, so too could he broker 
peace with Israel’s other Arab neighbors, Syria, Lebanon and, more importantly, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).  
 The second research question focused on the primary drivers of White House 
decision-making and queried whether or not the public justifications of the MNF’s 
deployment accorded with the Reagan Administration’s underlying motivations. This 
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thesis argues that Reagan did not initially see Lebanon as a foreign policy frontline 
and therefore further questions why the US stayed in Lebanon as long as it did, even 
when the results proved catastrophic. To answer this, it is important to divide the 
deployment into the two policy periods, defined by the MNFI and MNFII.  
 The MNFI was mandated to oversee Yasir Arafat and the PLO’s safe removal 
from Lebanon, which had been agreed under US Envoy Philip Habib’s ceasefire 
mediation in August, 1982. This policy’s key driver was exclusively based around 
making headway on the Israeli-PLO relationship. The MNFI was a restricted 
peacekeeping and monitoring force with a defined purpose and a limited deployment 
strategy and period. With the seemingly successful MNFI mission, Reagan was self-
congratulatory about his administration’s attempts to secure sustainable measures 
regarding the peace process. Reagan saw the successful removal of the PLO from 
Beirut as an important step toward broader Arab-Israeli peace talks.  
 The MNFII was far more complicated. Firstly, the Sabra and Shatila massacre 
of the Palestinians and the assassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese President-elect, 
Bachir Gemayel, threatened not only the possibility of peace talks regionally but also 
the Reagan Administration’s credibility as the leading peacemaker globally. If the 
events from 14-18 September 1982 escalated the Lebanese conflict and further ignited 
an Israeli-Syrian confrontation, then all of the MNFI’s purported successes would be 
discredited. Reagan felt, ‘there is no alternative to their [US Marines] returning to 
Lebanon.’3 The policy driver was therefore not about Lebanon’s stability but what the 
opportunity costs were if Reagan either failed to intervene or attempted to withdraw. 
                                                
3 [Address to the Nation Announcing the Formation of the New Multinational Force in 
Lebanon], 20 September  1982, Public Papers, Online: 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/92082f.htm, Accessed 20 April, 2014. 
 315 
 Second, the MNFII’s mandate was ambiguously created to provide the US 
with greater flexibility with regard to time and strategy compared with the exclusive 
monitoring and mediation role by which a traditional peacekeeping force is limited. 
The numerous incremental policy addenda were driven by the need to protect US 
credibility in the face of growing opposition and the MNFII’s failure to control any 
part of the conflict. Credibility was an essential part of this because Lebanon 
represented a highly publicized, visible conflict in which US intervention was being 
judged and challenged by the international community. Reagan and Shultz, as the 
architects of US policy in Lebanon, continually entangled themselves and the 
administration’s credibility in the conflict, both militarily and diplomatically. This 
fused the two key decision-makers to the integrity of the US mission and also to the 
successful fulfilment of its objectives. Failing on one policy front would lead to a 
failure across other areas, both regionally and internationally.  
 The third research question asked whether or not the use of military force led 
to the failure of the MNFII and the Reagan Administration’s policies in Lebanon.  
This thesis concluded that the MNFII mandate was purposefully established in respect 
to its ambiguity to allow the US Administration flexibility regarding the methods for 
solving the Lebanese crisis. While Washington continued to justify the incremental 
escalations and adjustments to the USMNF’s military strategy on the grounds that US 
troops needed to respond proportionately to the threat that they encountered, this 
policy bonded the US to Lebanon. The constant military escalations that characterized 
US policy in Lebanon in 1983 allowed the Reagan Administration to engage more 
directly in ‘aggressive self-defense’, ‘vigorous self-defense’ and ‘somewhat leaning 
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forward.’4 Driven by the need to implement the MNFII’s initial mandate, and the 
broader US desire to demonstrate its commitment to Arab-Israeli peace, the US 
military strategy escalated beyond any peacekeeping or peacemaking mission. The 
ultimate consequence of this was that the USMNF transformed itself into an active 
participant in the Lebanese Civil War. No longer was political or military neutrality 
the foundation of US policy but, rather, the USMNF and US military took aim at the 
Syrian Armed Forces (SAF) and Lebanese Shi’a groups that Washington linked to 
both Syria and Iran. The research demonstrated that the use of military force in 
Lebanon was a clumsy decision that invariably led to a protracted mission that 
aggravated internal tensions within the country, arguing that the Reagan 
Administration failed to understand adequately the Lebanese Civil War’s internal 
sectarian dynamics or the role that Lebanon’s unique confessional system played in 
the conflict’s continuation. That is, the MNFII’s failure and subsequent withdrawal in 
February 1984 was less due to the force’s daily operational ability than the fact that 
the broader military strategy failed to recognise the Lebanese system’s internal 
elements.  
 The final catalyst that led to US withdrawal from Lebanon was the 23 
October, 1983 Marine Barracks bombing - an attack that was an inevitable outcome 
of Washington’s aggressive interventionist policy. Even though Reagan symbolically 
took the blame for the US casualties in Lebanon on 27 October, 1983, the Department 
of Defense Report on Lebanon ultimately found the US Commander in Chief, 
European Command, General Kelley, responsible for a failure to implement an 
accurate chain of command and for not recognizing the emergent threat of anti-US 
                                                
4 Cable from Shultz to Rumsfeld, [Short term strategy for Lebanon], 3:21pm, 28 December 
1983, Cable #366307, Rumsfeld Middle East Mission Vol.1 File, Box 45, p.4 & [NSDD 103 
Strategy for Lebanon], 10 September 1983, NSDD103 File, Box 91291, Executive Secretariat 
Records: NSC Country Series, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRPL), p.1. 
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‘terrorist’ attacks. This thesis contends that it was far from being the commander’s 
fault alone. There should have been a continued awareness of the civil war’s internal 
and volatile dynamics, such that any decision made in Washington took into account 
the possible consequences of military escalations and bias against certain actors or 
parties in Lebanon. Furthermore, as had occurred during the final years of Carter’s 
presidency, the Reagan Administration failed to accurately gauge the threat coming 
from the growing anti-American Islamic movement sponsored by Iran. Instead, the 
Reagan Administration constructed aggressive military policies without taking any 
measures to ascertain if these were, in fact, making the Lebanese situation or the anti-
American context more stable or merely aggravating matters, until it was too late. 
 As this thesis is ultimately a critique of the Reagan Administration’s executive 
level decision-making in Lebanon and the MNF’s subsequent establishment, it is 
important to consider the commonly-employed judgment criteria. Most of the key 
academic works relating directly to the MNF, regard the force as an abject failure for 
US policy because critics see the Reagan Administration’s attempts in Lebanon as 
careless, ambiguous and ignorant.5 This thesis does not entirely disagree with these 
assumptions but does illustrate the need to qualify such broad generalizations. If, for 
example, the MNFII’s initial mandate in September, 1982 was compared to the 
outcomes that the force had produced by February 1984, then this would most 
certainly lead to a broad judgment of failure.  
 However, because the two forces’ operational strategy underwent numerous 
phases, considerable policy addenda and constant changes, the MNFI and MNFII 
                                                
5 Richard Nelson, ‘The Multinational Force in Beirut’, Augustus Norton, ‘The Demise of the 
MNF’, Geoffrey Kemp, ‘The American Peacekeeping Role in Lebanon’, in Anthony 
McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek, The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984, (Miami: 
Florida International University Press, 1991).& Ramesh Thakur, ‘International Peacekeeping 
in Lebanon: United Nations Authority and Multinational Force’, (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1987), pp.11-121. 
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must be assessed in more detail. For example, the MNFI’s establishment led, in 
simple terms, to significant progress on the Israeli-PLO frontline. The following 
MNFII Phase One set out to achieve peacemaking objectives with merely the threat 
of military retaliation and thereby ended up becoming a helpless interposition force 
between the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and SAF. The judgment of Phase Two 
should be based on different grounds; namely, the failure of Shultz’ policy duality in 
the use of force while trying diplomatically to negotiate the May 17th Agreement. 
Phase Three set out pre-emptively to target Syrian positions and justify a US 
offensive or ‘aggressive self-defense’ mission. From the USMNF commander’s 
perspective, this escalation was successful, yet whether or not it served US interests is 
another matter entirely. The MNFII and US’s failure was that they were drawn into 
the Lebanese conflict too easily.  
 It is also important to note the differences between theory and practice 
between legislative and executive decision making in the US during Reagan’s years in 
office. Reagan was often comically portrayed as belligerent cowboy who preferred 
confrontation over diplomacy but this image is oversimplified and does not take into 
account the influence of the Shultz who played the key role in shaping US foreign 
policy, particularly in regards to the Middle East. The Carter Administration’s 
seemingly soft-handed approach to the Iranian hostage crisis left Carter looking 
politically impotent and internationally weak. Reagan was determined that his 
Presidency would not to be plagued by the image of hesitance but rather one of 
international power and prestige. Shultz, therefore, was Reagan’s ideal deputy. Not 
only was he the leading architect in the use of military force but also resolute in his 
confrontation with the Administration’s opposition internally and internationally. 
Shultz, far more than Haig, shaped and guided Reagan’s policy decision making so 
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much so that he ultimately alienated Secretary of Defense Weinberger from the 
President’s inner circle and persuaded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to continue the 
military escalations in Lebanon against Weinberger’s advice. This is important when 
examining the Lebanese case study through a bureaucratic approach as Shultz’s 
internal manipulation of the executive decision makers, and Reagan specifically, not 
only led to the US pursuing a disproportionately aggressive military policy in 
Lebanon but also pushed the Reagan Administration back to a pro-Israeli Middle East 
policy. 
Overall, the US’ initial objectives to reassert itself as the leading peacemaker 
in the Middle East could have been achieved if the policy-makers had foreseen the 
events of the second half of 1983 and withdrawn earlier. Reagan and Shultz should 
have learned this lesson from President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Operation Blue Bat. 
Had the US accepted that Syria would not readily withdraw from Lebanon, and then 
altered their objectives accordingly, they could have withdrawn before the 23 
October, 1983’s tragic events, perhaps with the same glory that the Reagan 
Administration experienced following the MNFI’s withdrawal. Rather, the situation 
led to a short-sighted policy that was aggressive and reactionary rather than aimed at 
creating a sustainable peace.  
 The conceptual implications of this short-sightedness directly contributed to 
the incremental decision-making and prospect theory approaches rather than simply 
applying a neo-conservative theoretical model that is often attributed to the Reagan 
Administration’s international foreign policy. This research recognizes that Lebanon, 
as a policy context, was neither about Reagan’s international democratic revolution, 
nor from the onset, particularly linked to a confrontation with the Soviets, rather, US 
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foreign policy in Lebanon evolved as a cumulative program of smaller, incremental 
policy phases and addenda.  
 An examination of US-Lebanese relations in the early 1980s was undertaken, 
with the research arguing that, while Lebanon was initially seen by Washington as a 
an extension of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Lebanese intervention as a 
policy in itself became a thorn in the side for the Reagan Administration. On 
becoming president, Reagan inherited an already present and worsening context in 
Lebanon. In spite of the events of 1981, including the Battle of Zahleh and the Israeli-
PLO conflict in Southern Lebanon, there had been no determination for Reagan to 
enter the civil war. This thesis argues that Reagan did not see Lebanon, in itself, as a 
leading policy concern until the Israeli invasion under Operation Peace for Galilee. 
Lebanon was a policy afterthought, which only presented itself to the Reagan 
Administration because of the Israeli invasion. The administration fundamentally saw 
Lebanon as a sandpit in the Arab-Israeli playground. The Israeli operation presented a 
potential opportunity to create a path for the Reagan Administration to become more 
actively involved in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Reagan Plan, which was 
announced on 1 September 1982, explains much of the US’ policy vision in Lebanon 
in terms of both the US’ intervention under the MNFI and the subsequent MNFII. 
So, in May I called for specific measures and a timetable for consultations 
with the Governments of Egypt and Israel on the next steps in the peace 
process. However, before this effort could be launched, the conflict in 
Lebanon pre-empted our efforts.6 
 
Nowhere in the Reagan Plan did the US President discuss the Lebanese conflict as an 
entity in itself which, even though aggravated by the regional proxy wars, was also 
driven by internal sectarian divisions that were independent of the wider Arab-Israeli 
                                                
6 [Address to the Nation on United States Policy for Peace in the Middle East]. 
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issues. As the US pursued this broader opportunism, Lebanon evolved into the policy 
frontline for US foreign policy regionally.  
 With this opportunism came the undeniable threat that the unstable, uncertain 
Lebanese context might not be the best place to base the Administration’s Middle 
East foreign policy goals. The impact of ignoring the internal dynamics would 
ultimately realize this threat, thereby greatly impairing the administration’s attempts 
at peace. The divisive consociational and sectarian political context would lead to the 
US becoming entangled in the domestic Lebanese politics and the Christian Lebanese 
President Amin Gemayel’s political survival. Instead of exclusively focussing on the 
foreign forces’ removal as a measure for assisting Lebanon’s sovereignty, the policy 
ultimately became about reducing Syrian domination and removing the justifications 
for radical Arab hatred of Israel that the IDF presence legitimized. Upholding 
Lebanese sovereignty fundamentally meant unwavering US support for Gemayel, 
even after the Lebanese president revealed his inability to unify the Lebanese 
factional leaders or resist the regional interference.  
 Reagan and Shultz had intentionally ignored the UN framework and the 
presence of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as they launched their 
military ‘peacemaking’ intervention force. This research on the MNF is an important 
part of the broader UN histories as Lebanon represented a conflict with an existing 
UN operational force attempting to mediate a peace that was directly undermined by a 
US-led military intervention. The MNFII’s deployment fundamentally undermined 
UNIFIL which Reagan believed was patently unable to convince Israel to withdraw.  
While the Reagan Administration argued that the Soviets would not pursue a 
UN solution to the conflict, it was Reagan and Shultz who had overlooked this option 
before it had even been proposed. Israel felt a deep mistrust toward the UN, especially 
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since the 1978 Operation Litani and the numerous UN Security Council Resolutions 
that reprimanded Israel’s interference and incursions in Lebanon. Begin and Sharon 
argued that UNIFIL was allowing the PLO to continue rearming and preventing the 
IDF from removing the rockets that the Palestinians had positioned in South Lebanon. 
While UNIFIL had been President Carter’s contribution to peace in Lebanon, Reagan 
and Shultz were committed to a non-UN solution, not because they succumbed to 
Israeli or Soviet pressure but rather to maximize the Reagan Administration’s 
opportunity as the more effective, primary international peacemaker. In order to 
overcome the traditional peacekeeping operational limitations and launch the MNF, 
Reagan had to argue that UNIFL was impotent. This ultimately weakened the UN 
approach that tried to reach an international consensus in the conflict.  
 While acknowledging the broad ideological links that must be taken into 
account during the Cold War, this thesis tempers the degree to which this narrative is 
projected onto US decisions to intervene in Lebanon. This thesis shows that there 
were no tangible concerns over the threat of superpower confrontation in Lebanon. 
Although Syria represented the strongest Soviet ally in the region, SAF presence in 
Lebanon was a concern for the US less because it was a Soviet client than the threat 
that Syrian domination posed to Israel and the pro-American Lebanese government. 
Chapters Six and Seven illustrated that the initial, limited fears of Moscow’s support 
for Syria subsided when the US realized that even its superpower opponent had little 
control over Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad’s strategy in Lebanon. Once this had been 
recognized, the Soviet dynamic diminished and the US adopted a more resigned 
policy of accepting Syrian domination. This supports both Westad and Khalidi’s 
arguments that, by the 1980s, drawing crude ideological links between US-Soviet 
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actions and conflicts in the ‘Third World’ is inaccurate.7 This research illustrated that 
there was a Soviet component to the Lebanese conflict, defined by the military 
support for Syria, but that this, in itself, would never have represented a primary 
reason for US intervention.  
 Undeniably, the Lebanese intervention occurred during the Cold War and 
during a particularly violent phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both have created 
global policy frontlines for the US since the 1950s. However this thesis has clearly 
argued that Lebanon was not a strategic Cold War conflict. Given the US did play a 
role in worsening the tensions in Lebanon it should be questioned whether Lebanon 
was an anomaly in US policy or whether there is much to be garnered from using 
Lebanon as a lens to reexamine key historical events such as the Cold War, Arab 
Israeli conflict and particularly US influence internationally. To this, Hadar correctly 
argues that ‘the boundaries between local, national, regional and international issues 
are blurred’ particularly in a traditional Cold War reading of US policy in the Middle 
East.8 Because of the regional and sectarian complexities that characterised Lebanon 
in the 1970s and 1980s forcing a traditional ‘Third World’ Cold War reading of the 
context does not comprehensively outline the regional agendas that led to the US 
decision to intervene in Lebanon. This thesis adds to the caution of the emerging 
revisionist narratives argued by New Cold War historians such as Khalidi and 
Westad.9 While Westad does not discuss the Lebanon case study specifically, this 
                                                
7 Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our 
Time’, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.331-363 & Rashid Khalidi, 
‘Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East’, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2009), pp.145-150. 
8 Leon Hadar, ‘Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East’, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 
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time’, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.331-363; Rashid Khalidi, ‘Sowing 
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thesis supports his decentralization and regionalization of the Cold War methodology. 
This research argues that US foreign policy in Lebanon was incrementally shaped 
around the regional and later, as the US became tied to the success of Gemayel and 
the MNF’s unrealistic goals, the local Lebanese context. The archival analysis proves 
that rather than simply being driven by confrontation with the Soviets in the Middle 
East, US policy in Lebanon was reactionary. This therefore provides a case study in 
the ways that other conflicts or engagements in the Middle East during Cold War 
should also be reexamined.  
 The research offers a unique primary archival study of US decision-making in 
Lebanon. A number of limitations must be noted. Given the lack of access to French, 
Italian and Arabic archival material, the thesis cannot claim to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of all of the MNF partners’ policies in Lebanon. Also, unlike 
many other Lebanese Civil War narratives, this thesis does not attempt to cover 
comprehensively Lebanon’s political and military landscape’s complex inter-
communal or internal sectarian dynamics.  
However, the broad academic lessons from Lebanon are two fold. First, and 
most significantly, the Lebanon case study proves that US policy in the Middle East 
must be brought into the regional historical narratives of the region and not simply as 
a part of the often-argued pursuit for US global hegemony. The US intervention in 
Lebanon tempers the traditional Cold War analysis associated with the Reagan 
Administration. Second, the intervention in Lebanon demonstrates that the US’ use of 
military force in the Middle East is not only an inefficient way of engaging with the 
inherent sectarian or regional complexities - that ultimately tied the US into the local 
conflict - but also that military policy is not always a frontline strategy. Academic 
opponents to US policy in the Middle East often conspiratorially argue that 
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Washington actively and militarily intervenes in the region to achieve broad 
ideological or resource goals. The incremental and reactionary escalations that 
occurred in Lebanon under the MNF demonstrate that there is not always a grand 
strategy in the use of force and that the strategic objectives of such military missions 
can be dangerously ambiguous, where the results are a surprise to even the highest 
level decision makers. 
 Though difficult to prove, Pintak directly links US policy in Lebanon in the 
1980s to the growth of the anti-Western jihad movement throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, both in the Levant and internationally. This thesis does not project such 
responsibility onto the Reagan Administration or MNF’s failings in Lebanon but 
does, however, draw links between Reagan and Shultz’s military policies and the 
targeting of US troops by radical Lebanese or regional groups positioned in Lebanon 
from 1983-1984. 10 As Reagan and Shultz moved forward in developing the 
interventionist policy, they did so without considering how blundering into a political 
landscape as fragile as that of Lebanon could lead to a direct US confrontation. 
However it is true that the contemporary US interventions and policy in the Middle 
East suggest that the practical lessons were not learnt from Lebanon. The more recent 
US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been a greater learning curve for the 
US in relation to the Middle East than Lebanon served.  
 While critics of the MNF abound, they fail to argue whether or not another 
intervention force could have engaged with the divisive context any more 
effectively.11 Certainly, UNIFIL had suffered from the same challenges, especially 
                                                
10 Lawrence Pintak, ‘Seeds of Hate: How America’s Flawed Middle East Policy Ignited the 
Jihad’, (London: Pluto Press, 2003), pp.196-206. 
11 Richard Nelson, ‘The Multinational Force in Beirut’, Augustus Norton, ‘The Demise of the 
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McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek, The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984, (Miami: 
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regarding the decisions about how to engage the various internal and regional actors 
without the use of force. This reflection is not made as a way of justifying the Reagan 
Administration’s policy under the MNF, especially given that this thesis argues that 
little progress had been made in Lebanon when the US withdrew from an equally 
violent context in 1984. Rather, this thesis argues that a more detailed framework is 
required to analyze the MNF’s peaks and troughs in the same way as the many 
Lebanese Civil War narratives divide the internal Lebanese and regional Arab and 
Israeli actors’ phases, battles and policies. In a post 9/11, Arab Spring context, the 
findings of this thesis resonate with the dialogues of whether or not the international 
community, led by the US, should intervene in politically-divided, unpredictable 
contexts.  
This research challenges the degree to which such policies would be morally 
right for either the nation in which the intervention is made or the ‘peacekeepers’ who 
intervene. Beyond the MNF, this thesis challenges whether ‘peacemaking’ is a viable 
proposition in a highly divided state. If so, it must further be asked whether the use of 
a military intervention is effective in delivering sustainable peace in the Middle East. 
As the Reagan Administration’s forays into Lebanon and the MNF’s use of military 
force in peacekeeping demonstrated, the inherent dangers present in such military 
interventions would intimate that it is not. 
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